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Abstract 
In sixteenth and seventeenth century England slander was increasingly understood as a 
distempering force that had the potential to spread from a subject’s body to the body politic, a 
fear that pervaded legal, religious, and medical discourses. My dissertation—the first sustained 
study of slander’s real and perceived ability to affect both individual and social bodies—
examines the internal responses incited by slander and their effects on community bonds. 
Because slander was conceived as a domestic threat undermining unity at all levels of society in 
early modern England, writing of the period relies on metaphor to explain this verbal ill’s genesis 
and to illustrate its effects on individual and figurative bodies, including its ability to incite 
anger, wound, or kill. As my title suggests, slanderous speech could emerge from any social 
rank; commoners (the “feet” of the social body) and those of gentle status could and did use the 
language of critique (their “mouths”) to identify and attempt to ameliorate the ills of the body 
politic, even as the monarch and others in authority countered such charges by labeling them 
sedition. 
Each chapter of my project places literary texts from the period roughly spanning the 
1560s to the 1630s alongside little-studied treatises about slander and sins of the tongue, all of 
which I consider within the developing legal framework of slander law. The fear that slander 
could spread from an offender’s body to the kingdom is newly evident in the sedition statute of 
1554, which decreed slander against the monarch a criminal offense punishable by public 
mutilation, and called for convicted seditionists to be punished at the market of the town where 
the slander was first voiced. Literary critics have focused on period authors’ demonization of 
slander, its relation to gender, and its depiction in drama. “Do Feet Have Mouths,” in contrast, 
cuts across a variety of media and several genres, engaging and extending recent scholarship in 
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literature and the law, the history of slander, and the history of the senses. Furthering Lindsey 
Kaplan’s arguments concerning slander’s unstable nature, I argue that this volatility allowed it to 
be put to many uses, from policing the behavior of others to defining exclusive communities. 
Combining the approaches of historians such as R.H. Helmholz who have delineated the 
development of slander law, and cultural historians, particularly Gail Kern Paster, who have 
illustrated how the early modern body was conceived as a vulnerable, almost porous entity, I 
demonstrate how conceptions of slander developed from a spiritual sin under the purview of 
church courts to a dangerous and potentially criminal threat against a person’s body, livelihood, 
and society itself. 
Chapter One investigates three Tudor case studies that collectively exhibit slander’s 
dangerous nature and the body of law that emerged to contain threat. This chapter introduces a 
central claim: in the cultural history of slander, social status plays a determinative and often 
overlooked role. I examine how legal punishments were influenced by the social status of 
convicted slanderers as well as numerous, unpredictable factors including the socio-political 
climate. The first two case studies, John Bale’s King Johan (circa 1538, revised post 1558) and 
John Stubbs’s The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf (1579), concentrate on a particular type of 
slander, religiously motivated sedition. Commoners used religion to define sedition as 
anything— including a monarch’s marriage—opposed to individual religious belief. The 
community’s sundry responses to Stubbs’s text and eventual punishment emphasize the 
draconian nature of the era’s slander laws, partly shaped by social status which resulted in the 
removal of Stubbs’s offending hand. The final case study, the 1590 infanticide rumors alleged 
against Queen Elizabeth, underscores the importance of the socio-political climate when 
addressing slander.  
		 iv	
Chapter Two turns to the body and focuses on the surprising and often conflicting range 
of emotions that slander could elicit from commoners and monarchs alike. Shakespeare’s 
Measure for Measure (1603-04) depicts a range of corporeal responses to slander, many of them 
organized through the play’s neglected heart and tongue imagery. In his capacity as ruler of 
Vienna, the Duke’s fear of and attempt to eradicate slander portrays the impossibility of 
exorcising this threat, a fantasy that could only occur if the government routinely employed 
public mutilation. My examination of “The Five Senses” (1621-23), a widely circulated 
manuscript libel that brazenly depicted James I’s body as dangerously open to outside influences, 
demonstrates an unexpected reply to slander: mercy. The King chose not to interpret this libel as 
slander, instead demonstrating his authority by merely quipping that the author “wished good 
things for him.” In contrast, John Rous, the man who preserved this forbidden libel and recorded 
James’s purported reply, showed palpable anxiety because of the risk he ran by recording the 
poem. I contend that these individuals’ contrasting responses exhibit the conflicted feelings that 
early modern slander provoked. 
My scrutiny of Measure for Measure’s heart and tongue imagery in Chapter Two 
introduced the prevalence of metaphor when discussing slander’s effects upon individual and 
social bodies. Chapter Three furthers this analysis by focusing on the popular metaphorical 
depiction of slander as a poison or plague that distempers the individual and the metaphorical 
body. The effects of this deadly poison are portrayed in several allegorical episodes of Book II of 
Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queen (1596). The House of Alma, a house of temperance shaped 
as a human figure, is assaulted by an assortment of incorporeal forces including slander, an 
episode that showcases the body’s vulnerability to outside influence. This event moreover 
prepares the way for the appearance of the Blatant Beast, slander made flesh, in the second half 
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of the work. I argue that Spenser’s suggestion that patience is the tempered body’s defense 
against slander resembles the course of action preferred by the court system, which moved 
notoriously slowly in the hopes of allowing the individuals involved in a slander litigation case 
time to repair their fractured relationships.  
Chapter Four develops the notion of slander as poison by investigating what happens 
when it is the monarch who has become possessed by slander and the resulting harm this causes 
to familial and social bonds and the nation itself. Focusing on The Winter’s Tale (1610-11), I use 
the concept that slander is responsible for a triple homicide, murdering the speaker and hearer of 
the slander as well as the individual slandered, to generate an innovative reading of the play, one 
that better explains the seemingly arbitrary deaths of Hermione, Mamillius, and Antigonus. I 
additionally contend that the play’s surprisingly redemptive conclusion shares context with 
slander suits filed in the ecclesiastical courts. Church courts relied on public penance to repair 
the damage caused to a slander victim’s reputation. My dissertation thus concludes by focusing 
on how individuals and the larger community can move beyond slander and begin to heal.  
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Introduction: “It Started with a Whisper”: The Metaphoricity of Slander 
 
At the pivotal moment in Ben Jonson’s The Masque of Queens (1609), a loud sound is 
heard and the disorderly antimasquers vanish, replaced by the House of Fame and the twelve 
masquing queens.  
In the heat of their Dance, on the sudden, was heard a sound of loud Musick, as if 
many Instruments had made one blast; with which not only the Haggs themselves, 
but the Hell, into which they ran, quite vanished, and the whole face of the Scene 
altered, scare suffering the memory of such a thing. 
 
Among the vanquished foes, the hags sent back to hell include “Slander” who is characterized by 
an “oblique look” and is accompanied on “her subtle Side” by “black-mouth’d Execration,” as 
well as: “Two-faced Falsehood,” “Murmur, with the Cheeks deep hung,” and “Malice, 
whetting…her forked Tongue.” These assorted women had originally gathered in order to “shew 
our selves truly Envious, and let rise / Our wonted Rages,” thus ensuring that Justice cannot 
return to earth to usher in a new golden age.1 Although the anti-masquers are depicted as 
witches—they cast several ineffectual charms and spells—none of them are associated with 
classical witches or sorceresses, such as Hecate or Circe. Instead, they are each given allegorical 
names linking them with twelve vices, beginning with Ignorance and culminating in Mischief. 
Strikingly, several of these vices are verbal vices, speech acts that create and exacerbate 
dissension among a community, a notion mirrored by the anti-masquers’ discordant music and 
indecorous, disorganized dancing.  
In a wish-fulfillment moment typical of early modern masques, these monstrous women 
and the social ills they represent are easily repelled, allowing the singing and dancing of the 
																																																								
1 All quotations from Ben Jonson’s The Masque of Queens are from “The Holloway Pages: Ben Jonson: Works 
(1692 Folio): The Masque of Queens.” ed. Clark J. Holloway (2003). 
[http://www.hollowaypages.com/jonson1692fame.htm, accessed 13, April 2002]. 
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masque proper, representative of a harmonious body politic, to commence. The anti-masquers 
are banished through the mere presence of good Fame, who “hoorl’d / All Rumors and Reports, 
or true, or vain.”2 Fame eradicates the allegorized vices as well as their words. “True or vain” 
“rumors and reports” have the power to spark dissension and encourage disagreements that can 
fester long after the words themselves have been spoken. For this reason, all reports and the 
potential influence they hold must also be accounted for if harmony is to be established. Fame 
explains that she, together with the twelve historical and mythological queens that accompany 
her, have been drawn to England “to you, most Royal, and most Happy King, / Of whom, 
Fame’s house, in every part, doth ring / For every virtue.”3 The personal virtue and splendor of 
King James I and VI calls these remarkable figures to England. It is ultimately his mere presence 
that allows for the exorcising of Slander and her companion vices. This metaphorical banishment 
and purging of the vices’ effects may represent a fantasy, yet there is a public-relations value in 
its staging. James is presented as a monarch whose resplendent virtue establishes true harmony, a 
harmony that extends beyond the absence of warfare to include the exiling of all forms of vice 
and discord. That such peace can only exist once these dissonant forces are banished intimates 
the severity of the threat that they were seen to pose.  
The genealogy that Jonson briefly sketches between the vices, specifically, Slander’s 
relationship to Ignorance and its connection to envy, suggests some of the ways that calumny 
was conceived of at the time, including potential motivating factors. Slander is personified twice 
more in early modern drama, all three times appearing in a Jonson masque, including Hymenaei 
(1606), The Masque of Queens (1609), and The Golden Age Restored (1616).4 Jonson was 
																																																								
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Berger et al.’s An Index of Characters and Darryll Grantley’s English Dramatic Interludes, 1300-1580: A 
Reference Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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famously brought before the Privy Council for his Sejanus, His Fall (1603). Such an experience 
undoubtedly contributed to Jonson’s fear of defamation, yet one must wonder why he felt the 
need to stage the conquering of slander on three separate occasions. This repetition intimates this 
danger’s ubiquitous nature and the need to continually be on the alert against such allegations. 
Moreover, as the monarch and court had oversight over the content of a masque, this reiteration 
may suggest an agenda on James’s part, a speculation not out of the realm of possibility for a 
monarch whose fear of slander is explicitly discussed in Basilikon Doron (1598).  
In the Direction for the Government of the Tongue (1597), the Protestant theologian, 
William Perkins, contends that “tale-bearing is the common table talke in England;”5 likewise, 
one of the motivating factors behind Charles Gibbon’s The Praise of a Good Name: The Reproch 
of an Ill Name (1594) was Gibbon’s belief in the omnipresence of “whisperers.”6 While the 
authors of works that focused on slander or the ills of the tongue7 utilized an assortment of 
similes and metaphors to describe the effects of harmful speech, they all agreed upon one thing, 
that slander was ubiquitous in early modern England. Despite of or possibly because of this 
pervasiveness, there was no consensual definition or depiction of slander. The catalogue of near-
synonyms used by laymen illustrates the sense of growing menace:8 defamation, rumor, scandal, 
																																																								
5 William Perkins, Direction for the Government of the Tongue. 1597 in The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern 
England: Three Treatises, ed. Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2011), 39-
80, 62. 
6 Charles Gibbon, The Praise of a Good Name: The Reproch of an Ill Name (London: 1594), 27. 
7 Following the lead of Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin, I have termed these little-studied treatises about slander and the 
sins of the tongue “slander treatises” and/or “tongue treatises.” See The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England. 
Introduction. Vienne-Guerrin. xvii-xxvii. 
8 The belief that slander was a growing threat was perceived, as demonstrated by slander and tongue treatises, but 
also supported by the era’s legal records. There was a dramatic increase in slander litigation during the final decade 
of Elizabeth’s reign, a trend that continued into James’s reign. J.A. Sharpe writes, “For once, archive evidence can 
be deployed to lend credence to the common cry of seventeenth-century commentators that they lived in the worst of 
all possible worlds, beset by new symptoms of social breakdown and the intensification of old ones. The records of 
both the common law and the ecclesiastical courts provide ample proof that defamation suits were indeed 
multiplying” (Defamation and Sexual Slander in Early Modern England: The Church Courts at York [Heslington, 
York: University of York, Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, 1980], 3).  
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murmur, etc.9 Furthermore, slander law was a morass, overlapping with legislation on libel, 
sedition and treason, with slander suits being filed in both the ecclesiastical and civil courts. 
Among these terms slander became the catch-all, an umbrella term for the era’s myriad charges 
of ill speech.  
The purpose of this study is to uncover the nuances of early modern English conceptions 
about slander by highlighting and embracing these contradictory notions. I will illustrate how 
slander was used for a variety of purposes, despite the fact that contemporary metaphors 
demonized it as a destructive social ill. In my investigation of the nature of slander, I explore 
such questions as: what constitutes slander? What are its defining characteristics? What is its 
relationship to truth? Who determines what gets labeled as slander? Answering these questions 
requires briefly charting the rise of slander law and distinguishing its contours from later 
definitions of slander, which still carry vestiges of its prior, often figurative, characterizations 
from the early modern period. I then construct a heuristic period definition of slander drawing 
from law books of the age. Period law books reveal how attempts to define calumny overlapped 
with coexisting verbal offenses like sedition and scandalum magnatum.  
Because of these definitional inconsistencies, a more telling assessment of early modern 
beliefs about slander can be found by tracing the development of scandal in metaphor, which was 
continually employed to voice the anxieties that ill speech provoked. This literary device proved 
best able to address and encompass slander’s unstable definition, allowing period authors to 
portray how slander, an intangible phenomenon, caused both literal and figurative effects.10 																																																								
9 There were even those who considered slander as a subset of news. The first sedition statute of the era, passed in 
1554, at one point refers to seditious statements as “Newes”; Statutes of the Realm (9 vols., 1810-1825), Vol. 4, part 
1, 240. In Ferdinando Pulton’s An Abstract of all the penall Statutes which be generall, in force and use (London, 
1577), slander laws are found under the heading “Newes.”  
10 I would add that metaphor continues to be one of the most effective means for discussing slander. As I began this 
study, I quickly discovered that it is impossible to discuss slander without turning to metaphor to help portray 
particular aspects of this linguistic phenomenon. Even scholars studying early modern England’s slander laws 
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Kenneth Gross notes that slander was “described variously through metaphors of murder, plague, 
poisoning, rebellion, rape, abortion, witchcraft, and demonic possession.”11 Many of these 
notions were themselves inherited from the Bible, specifically King David’s Psalms, a work that, 
among other considerations, laments the fact that no one is exempt from slander, as well as from 
King Solomon’s Proverbs. Psalms and Proverbs are doubly attractive since they are biblical 
authorities written by reigning sovereigns, perfect sources for an era where individuals were 
trained from birth to obey. Slander’s relation to metaphor extends beyond merely elucidatory 
purposes. Early modern England’s punishments for sedition, a form of slander, were not only 
brutal, they were also highly metaphoric, as was the locale chosen for the carrying out of these 
punishments, as discussed in greater detail below. 
 
Words are but wind? 
Today, slander is commonly considered to be a false statement that aims to damage the 
reputation of another individual. Falsehood and malicious intent are understood as slander’s 
defining characteristics. For the early modern period, I find this definition to be problematic and 
misleading, one that overlooks slander’s ambivalent relation to truth, as well as the question of 
who exactly determines said “truth.” In William Shakespeare’s Much Ado about Nothing (1598), 
Hero decides to “devise some honest slanders / To stain my cousin with. One doth not know / 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
cannot avoid using metaphors in relation to their subject. Historians and literary scholars are particularly fond of 
employing the term “flood” when discussing the rise of slander and sedition cases in the sixteenth century. See J.H. 
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 3rd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1990), 500; David Cressy, 
Dangerous Talk: Scandalous, Seditious, and Treasonable Speech in Pre-Modern England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 48; S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1981), 379. J.A. Sharpe employs the equally colorful noun “explosion” in Defamation and Sexual Slander, 3.  
11 Shakespeare’s Noise (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 6. 
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How much an ill word may empoison liking” (3.1.84-86).12 Hero’s comment reveals that 
statements labeled as “slander” are not always false, or maliciously motivated. While her plan 
works like a charm, helping Beatrice realize and embrace her true feelings for Benedict, Hero’s 
comments playfully refer to the more typical, darker understanding of calumny.13 Her choice of 
the word “stain” alludes to slander’s ability to blemish heretofore-unsullied reputations, much 
like the damage caused by poisonous or corrosive substances, a popular metaphorical depiction 
for slander examined in Chapter 3. Much Ado about Nothing demonstrates the ease with which 
both true and false slanders are internalized and the serious consequences that result from such 
belief.  
The legacy of slander’s fraught relation to the truth remains to this day. As Lindsay 
Kaplan has demonstrated, a brief glance at slander’s definition in the Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED) reveals that definitions one and three are diametrically opposed: 
The first sense of the term offered in the OED explains slander as “1. The 
utterance or dissemination of false statements or reports concerning a person, or 
malicious misrepresentation of his actions, in order to defame or injure him.” This 
seems straightforward enough: slander imputes false crimes against its 
underserving target. However, the opposite meaning is also available:  
“3. Discredit, disgrace, or shame, incurred by or falling upon a person or persons, 
esp. on account of some transgression of the moral law, unworthy action, or 
misdemeanor; evil name, ill repute, opprobrium.” Here slander is not the result of 
groundless ill-speaking but a true report of one’s own ill-doing; in the first case 
one is an innocent victim, while in the other a deservedly exposed offender. The 
editors go on to note that the latter definition is “in some cases not clearly 
separable from sense 1.”14 
 
																																																								
12 All references to Shakespeare’s works are to The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the Oxford Edition. Stephen 
Greenblatt et al. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997). Hereafter quotations are cited in the text by act, 
scene, and line numbers. 
13 Her comments also adumbrate her own slandering by Claudio. 
14 Lindsey Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 13. 
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The link between slander and falsehood is an ancient one. It harkens back to the Greek word for 
Devil15, διάβολος, meaning “accuser, calumniator, slanderer, traducer.”16 Despite her emphasis 
on slander’s unstable depictions, Kaplan states, “in its most general sense, slander is a false 
accusation which results in the humiliation of its victims.”17 Ina Habermann likewise finds the 
notion of “honest slanders” to be “an oxymoron if ever there was one.”18 Though we often 
consider slander an underserved, malicious critique (and in many instances this is indeed the 
case), slander is not interchangeable with falsehood. The contemporary certainty that slander is 
nothing but lies merely creates the illusion that such linguistic phenomena can be easily labeled 
and contained. Slander’s potential as an uncontrollable social and political force was a 
frightening and uncomfortable realization for the early modern era, a state of affairs that has not 
much changed over the centuries. In order to better understand the way slander works, both 
during the early modern period and in contemporary times, we need to embrace its contradictory 
nature. It is a phenomenon that is hard to pin down precisely because of the ease with which 
accusations of slander can be leveled at individuals and the effortlessness with which these 
accusations can be reversed, creating a situation of allegations and counter-allegations that is 
difficult to navigate. Moreover, maliciously motivated slander can nonetheless convey truth, 
while well meaning advice can ultimately be false and slanderous. 
As both the OED and Much Ado about Nothing demonstrate, slander is a social 
phenomenon. Habermann defines slander as “a form of communication, a particular type of 																																																								
15 The Devil after all is the great deceiver.  
16 “Devil.” OED. Oxford English Dictionary, 2012; online edn., 2012. 
[http://www.oed.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/view/Entry/51468?rskey=3sHZBm&result=1#eid, accessed 17 
Aug. 2012]. For a brief etymological history of the word “slander,” see Kenneth Gross, Shakespeare’s Noise, 209, 
fn3.  
17 The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England, 9. 
18 While I disagree with Habermann concerning slander’s relationship to the truth, Staging Slander and Gender in 
Early Modern England has enriched my own understanding of slander through her meticulous and thoughtful 
investigation into the gendered, literary, and political implications of slander in the period (Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2003), 10. 
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speech act which, once assumed or recognized to be defamatory, becomes a public event with 
ethical as well as juridical and theological implications.”19 To qualify as slander, speech must 
involve three parties, the speaker, the listener, and the person slandered. Moreover, it is usually 
spread surreptitiously, as allegations are not often voiced before the subject of the slander.20 
However, as a social phenomenon, slander has the ability to multiply exponentially and to 
convert listeners into slanderers. The roles of the parties involved are malleable and complex. 
Once a slander has been heard, it is internalized, at which point the listener determines whether 
the information should be believed as truth (or possibly true), or ignored as a falsehood. If the 
information conveyed is believed, the listener has the potential to take on the additional position 
of a slanderer, sharing the information with new listeners. Slander is a form of judgment that 
begins as an illicit ruling21 yet has the potential to spread and cement into an authorized verdict. 
Neither neutral nor objective, it involves a certain amount of moral superiority in those who 
spread slander over those maligned. Even those who report a slander to the victim do so out of a 
sense of injured justice, feeling that the victim has been unjustly defamed. As Gross has argued, 
“The danger of slander is that it mimics the law…slanderers preempt established structures of 
legal accusation. They both usurp and parody the work of law.”22 Working outside the law, 
slander creates unofficial courtrooms where slanderers are converted into prosecutors, listeners 
into juries and judges, and the defense attorney is often missing.  
Slander is inseparable from moral or emotional implications. It is a speech act that begs 
for a reaction, one that can run the gamut from selfish glee to disbelief. More often than not, it is 
																																																								
19 Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England, 2. 
20 Though it generally spreads surreptitiously, this is not always the case. Slander can occur between two 
individuals, with one directly slandering the other through such statements as, “Thou art a knave.” 
21 I term slander an “illicit ruling” only in the moral sense that it is not the place of one individual to judge another. I 
do not mean to imply a value judgment as to the truth of said “ruling.” 
22 Shakespeare’s Noise, 54. 
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met with anger. In his essay, “Of Seditions and Troubles,” Francis Bacon locates the root of 
sedition (itself a form of slander) in excessive poverty and discontentment, that is, in public 
envy. In his typical scientific manner, Bacon explains, “as for discontentments, they are in the 
politic body like to humours in the natural, which are apt to gather preternatural heat and to 
inflame.”23 Righteous anger is a common response, either because the allegation is a blatant lie, 
or simply because the victim is furious at having found themself the topic of conversation.  
For these reasons, I have chosen to define slander as speech acts that meet one of the 
following criteria: (1) maliciously motivated false speech; (2) speech critical of another’s 
wrongdoing, whether true or false; (3) fabrications meant to entertain; (4) words that cause 
offense. This definition is not all-encompassing, but it allows for a variety of practices and 
perceptions across time periods. My definition attempts to reflect numerous facets of slander’s 
contradictory nature. “Offense” suggests the emotional reaction that slander elicits, as well as its 
moral and judicial characteristics. This definition emphasizes both a statement’s intent and 
veracity, as intent can vary widely and thus be difficult to determine, while the question of 
veracity can be subjective. My definition also accords me the opportunity to simultaneously 
explore slander’s opposing definitions, as demonstrated by the early modern period overlapping 
and inconsistent attempts at defining this verbal crime, a contradiction still visible in the OED 
definition of “slander.” Lastly, although slander generally spreads surreptitiously, this definition 
does not assume that this is always the case, nor does it differentiate between verbal and written 
words, though it suggests that slander is predominantly verbal, which is helpful because there 
was no distinction between slander and libel prior to 1660.24 Below, I take up this question of 
veracity, as well as the consideration of a speaker’s social status and the notion of intent, 																																																								
23 Francis Bacon: The Major Works. ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 367-68. 
24 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 506.  
		 10	
variables that can each affect whether a speech act is labeled as slander.25 The importance of the 
speaker’s social rank is further developed in Chapter 1, in which I additionally investigate how 
religion can be used to define slander.  
 
Slander Law 
Slander law in England stems from the Constitution of the Council of Oxford in 1222, which 
punished that all those who “maliciously impute a crime to any person who is not of ill fame 
among good and substantial persons.”26 This doctrine would continue to hold sway through the 
sixteenth century, when the secular courts began wresting jurisdiction over slander law from the 
ecclesiastical courts and, consequently, began expanding the sorts of allegations that could 
constitute slander (until the sixteenth century, the ecclesiastical courts had sole jurisdiction over 
slander cases, with certain exceptions). The requirement of an imputation of a crime was the 
closest conception to a governing rule in slander litigation. This “rule” was tested in the late 
sixteenth century, but it was only in the seventeenth century that words that caused harm 
(demonstrable damage), yet did not impute a criminal allegation, consistently began to be judged 
as slander.27 
Although there was no established definition of slander in the early modern period, 
seventeenth century law books attempted to provide a set of criteria for determining if certain 
																																																								
25 As Gross contends, “Human speakers, however malicious, are not likely to call their own speech “slander.” They 
will rather insist on their own purity and truth”; Shakespeare’s Noise, 40. This only heightens the difficulty of 
determining the veracity of a statement. For an example of a true statement that was labeled slander, see my 
discussion of the case between Mrs. Margaret Knowsley and Mr. Stephen Jerome below. 
26 R.H. Helmholz, ed. Select Cases on Defamation to 1600 (London: Selden Society, 1985), xiv. 
27 For a brief survey of the history of slander laws in England, see Select Cases on Defamation to 1600, ed. 
Helmholz. For a brief consideration of those categories of slander that did not require proof of damage, see Baker, 
An Introduction to English Legal History, and Select Cases on Defamation to 1600, ed. Helmholz. 
		 11	
words were slanderous and therefore actionable (punishable by law).28 These law books, 
however, must be approached with caution, for they gloss over the period of experimentation in 
slander law that occurred in the sixteenth century, as well as the fact that both the ecclesiastical 
courts and the Star Chamber were closed in the 1640s, preceding the publication of some of the 
era’s more famous law books.29 The first seventeenth century law book to focus on slander was 
John March’s Action for Slander (1647), followed shortly by William Sheppard’s Action upon 
the Case for Slander, or a Methodical Collection under Certain Heads, of Thousands of Cases 
(1662). In his book, Sheppard provided a list of conditions that a statement had to meet in order 
to qualify as slander, which included, among other things, that it must be false, malicious, 
purposeful, clear, and particular.30 Early modern slander litigation contends that the speech in 
question must be false in order to be actionable. However, this criterion does not always hold. 
For example, the truth of a statement was not a viable defense in the Star Chamber.31 Moreover, 
in 1605, Coke’s doctrine of sedition further developed the period’s slander law, most notably 
arguing that “it is not material whether the Libel be true” because a true libel was just as likely to 
																																																								
28 In his law book of the era, William Sheppard explains that an action of the case is “a Writ brought against one for 
an offence done without force,” moreover, it is called “an Action of the Case, because the whole Cause or Case, so 
much as is in the Declaration (save only the time and place) is set down in the Writ”; Action upon the Case for 
Slander, or a Methodical Collection under Certain Heads, of Thousands of Cases (London 1662), 1. 
29 As Helmholz has noted, “because the developed law of libel and slander took a somewhat different shape from the 
earliest remedy, it has been easy to read back later doctrine into the early cases”; Select Cases xii. Chapter 1 focuses 
on some of the more frequently occurring variables that were considered when making determinations about slander. 
30 Action upon the Case for Slander, 6-7. His criteria for slander apply only to attempts at definition within the civil 
courts. Slander litigation in the ecclesiastical courts is discussed in Chapter 4. Sheppard provides a more detailed 
examination of actionable words on 3-14; see also John March, Actions for Slaunder (London 1647), 1-136, and 
William Vaughan, The Spirit of Detraction, Conjured and Convicted in Seven Circles (London 1611), 160-74. 
31 Habermann, Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England, 47. Kaplan observes, “When slander is 
determined by its outcome, the words function in relative rather than absolute terms, since the same speech can have 
different effects once the context is changed. Thus, emphasizing the effect of defamation allows for contradiction in 
its definition. When financial damages are the gist of the action, then the words spoken must be false; if the 
allegation is true, then the subject’s actions, and not the speaker’s words, bring about monetary loss. However, when 
breach of peace determines the actionability of the words, the truth is immaterial”; The Culture of Slander, 17-18.  
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incite revenge as a false one. The truth of a statement was no longer a viable defense in the case 
of sedition or libel.32  
The case between Mrs. Margaret Knowsley and Mr. Stephen Jerome demonstrates how 
Coke’s doctrine of sedition could be used to convict an individual who merely spoke the truth.33 
Knowsley was a Nantwich laboring woman in the employ of the local priest, Jerome. During the 
latter half of 1625, Jerome began to make unwanted advances, causing Knowsley to relate her 
experiences to two female confidants who subsequently betrayed her trust. The authorities were 
forced to investigate when news of the lascivious priest overran the town. Jerome eventually 
filed a slander suit against Knowsley.34 The “Nantwich judges received ‘unimpeachable judicial 
authority’ that corroborated Knowsley’s version of events,” yet she “was sentenced to public 
flogging through the streets.”35 Although the evidence supported Knowsley’s claims, it was she 
who was publicly shamed because her allegations had instigated critique of a church official, 
thus reflecting on the Church of England itself.36 
The story of Margaret Knowsley exposes the double standard that lay in the very heart of 
period slander law. The truth of an offensive statement made against a common man or woman 
guaranteed that the speaker of the statement could not be penalized for slander in a court of law. 																																																								
32 The Reports of Edward Coke (London: printed for H. Twyford et al, 1680), Vol. 5, 125-26, 125. Coke also subtly 
implies that a true slander against a public person “is a greater Offense; for it concerns not only the Breach of Peace, 
but also the Scandal of Government; for what greater Scandal of Government can there be than to have corrupt or 
wicked Magistrates to be appointed and constituted by the King to govern his Subjects under him?” (125). For a 
brief overview of the development of the doctrine of sedition, see Roger B. Manning, “The Origins of the Doctrine 
of Sedition.” Albion 12.2 (1980): 99-121. For the overlap between the crimes of slander and sedition see below.  
33 See Steven Hindle, “The Shaming of Margaret Knowsley: Gossip, Gender and the Experience of Authority in 
Early Modern England,” Continuity and Change 9 (1994): 391-419. 
34 My use of terms such as “the authorities,” “the state,” or “the government” does not imply that early modern 
English government was a centralized bureaucracy with all levels working in tandem. I use these terms for ease of 
reference only. 
35 M.C. Bodden, Language as the Site of Revolt in Medieval and Early Modern England: Speaking as a Woman 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 59. 
36 The information in this paragraph is based on Steven Hindle’s “The Shaming of Margaret Knowsley: Gossip, 
Gender and the Experience of Authority in Early Modern England” and M.C. Bodden, Language as the Site of 
Revolt, 58-62. Bodden interprets Knowsley’s experience, and her petitions in particular, as evidence of how women 
utilized (male) legal discourse, thus “expos(ing) it as a site of contradictions” (59-60).  
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In contrast, the speaker of a seditious statement was guilty and subject to punishment regardless 
of the accuracy of the statement. After 1605, the year Coke outlined his doctrine of sedition, the 
same held true for statements that amounted to scandalum magnatum (words spoken against a 
peer or magistrates); words directed at a commoner that would not normally be actionable were 
punishable if directed against a public person.37  
The rank of the speaker was also an important consideration when determining whether a 
given statement or work was slanderous. Both Phillip Sidney and John Stubbs spoke out against 
the marriage negotiations between Queen Elizabeth I and François Hercule, Duke of Alençon 
and later Duke of Anjou.38 Whereas Sidney avoided official punishment for his outspokenness, 
Stubbs was not so fortunate.39 While there are many reasons why Sidney may have escaped the 
punishment that left Stubbs maimed, Sidney’s higher rank cannot be overlooked. Moreover, the 
rank of the person passing judgment was also tantamount, for “truth” could be determined by the 
highest-ranking individual involved. A subject’s truth could easily be a magistrate’s slander, as 
portrayed in such plays as The Winter’s Tale (1610-11) and Othello (1603-04). Further 
complicating matters is the recognition that a slanderous statement could be factually untrue and 
reveal some political understanding, as when in Measure for Measure (1603-04, published 1623) 
Lucio’s exaggerated slanders against Duke Vincentio accurately gesture to the Duke’s 
Machiavellian maneuverings, or as in the rumors that claimed that Queen Elizabeth I murdered 
her illegitimate children, which attacked her symbolic role as mother of the country.  
																																																								
37 March, Actions for Slaunder, 98-102. See below for the similarities between the crimes of sedition and scandalum 
magnatum. 
38 By the time of the courtship with Elizabeth, Francois had already inherited the title of Duke of Anjou. In an effort 
to avoid confusion, I take my cue from scholarly convention and refer to him by his original title, the Duke of 
Alençon.   
39 For Sidney’s letter to Elizabeth, see Miscellaneous Prose of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones and 
Jan van Dorsten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 46-58. Stubbs’s fate is discussed in Chapter 1.  
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Sheppard’s criteria for determining slander also contended that a statement had to be 
malicious for it to qualify as slander. This seemingly simple criterion is a tricky proposition, for 
it is ultimately a question of intent. Referencing the 1581 sedition statute, Annabel Patterson 
argues that the addition of the “saving clause ‘with malicious intent’” only complicated the 
burden of proof by requiring interpretation of the accused’s intentions.40 In the civil courts, the 
question of intent was foregrounded by the mitior sensus rule.41 According to Helmholz, 
That infamous doctrine allowed defendants to escape liability if the words were 
capable of a non-defamatory construction – “Thou hast stolen my wood” would 
not be actionable, because the words might refer to growing trees, and for the loss 
of growing trees no criminal action lay…for the most part, however, in their 
sentences the courts themselves stuck with the rule that words should be 
interpreted in their most natural sense, as they would have been understood 
among hearers.42 
 
As Helmholz demonstrates, this rule had the unfortunate effect of allowing defense lawyers to 
twist a statement’s meaning in unnatural ways.43 While the mitior sensus rule offered civil 
lawyers the opportunity to establish inoffensive meanings for slanderous statements, the rule of 
innuendo presented an alternate path. This rule allowed lawyers to argue that a statement’s latent 
implications had to be taken into consideration, that the “defendant had meant the worst.”44 In a 
																																																								
40 Annabel Patterson. Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early Modern 
England (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990 (1984)), 34. The sedition statutes are discussed in greater 
detail below. The 1554 statute as well as the statute “An act for the explanation of the statute of seditious words and 
rumors” passed in the first year of Elizabeth’s reign, which extended the application of the former statute to 
Elizabeth, each assumes malicious intent as motivating any seditious statement. 
41 Baker interprets the mitior sensus rule as one of several “attempts to abate the flood of [slander] actions”; An 
Introduction to English Legal History, 500. 
42 R.H. Helmholz. The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume I, The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical 
Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s, gen. ed. John Hamilton Baker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 577. 
43 In such instances, a lawyer’s manipulation of offensive words appears no more artificial than Malvolio’s 
“crushing” of the text in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night (1601-1602). Early in the play, Malvolio stumbles upon an 
enigmatic (forged) letter addressed “to the unknown beloved” identified only by the letters “M.O.I.A.” (II.5.82, 97). 
Interpreting the letter’s possible meaning, Malvolio states, “M.O.A.I. This simulation is not as the former. And yet, 
to crush this a little, it would bow to me, for every one of these letters are in my name…” (2.5.113-15). 
44 Helmholz. The Oxford History of the Laws of England, 578. More specifically, innuendo was used to interpret 
ambiguous statements. Helmholz provides the example, “Thou hast the pox,” noting that this statement could refer 
to either small pox or the French pox; the distinction is an important one, as “the former implied no moral turpitude; 
the latter did” (578).  
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sense, the rules of mitior sensus and innuendo could appear like a fork in the road and it was the 
judge’s role to determine which path was correct. The employment of common sense would have 
been crucial to the act of interpreting questionable words according to their usual sense.  
The question of intent was one of the challenges posed to judges hearing slander suits—
the question of motive was another. Sheppard explains that if no cause could be determined as to 
why an individual spoke potentially slanderous words, then the words were considered 
malicious. He also goes on to relate that if a person merely reported a slander to a friend in order 
that the friend could clear his name, then it was not actionable; however, if a person reported a 
slander without naming the author of the slander, then it was actionable.45 In such a scenario, it 
appears that the identity of a slander’s author is of greater importance than the question of intent, 
perhaps because period authorities would attempt to trace slanders back to their original source. 
If a person could not identify the author of the aspersion reported, then it was conceivable 
(though not self-evident) that the individual reporting the slander was in fact the author, thus 
explaining their inability to point the finger elsewhere.46 In the absence of an identifiable source 
for a slander, or a motivating factor for the reporting of a slander, English courts essentially 
could assign an author or malicious interpretation to statements with unknown motivations. All 
slanders had to have a provenance. They had to have an author and a reason for their creation 
and, in the absence of either, a court could appoint one to its case. The reason period authorities 
insisted on such a forensic investigation, creating a legal fiction that each slander could be traced 
to its point of origin, is that slander was often spread in secret and “really successful slander by 																																																								
45 Sheppard, Action upon the Case for Slander, 8, 26. The 1554 statute of sedition explicitly references a statute 
passed in “the twelvethe yere of the reigne of” King Richard II (12 Rich II, c.11) that stated that if an imprisoned 
“Offendor” “coulde not finde him of whom he hearde those Newes whiche he spake...then the same speaker shoulde 
bee punished by the Advice of the Cowncell”; Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, part 1, 240. 
46 This line of reasoning can be seen, for instance, in the following royal proclamations issued by Mary Tudor, “A 
Proclamation Suppressing Seditious Rumors” issued July 28, 1553, and “A Proclamation Ordering Seditious Bills 
Destroyed” issued April 10, 1554; Tudor Royal Proclamations: Volume II, The Later Tudors (1553-1587), ed. Paul 
L. Hughes and James F. Larkin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 4, 41.  
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definition is not detected.”47 The question of intent and the notion that slander was not always 
traceable appear to have been unacceptable to early modern authorities.  
 
Degrees of Separation: Overlapping Verbal Offenses 
Further complicating the fact that slander lacked a consensual definition was its considerable 
overlap with other terms for harmful speech. Slander’s near synonyms were varied, but this is 
still only part of the picture. Legally, slander also overlapped with legislation on libel, scandalum 
magnatum, sedition, and treason. In 1534, partly in response to the negative public reaction to 
Henry VIII’s divorce, remarriage, and the change in religion, the government passed the 1534 
Treasons Statute, an unprecedented statute that expanded the definition of treason. According to 
Rebecca Lemon, the statute “reshaped definitions of the crime for the next hundred years” 
because of “its innovative claim that treason is based in language.”48 Although slander, libel, and 
scandalum magnatum were all viewed as distinct offenses, the various terms often collapsed into 
each other. The 1534 statute only further muddied the waters by adding treason to the list of 
verbal offenses. “Slander” and “libel” were used interchangeably and treated as synonymous 
until the late seventeenth century, when libel came to be defined as a written slander.49 Before 
then, libel was usually defined as a written slander, a picture, or a sign.50 In this sense, libel can 
be viewed as a subset of slander, which is why slander is my overarching term. While slander 
was words that gave offense, scandalum magnatum and the later-created political crime of 
sedition were words spoken against a peer, public official, prelate, or certain members of the 																																																								
47 Habermann, Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England, 2. 
48 Treason by Words: Literature, Law, and Rebellion in Shakespeare’s England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), 5. Manning notes that there were precedents for the notion of “constructive treason” (treason 
committed through words), yet the 1534 Treasons Statute was the first act that stated that simply slandering or 
libeling the king was treason; “The Origins of the Doctrine of Sedition,” 105. 
49 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 506. 
50 Sheppard, Action upon the Case for Slander, 115. 
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royal household. Words spoken against the monarch were seditious or treasonous, depending 
upon the allegation. The overlapping nature of these various offenses lies in the fact that the root 
of scandalum magnatum, verbal sedition, and verbal treason is slander. In short, they are 
different degrees of slander. The definitions scandalum magnatum, verbal sedition, and verbal 
treason attest to the fact that these crimes were primarily defined as a particular kind of slander, 
one directed at a particular type of individual.  
Verbal treason was the most heinous of these inter-related crimes. It generally consisted 
of directly denying a monarch’s right to the crown, or claiming that a particular monarch was not 
the ruler of the realm. In the years following the groundbreaking 1534 statute, additional types of 
speech acts were identified as treasonous. In 1555, a Parliamentary statute declared traitorous 
any prayers that wished for Mary’s death, or “that God woulde turne her Hart from Idolatrye to 
the true Faithe”; a second statute passed that year also made slanders spoken against either Mary 
or Philip treasonous, while second offenses were declared high treason.51 Elizabeth had a similar 
statute passed in 1571 that declared it treasonous for anyone to say, write, or print that Elizabeth 
was not the rightful queen, was a heretic or usurper, or to “compasse imagyn invent devyse or 
intend the Deathe or Destruccõn or any bodely harme tending to Deathe Destruccõn Mayme or 
Wounding of the Royal Pson of the same our Sovaigne Ladye Queene Elizabeth.”52 In its 
narrowest sense, verbal treason was a direct refutation of a monarch’s crown. Although 
Parliamentary statues also made room for offensive words aimed at the monarch, “the public 
execution of traitors was a relatively rare event, after the Henrician bloodbath, and few 
Elizabethans were convicted of treason by words.” Elizabethan authorities seem to have 
																																																								
51 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, part 1, 254, 255. The statutes referenced are numbered 1 & 2 Phil. and Mary, c. 9 
and 1 & 2 Phil. and Mary, c. 10, respectively.  
52 Ibid., 526-27. The statute is numbered 13 Eliz., c. 1. 
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preferred to act leniently, and those guilty of verbal sedition sometimes claimed drunkenness as a 
mitigating factor.53  
Although Scandalum magnatum and sedition are quite similar, there were key differences 
in the way these two crimes were punished prior to Coke’s redefinition of the doctrine of sedition 
in 1605. A slander had to be false in order to be punishable as scandalum magnatum (truth was a 
valid defense for this verbal crime) and there was uncertainty as to whether anyone who 
published a slander could be punished for scandalum magnatum if he/she was able to produce 
the author of the slander.54 That said, both crimes were defined as words or actions that 
threatened to tear the social fabric. Scandalum magnatum could create division between the 
monarch and magistrates, while sedition was feared as setting commoners against themselves as 
well as setting them against magistrates or elected officials. Both crimes created division within 
the body politic. Roger Manning explains that “the original, and primary, meaning of the word 
sedition was factionalism or violent party strife” and that 
it was only towards the end of the sixteenth century that the secondary or more 
modern meaning of the word sedition began to emerge – the notion of inciting by 
words or writing disaffection towards the state or constituted authority. Thus, 
sedition came to be interpreted as words that fell short of treason and did not 
directly involve – although they might lead to – acts of violence.55 
 
Sedition’s original definition proved impossible to shake, for “it was axiomatic that slander or 
libel could lead to factionalism and that factionalism in turn could lead to a breach of the 
peace.”56 
																																																								
53 David Cressy, Dangerous Talk, 66, 66-67. 
54 Manning, “The Origins of the Doctrine of Sedition,” 112. The fact that truth was a valid defense and the 
uncertainty as to whether anyone who could produce the author of the slander was still punishable for scandalum 
magnatum, may partly account for why, during the sixteenth century, many slandered magnates chose to pursue 
legal recourse through slander litigation, “the ordinary action on the case for words,” rather than prosecuting for 
scandalum magnatum; Helmholz, Select Cases, lxxii. 
55 Manning, “The Origins of the Doctrine of Sedition,” 100, 101. 
56 Ibid., 100. 
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Even though the first sedition statute was not passed until 1554, and the crime “did not 
acquire precise definition in case law until early in the seventeenth century,” the adjective 
“seditious” was frequently used in numerous royal proclamations of the first half of the sixteenth 
century.57 The adjective was used to describe a more serious verbal or written critique directed 
against a public official, such as in the phrases “seditious rumor” or “seditious slander.” During 
this same period, “sedition” began to be used as a noun, describing a distinct crime, even as its 
adjectival form was still in use.58 The 1554 statute of sedition, passed under King Phillip and 
Queen Mary’s reign, assumed that all seditious statements or writings were intended “to move 
and stir sedicious Discorde Disention and Rebellyon within this Realme, to the greate perill and 
daunger of the same.” It also attempted to emphasize the disloyalty of seditious individuals to 
their “natural” leader, Queen Mary: 
And Forasmuche as dyverse and sundry malicious and evil disposed persons 
maliciouslye sediciouslye rebellyouslye and unnaturally, contrary to the Dutie of 
their Fidelytees and Allegiances, have now of late not onely ymagined invented 
practised spoken and spredd abroade dyvers and sundry false sedicious and 
sclaunderous News Rumours Sayenges and Tales, ageynst our most dreadd 
Sovereigne Lorde and King, and ageynst our most naturall Sovereygne Ladye and 
Quene and against either of them, of whom we ar forbidden to thinck evill and 
muche more to speake evell.59 
 
The phrasing of the statute makes it a foregone conclusion that all those who slander the 
monarch(s) do so out of malice, a belief that was reiterated when this statute was extended to 
cover the reign of Elizabeth in 1558. Those who slander the monarch do so contrary to the duty 
they owe their natural sovereign, making their actions not only disloyal, but also unnatural. More 
surprising is the wishful thinking that authorities could govern a subject’s thoughts, forbidding 
them to even think badly about their ruler(s). This idea is reflected in one of the first Inns of 																																																								
57 Ibid., 99.  
58 David Cressy likewise notes in Dangerous Talk that “seditious” was used more frequently than “sedition” in 
judicial legislation. 
59 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, part 1, 240. The statute is numbered 1 & 2 Phillip and Mary, c. 3. 
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Courts plays, Thomas Norton and Thomas Sackville’s Gorboduc (1561). In lines that were only 
included in the first, unauthorized printing of the play, the virtuous counselor Eubulus declares, 
That no cause serves whereby the subject may 
Call to account the doings of his prince, 
Much less in blood by sword to work revenge, 
No more than may the hand cut off the head; 
In act nor speech, no, not in secret thought 
The subject may rebel against his lord,  
Or judge of him that sits in Caesar’s seat, 
With grudging mind to damn those he mislikes (5.1.42-49).60 
 
Whether a subject takes sword against his/her ruler, or merely critiques the sovereign in word or 
thought, each of these actions implies passing judgment on one’s monarch and is thus a form of 
rebellion, an action that the wise Eubulus utterly forbids. These lines were expunged from the 
second, authorized printing, as if Norton and Sackville realized that they had stretched the 
loyalty due to monarchs too far.61 Perhaps they realized that by writing a play that sought to 
counsel Elizabeth concerning the question of her marriage and, more importantly, the succession, 
they could very well have been accused of slander had their words offended. While they 
certainly would not condone critique of one’s sovereign, the removal of these lines seems to 
imply a subject’s freedom of thought.  
During the reign of Elizabeth I, sedition continued to be regulated through the 1554 
statute of sedition, which was reinforced during Elizabeth’s first year (under statute 1 Eliz., c. 
6),62 only to be superseded by a second sedition statute passed in 1581. The1554 statute (1 & 2 
Phillip and Mary, c. 3) attempted to draw distinctions between different manners of spreading 
sedition, each of which carried its own steep penalty. The worst of the punishments was reserved 
																																																								
60 Thomas Sackville and Thomas Norton, Gorboduc, or Ferrex and Porrex. Drama of the English Renaissance, I: 
The Tudor Period, ed. Russell A. Fraser and Norman Rabkin (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1976), 
81. 
61 Ibid., 97, fn. 1.  
62 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, part 1, 366-67. 
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for those who “devise write printe or set forthe any maner of Booke Rime Ballade Letter or 
Writing, conteining any false Matter Clause or Sentence of Sclander Reproche and Dishonor of 
the King and Quenes Majesties or of either of them.” Procuring such a text carried the same 
punishment, the loss of the right hand. Speaking sedition was punished by the pillory and the loss 
of both ears, or, if the convicted slanderer had the means, a fine of £100 to be paid within one 
month of conviction, followed by three months imprisonment. Repeating a seditious statement 
carried a lighter punishment, the pillory and loss of one ear, unless the slanderer chose to pay a 
fine of 100 marks within one month of conviction and suffer one month’s imprisonment 
thereafter. Any person convicted of a second offense would face life imprisonment and the loss 
of all their personal property.63 
Despite the severity of the 1554 statute, the punishments for sedition were made even 
more stringent with the passage of the 1581 statute of sedition (23 Eliz., c. 2), which repealed 
and replaced the former statute. As Patterson has argued, though, the addition of the phrase “with 
malicious intent” served “to complicate the business of proof in charges of sedition.”64 The 1581 
																																																								
63 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, part 1, 240-41. For a brief overview of the procedure for enforcing sedition laws, see 
Joel Samaha “Gleanings from Local Criminal-Court Records: Sedition amongst the ‘Inarticulate’ in Elizabethan 
Essex.” Journal of Social History 8 (Summer, 1975): 61-79. 
64 Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation, 34. The phrase “with malicious intent” does give the appearance that 
malice was no longer assumed to have been the motivating factor behind slanderous statements directed at the 
monarch, yet the 1581 statute remains ambiguous on the matter. The opening sentence reads, “Whereas in and by 
the Lawes and Statutes of this Realme, alreadye made and ordeyned againste sedicious Wordes and Rumors uttered 
againste the Queenes moste excellent Ma[jes]tie, there ys not sufficient and condigne Punishement provided for to 
suppresse the Malice of suche as be evell affected towardes her Higheness”; Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, part 1, 
659. This sentence appears to agree with the sentiment expressed in earlier sedition statutes, in which malice against 
the monarch was assumed. However, Patterson is right in noticing that the phrase “with malicious intent” does act as 
caveat throughout the remainder of the statute. Thus, while the 1581 statute is not clear and consistent on the matter, 
I must agree with Patterson that the added phrase complicates the burden of proof. I must add, though, that Patterson 
does not specify whether this burden falls upon the defendant or the prosecutor, the state. She merely goes on to 
claim that “the state had formally entered the business of textual interpretation, and had been forced to declare a 
respect for authorial intention” (34). For an example of the importance of the notion of malicious intent, see Select 
Statutes and other Constitutional Documents Illustrative of the Reigns of Elizabeth and James I, ed. G. W. Prothero 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), which excerpts part of the 1590 Croydon Assize proceedings against John Udall 
for written sedition. The indictment claims that Udall “being stirred up by the instigation and motion of the Devil, 
did maliciously publish a slanderous and infamous libel against the Queen’s Majesty, her crown and dignity.” Judge 
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bill was initiated by the House of Lords in response to negative public commentary concerning 
the proposed marriage of Elizabeth and Alençon.65 Those who were found guilty of fabricating or 
repeating seditious rumors again faced the same penalties as those defined by the 1554 law. 
Differences lay in the heavier fines and lengthier jail sentences, the lack of benefit of clergy, and 
the new statute’s specification that suspected seditionists had to be accused by two witnesses in 
person at the arraignment. Two witnesses were also required at the indictment. Individuals 
convicted of fabricating a seditious statement who hoped to avoid mutilation now faced a fine of 
£200 and six months’ imprisonment to be paid within two months of conviction, or 100 marks to 
be paid within two months of conviction followed by three month’s jail time for those convicted 
of repeating seditious statements. The writing or printing of sedition was now a felony and 
felonies carried a mandatory punishment of hanging. In addition, a second offense for either 
repeating a seditious rumor or reporting a seditious rumor without being able to specify the 
source of the slander equated to a felony. Lastly, it was now considered a felony for anyone, 
regardless of rank, to try to predict the Queen’s death, to merely wish for it, or to seek to know 
when it would occur, or who would succeed her.66 
The sentences carried against convicted seditionists relocate the damage the crime 
perpetrated against the body politic upon the physical body of the convict. Investigating the role 
of torture in sixteenth and seventeenth century France, Michel Foucault states, “Besides its 
immediate victim, crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law represents 
the will of the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the force of the law is the force of the 
prince.” He goes on to argue that the spectacle of judicial punishment “made it possible to 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Clarke additionally claims that Udall could not “excuse [himself] to have done it with a malicious intent against the 
bishops” (qtd. in Prothero, Select Statutes 442).  
65 Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation, 33-34. 
66 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, part 1, 659-61.  
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reproduce the crime on the visible body of the criminal; in the same horror, the crime had to be 
manifested and annulled. It also made the body of the condemned man the place where the 
vengeance of the sovereign was applied.” 67 Following the publishing of Discipline & Punish, 
Foucault’s arguments have, at times, been incautiously used to analyze the criminal justice 
systems and modes of governance beyond the scope investigated by Foucault. While I am wary 
of falling into the same trap, Foucault’s argument is applicable to early modern English sedition 
law, helping to illustrate the metaphoricity of its punishments as well as the location where these 
penalties were publicly carried out. Many punishments of the era were not the literal equivalent 
of the crime committed, yet when it comes to sedition, there is an undeniable connection 
between the sentences and the crime. For those convicted of written sedition, it was the same 
erring hand (assumed to be the right hand) that was claimed by the punishment. However, this 
was not the only crime punishable by the loss of a hand.68 Those who invented or repeated a 
verbal sedition were sentenced to lose one or both ears, as opposed to the offending tongue.69 
The distinction is an important one. Although it was the tongue that committed the crime, it was 																																																								
67 Michel Foucault. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 
1995), 47, 55 
68 For example, on September 26, 1614, James I issued “A Proclamation prohibiting the Exportation of Sheep, 
Wools, Wool-fells, and Fullers Earth.” This proclamation ordered all “Judges, Justices, Officers, and Ministers 
whatsoever” to enforce a statute passed under the reign of Elizabeth that likewise prohibited the exportation of rams, 
sheep or lamb, which statute, among other punishments, called for “the loss of the offenders left hand for the first 
offence.” See Stuart Royal Proclamations: Volume I, Royal Proclamations of King James I, 1603-1625, ed. James 
F. Larkin and Paul L. Hughes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 317-19.  
69 There were other crimes similarly punished by the loss of one or both ears during this period. Phillip and Mary 
issued “A Proclamation Expelling Vagabonds from London & Westminster” on September 15, 1554, which detailed 
punishments for those caught forging or counterfeiting bills or notes that falsely declared the bearer of said bill or 
note to be a servant of the master named in said bill or note. Punishments for such forgeries included “nailing on the 
pillory and losing of the ears or otherwise”; Tudor Royal Proclamations: Volume II, Hughes and Larkin, 46-48. 
Elizabeth I likewise issued “A Proclamation Ordering Punishment of Persons with forged credentials” on May 3, 
1596. This proclamation focused on those individuals who faked warrants from the Privy Council in order to exhort 
money from unsuspecting victims. The proclamation declares that those who had already been caught, sentenced 
and condemned were “set the on pillory, lost their ears, and some also marked in the face for their notable abuses”; 
Tudor Royal Proclamations: Volume III, The Later Tudors (1558-1603), ed. Hughes and Larkin. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969), 159-62. On April 23, 1606, James I issued “A Proclamation for prevention of future abuses 
in Purveyance” listing the punishments for this abuse as fine, imprisonment, pillory, and the loss of both ears; it is 
uncertain whether the loss of both ears was enforced when sentencing offenders; Stuart Royal Proclamations, 
Larkin and Hughes, 136-42. 
		 24	
through the ear that slanders entered the bodies of listeners—the ear was the sight of infection. 
Thus, because slanderers infected the ears of individual bodies and, just as important, the body 
politic, it was the ear that had to pay the price.70 
Furthermore, the 1554 statute of sedition specified that any individual convicted of 
sedition shall “in some Market Place within the Shire Citie or Boroughe wher or nere unto the 
Place where the sayd woordes were or shalbee so spoken, be set openly upon the Pylorye by the 
Sheryffe or his Ministers.”71 The statute sought to punish the crime within the same physical 
locale where the seditious statement was uttered, thus converting the location into a social space 
where witnesses could read the government’s verdict upon the body of the convicted. The 
spectacle was intended to add to the seditionist’s shame. The executioner became the 
government’s pen and the convicted individual the text—a new, authorized text that superseded 
the text of the seditious statement that the state sought to erase. This was a text that could never 
be expunged, one that proclaimed the wide-reaching power of the state, yet it was one that 
depended upon the reaction of the crowd who witnessed the event. The state expected witnesses 
to accurately read the message, which was that a convicted criminal deserved the sentence for his 
crimes against the state. On various occasions, the crowd refused to play along, sympathizing 
with the “criminal” rather than the state, as was the case in 1637 when William Prynne, John 
Bastwick, and Henry Burton were mutilated for sedition.72 
																																																								
70 Some zealous officials found these punishments insufficiently harsh. In 1577, Justice Roger Manwood suggested 
that seditionists should be punished by “burning in the face with letters, or by gagging his two jaws in painful 
manner, and so he cannot speak any words…or by burning through his tongue, or perchance cutting off his tongue, 
in such way as he may eat and drink and take sustenance after” (qtd. in Cressy, Dangerous Talk, 42-43). Cressy also 
relates that in early modern Ireland, seditionists “could be bored through the tongue” (43). 
71 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, part 1, 240. 
72 Susan Dwyer Amussen. “Punishment, Discipline, and Power: The Social Meanings of Violence in Early Modern 
England. Journal of British Studies 34.1 (January 1995): 1-34, 9-10. See also Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in 
Early Modern England, 26-27. 
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Of the various interrelated verbal offenses punishable during this era, libel most 
overlapped with slander, as the two terms were used interchangeably prior to 1660.73 A 
statement’s truth was a successful defense for individuals accused of slander in a civil or 
ecclesiastical court. Following Coke’s 1605 redefinition of sedition, those accused of libel could 
no longer rely on a statement’s veracity to ensure a “not guilty” verdict. Thus while slander and 
libel were still used interchangeably, after 1605, there was an important difference in the way 
slander and libel suits were determined when the slander or libel was directed against a 
commoner. Though a defendant could no longer establish the truth of a statement to avoid 
punishment, the plaintiff still had to contend with the burden of proof. For a libel suit to proceed, 
the plaintiff had to be able to produce a copy of the libel or a recitation of the words verbatim.74 
William Sheppard dedicated a chapter of his 1662 law book on slander to the matter of libel, 
outlining several rules for determining a libel. For example, a piece of writing or picture could be 
termed a libel regardless of whether it was true or false, the person it concerned had a good or 
bad reputation, it was spread secretly or openly, or if it concerned a deceased individual.75 
Additionally, one could be prosecuted for contriving a libel, procuring it to be contrived, or for 
maliciously disseminating or repeating it after one has learned that it was libelous. There were 
some caveats to this point, though. If a person heard, read, or took a copy of a libel but did not 
publish it to others, it was not punishable; yet if an individual took a copy and did not present it 
to a magistrate for examination, it was assumed that he intended to disseminate it, for “it is great 
																																																								
73 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 506.  
74 Adam Fox, “Ballads, Libels and Popular Ridicule in Jacobean England.” Past & Present 145 (Nov. 1994): 48-83, 
57. 
75 He goes on to admit, though, that there does not seem to be a clear procedure for libels directed against a deceased 
individual. He states, “it is to be enquired how this should be punished”; Action upon the Case for Slander, 117. The 
influence of Coke’s arguments concerning libels and the doctrine of sedition can be seen in Sheppard’s rules for 
determining libels. 
		 26	
evidence, that he doth publish it.”76 William Vaughan likewise mentioned in The Spirit of 
Detraction (1611) that the best way to stay out of trouble if one found a libel about a private 
individual was to either burn it, or present it to a magistrate.77 As always, the rank of the 
individual slandered was of great importance. If the libel concerned a public official or a peer, it 
had to be presented to a magistrate because such libels were of greater severity than those 
directed against commoners. The overlap in verbal offenses is evident in Sheppard’s comments 
concluding the chapter on libel. He noted that if a “great man” was slandered by libel, he could 
prosecute for scandalum magnatum.78 
As historians such as Manning and Cressy have demonstrated, verbal offenses were often 
interpreted more harshly during times of crises than they normally would have been during less 
contentious times. This was especially true during the reign of Henry VIII.79 A statement’s 
interpretation and its punishment as verbal sedition or verbal treason were partly dependent upon 
the current sociopolitical climate. Drawing on Václav Havel’s experiences in 1970s 
Czechoslovakia, Patterson notes, “no utterance is autonomous, still less, once it is uttered, [is it] 
under the author’s interpretive control. ‘Truth’ or meaning ‘lies not only in what is said, but also 
in who says it, and to whom, why, how and under what circumstances.’”80 
In summary, attempting to define slander in early modern England was a complicated 
business – and it remains so to this day. Not only did slander overlap with various verbal 																																																								
76 Ibid., 116. 
77 Vaughan, The Spirit of Detraction, 173.  
78 Sheppard, Action upon the Case for Slander, 117. 
79 See Manning, “The Origins of the Doctrine of Sedition,” and Cressy who notes, “In no other reign were so many 
executed for allegedly speaking treason,” before clarifying that “the king’s early years yield few instances of 
treasonable or seditious talk, but a flood of cases followed in the 1530s,” after Henry’s break with Rome; Dangerous 
Talk, 48. Referencing Henry VIII’s First and Second Acts of Succession, Kaplan likewise argues that “the political 
climate, and not the truth of the speech, determines whether language is defamatory or not”; The Culture of Slander, 
29. 
80 Censorship and Interpretation, 10. While Havel’s experience of censorship is located in a particular time and 
place, his observation concerning the nature of “truth” (and, just as important, the nature of meaning, as 
foregrounded by Patterson’s crucial interpolation of the word) extends beyond the particularities of the events that 
prompted this assertion. 
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offenses, there was no overriding rule governing slander litigation in the secular courts. As legal 
historians such as Helmholz have demonstrated, any attempt to establish such basic rules was 
always subject to a number of exceptions. Slander and tongue treatises treated the rise of slander 
litigation as an overwhelming epidemic, one that threatened the very stability of the country. 
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that the authors of such treatises would turn to 
metaphor to describe the effects of this worrisome phenomenon.  
In her investigation of slander’s “linguistic dimension,” Habermann argues that, “the 
susceptibility of language to slander is due to the metaphorical nature of language which appears 
in the signifying mechanisms of individual words as well as in types of “translated speech” such 
as tropes and figures.” Drawing on English treatises on rhetoric, she goes on to explain, “figures 
of speech are no innocent ornaments, according to Puttenham, but also ‘abuses or rather 
trespasses in speech’, because they extend normal language to create ‘a certain doublenesse’. 
Metaphors and allegories become figures of dissimulation and obscurity.”81 Habermann later 
clarifies that period conversation about slander “oscillates between the figurative and the literal” 
and that “there is a clear awareness of the metaphoricity of speech, but it does not appear to 
create the same feeling of distance – of Uneigentlichkeit – in the early modern period as it does 
today.”82 Although the act of slandering another is a concrete, identifiable event, one that can 
have very real effects, slander itself is an intangible phenomenon. It mimics the distance between 
words and objects in a similar manner to metaphor.83 Metaphors are a natural medium for 
																																																								
81 Habermann, Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England, 13, 23. Carla Mazzio also discusses the 
slipperiness of language, locating its source in the tongue itself, as the organ’s additional meaning of language “is 
made explicit in Renaissance discourses about discourse such as Erasmus’s Lingua, where the duplicities of 
language are imagined to emerge from the inherent slipperiness and duality of the organ of speech”; “Sins of the 
Tongue,” The Body in Parts, ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (New York: Routledge, 1997), 53-79, 54. 
82 Ibid., 113. 
83 Maria Franziska Fahey demonstrates in Metaphor and Shakespearean Drama that metaphors are inherently 
contradictory in that they combine like with difference, or, proximity with distance; Metaphor and Shakespearean 
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describing slander because they simultaneously gesture to both its figurative and literal effects. 
Although certain early modernists like Puttenham recognized the potential dissimulation inherent 
in figures of speech, as Habermann has noted, many of the most commonly used metaphors 
describing the nature and effects of slander were inherited from the Bible. The authors of slander 
and tongue treatises employed these inherited metaphors because they had a pedigree that 
presumably quelled Puttenham’s qualms, for the authors of the Bible are believed to have been 
divinely inspired. It may have been reasonable to distrust an individual’s words in an age where 
slander was seen as running rampant, but to doubt words inspired by God was blasphemy. These 
were metaphors that could be trusted, but not all metaphors were seen as similarly innocuous. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, metaphor was occasionally employed to slander others. Furthermore, 
period authorities ultimately relied on metaphor when punishing sedition. As discussed above, 
not only were the punishments themselves highly metaphoric, so were the locations in which 
these punishments were carried out. 
Each chapter of the succeeding chapters places literary texts from the period roughly 
spanning the 1560s to the 1630s alongside little-studied treatises about slander and sins of the 
tongue, all of which I consider within the developing legal framework of slander law. The fear 
that slander could spread from an offender’s body to the kingdom is newly evident in the sedition 
statute of 1554, which decreed slander against the monarch a criminal offense punishable by 
public mutilation, and called for convicted seditionists to be punished at the market of the town 
where the slander was first voiced. Literary critics have focused on period authors’ demonization 
of slander, its relation to gender, and its depiction in drama. “Do Feet Have Mouths,” in contrast, 
cuts across a variety of media and several genres, engaging and extending recent scholarship in 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Drama: Unchaste Signification (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 11. This idea is discussed in further detail 
in Chapter 3. 
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literature and the law, the history of slander, and the history of the senses. Furthering Lindsey 
Kaplan’s arguments concerning slander’s unstable nature, I argue that this volatility allowed it to 
be put to many uses, from policing the behavior of others to defining exclusive communities. 
Combining the approaches of historians such as R.H. Helmholz who have delineated the 
development of slander law, and cultural historians, particularly Gail Kern Paster, who have 
illustrated how the early modern body was conceived as a vulnerable, almost porous entity, I 
demonstrate how conceptions of slander developed from a spiritual sin under the purview of 
church courts to a dangerous and potentially criminal threat against a person’s body, livelihood, 
and society itself. 
Chapter One investigates three Tudor case studies that collectively exhibit slander’s 
dangerous nature and the body of law that emerged to contain threat. This chapter introduces a 
central claim: in the cultural history of slander, social status plays a determinative and often 
overlooked role. I examine how legal punishments were influenced by the social status of 
convicted slanderers as well as numerous, unpredictable factors including the sociopolitical 
climate. The first two case studies, John Bale’s King Johan (circa 1538, revised post 1558) and 
John Stubbs’s The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf (1579), concentrate on a particular type of 
slander, religiously motivated sedition. Commoners used religion to define sedition as 
anything— including a monarch’s marriage—opposed to individual religious belief. The 
community’s sundry responses to Stubbs’s text and eventual punishment emphasize the 
draconian nature of the era’s slander laws, partly shaped by social status which resulted in the 
removal of Stubbs’s offending hand. The final case study, the 1590 infanticide rumors alleged 
against Queen Elizabeth, underscores the importance of the sociopolitical climate when 
addressing slander.  
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Chapter Two turns to the body and focuses on the surprising and often conflicting range 
of emotions that slander could elicit from commoners and monarchs alike. Shakespeare’s 
Measure for Measure (1603-04) depicts a range of corporeal responses to slander, many of them 
organized through the play’s neglected heart and tongue imagery. In his capacity as ruler of 
Vienna, the Duke’s fear of and attempt to eradicate slander portrays the impossibility of 
exorcising this threat, a fantasy that could only occur if the government routinely employed 
public mutilation. My examination of “The Five Senses” (1621-23), a widely circulated 
manuscript libel that brazenly depicted James I’s body as dangerously open to outside influences, 
demonstrates an unexpected reply to slander: mercy. The King chose not to interpret this libel as 
slander, instead demonstrating his authority by merely quipping that the author “wished good 
things for him.” In contrast, John Rous, the man who preserved this forbidden libel and recorded 
James’s purported reply, showed palpable anxiety because of the risk he ran by recording the 
poem. I contend that these individuals’ contrasting responses exhibit the conflicted feelings that 
early modern slander provoked. 
My scrutiny of Measure for Measure’s heart and tongue imagery in Chapter Two 
introduced the prevalence of metaphor when discussing slander’s effects upon individual and 
social bodies. Chapter Three furthers this analysis by focusing on the popular metaphorical 
depiction of slander as a poison or plague that distempers the individual and the metaphorical 
body. The effects of this deadly poison are portrayed in several allegorical episodes of Book II of 
Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene (1596). The House of Alma, a house of temperance 
shaped as a human figure, is assaulted by an assortment of incorporeal forces wielding slander as 
a weapon, an episode that showcases the body’s vulnerability to outside influence. This event 
moreover prepares the way for the appearance of the Blatant Beast, slander made flesh, in the 
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second half of the work. I argue that Spenser suggests that patience is the tempered body’s 
defense against slander.   
Chapter Four develops the notion of slander as poison by investigating what happens 
when it is the monarch who has become possessed by slander and the resulting harm this causes 
to familial and social bonds and the nation itself. Focusing on The Winter’s Tale (1610-11), I use 
the concept that slander is responsible for a triple homicide, murdering the speaker and hearer of 
the slander as well as the individual slandered, to generate an innovative reading of the play, one 
that better explains the seemingly arbitrary deaths of Hermione, Mamillius, and Antigonus. I 
additionally contend that the play’s surprisingly redemptive conclusion shares context with 
slander suits filed in the ecclesiastical courts. Church courts relied on public penance to repair 
the damage caused to a slander victim’s reputation. My dissertation thus concludes by focusing 
on how individuals and the larger community can move beyond slander and begin to heal. 
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Chapter 1 Moving Targets: Unstable Definitions of Slander and the Emergence of Sedition 
 
Slander had no consensual definition in early modern England. Both the status of words 
and legal precedent were evolving. Slander law was being defined on a case-by-case basis as a 
result of slander cases being heard in the civil courts on an increasingly regular basis during the 
sixteenth century. Prior to this time, slander was considered a spiritual sin and thus fell under the 
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. The civil courts, unlike the ecclesiastical courts, 
rewarded financial damages to the victims of slander, which aided the flood of slander cases filed 
in the later half of the century. Yet while many cases were entered into the records, the majority 
of them were settled out of court and the resolutions were not recorded.84 Concomitant with 
jurisdictional changes, when a case did proceed to trial, determinations about what constituted 
slander involved weighing numerous variables, making it impossible to reduce this verbal 
phenomenon to all-encompassing rules. What was crucial in one case could be of secondary 
importance in another. In addition to the limits of the legal archive and the difficulties 
encountered in judging slander, the punishments meted out by the criminal courts to those 
convicted of political slander often varied, despite the clearly stated punishments noted in the 
statutes. Slander nonetheless rewards analysis because of the growing, unprecedented attention it 
garnered in sixteenth and seventeenth century England. This chapter will explore the complexity 
and instability of slander’s definition throughout sixteenth century England, focusing on a 
particular type of slander, that aimed at reigning monarchs. Throughout the century, the 
governments of the Tudor monarchs began to view words much more seriously than in the past, 
a concern that led to the articulation of the political crime of sedition: slander directed at a public 
person, including, but not limited to: magistrates, crown officials, members of the Privy Council, 																																																								
84 See the introduction for more on the deliberate slow pace of the court system when hearing slander cases. 
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or the monarch. While slander cases were mostly tried in civil courts, sedition was a criminal 
offense that could reach as high as the Star Chamber. 
I have chosen to focus on examples of slander against the monarch in this chapter 
because such statements present slander at its highest stakes and its most evident scope. Verbal 
or written critiques against the monarch could be seen as threatening the peace of the entire 
country. A slanderous statement directed against the monarch was considered sedition and, with 
the passage of the 1534 Treasons Statute, possibly even treason.85 When Henry VIII became the 
Supreme Head of the English Church, it meant that religious critique was now also political 
critique and thus subject to criminal charges in addition to heresy. Sedition was by its nature 
divisive, such statements always had the potential not only to create dissension between 
commoners and the monarch, but also to stir rebellion.86 In contrast, a slanderous statement 
spoken by one commoner against another created division between these two individuals and, at 
most, among their immediate community.  
This chapter investigates three case studies, one fictional and two historical, that 
collectively reveal slander’s unstable nature. These case studies focus on certain of slander’s 
more frequently reoccurring and interlocking variables, specifically, how religion and the current 
political climate affected determinations of slander. John Bale’s King Johan (completed circa 
1538, revised post 1558) was written after Henry’s watershed 1534 Treasons Statute, but during 
the period when the notion of sedition was developing as a serious, yet less harsh alternative to 
treason by words. The first sedition statute was passed in 1554 and it was under this statute that 
																																																								
85 The 1534 Treasons Statute, which held that simply slandering or libeling the monarch was treason, is discussed in 
greater detail in the introduction. 
86 The notion of sedition as a divisive force is a metaphor, yet one that in time came to be seen as truth. For example, 
Edward Coke argued that “It is not material whether the Libel be true” “for although the Libel be made against one, 
yet it incites all those of the same Family, Kindred, or Society to revenge”; The Reports of Edward Coke (London: 
printed for H. Twyford et al., 1680), vol. 5, 125. 
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John Stubbs’s The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf (1579) was punished. Yet Stubbs’s pamphlet was 
merely one effort in the larger English outcry against Elizabeth’s potential French marriage 
(although certainly the most infamous case). This outcry convinced Parliament to create a 
harsher sedition statute, passed in 1581, which preceded the final case study, the infanticide 
rumors leveled against Queen Elizabeth I in the 1590s. The first two case studies concentrate on 
a particular type of slander, religiously motivated sedition, revealing how broadly religion was 
used to define sedition as anything opposed to the author’s belief, even a monarch’s actions, 
while the final case study underscores the importance of the sociopolitical climate when 
addressing slander. My primary focus is on the interplay between religion and slander, yet my 
larger analysis will also incorporate such issues as the different stakes for written and verbal 
political commentary and how the rank of the individual uttering such commentary affected 
judgments on the matter. While the first two case studies involve texts crafted by highly educated 
men, the allegations examined in the last case study stem from low-ranking commoners. 
I have chosen to begin with Bale’s King Johan (circa 1538) because its portrayal of 
Sedition as a speaking character is unique for the era.87 By embodying this verbal crime, Bale 
emphasizes how sedition threatens national unity and the danger it poses to any monarch who 
seeks to reform the English Church. As with King Johan, the underlying belief motivating 
Stubbs’s A Gaping Gulf (1579) is the Catholic Church’s association with the Antichrist and the 																																																								
87 The only other period works to personify Sedition are the later political pamphlets Mistress Parliament Brought to 
Bed (1648) and Mistress Parliament Presented in her Bed (1648), both anonymous dialogues. See Thomas L. 
Berger, William C. Bradford and Sidney L. Sondergard, An Index of Characters in Early Modern English Drama 
Printed Plays, 1500-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For comparison, “Slander” was 
represented three times, in Ben Jonson’s Hymenaei (1606), The Masque of Queens (1609), and The Golden Age 
Restored (1616); “Rumor,” six times, in R.B. (Richard Bower’s?) Appius and Virginia (1575), the anonymous 
Clyomon and Clamydes (1599), John Phillip’s Patient and Meek Grissell (1566), Shakespeare’s 2 Henry IV (1600), 
R. Amerie and R. Davies’s Chester’s Triumph (1610), and Thomas Campion’s The Masque of Squires (The Masque 
at the Earl of Somerset’s Marriage) (1614); “Treason,” also personified in King Johan, is seen in three more plays, 
Anthony Munday’s Chyrysanaleia (1616) and Siderothriambos (1618), and the anonymous Charles the First (after 
January 29, 1649). This list was compiled using Berger et al.’s An Index of Characters and Darryll Grantley’s 
English Dramatic Interludes, 1300-1580: A Reference Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).   
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threat to England. Stubbs may not have read Bale’s works, yet A Gaping Gulf utilizes the 
apocalyptic language that defines Bale’s most influential work, The Image of Both Churches 
(1645).88 Stubbs’s massively popular Protestant polemic urged Elizabeth against marrying the 
French prince, the Duke of Alençon. The Stubbs incident painfully evidences the dangers of 
presenting unflattering portrayals of the monarch; additionally, Elizabeth’s response 
demonstrates the possible conflicts between judicial and monarchic judgments when determining 
what constituted slander in early modern England and whose verdict mattered most. 
The final case study focuses on the 1590 infanticide rumors alleged against Elizabeth. 
These rumors have not received sustained, critical attention. Though they are often mentioned by 
scholars discussing the critiques directed against Elizabeth, Carole Levin, in “‘We shall never 
have a merry world while the Queene lyveth’: Gender, Monarchy, and the Power of Seditious 
Words,” is the only scholar to attempt to analyze the motivation behind these appalling 
allegations.89 As with the preceding case studies, these rumors demonstrate how the language of 
critique is inextricably entangled with metaphor. I argue that the individuals who voiced these 
accusations utilized Elizabeth’s metaphoric depictions as the loving mother of her people and the 
phoenix in order to publicize her failure to act in accordance with these roles.  
 
The Battle of Two Churches: Sedition and Veracity in John Bale’s King Johan 
Bale’s King Johan has drawn scholarly attention as the first English history play (though 
technically a hybrid between a morality and a history play). Bale constructed the play on a set of 																																																								
88 In Reformers and Babylon: English Apocalyptic Visions from the Reformation to the Eve of the Civil War, Paul 
Christianson demonstrates how Bale’s vision of apocalyptic history, as worked out in The Image of Both Churches, 
“became the mainstream tradition in England” by the middle of Elizabeth’s reign (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1978), 46. While differences of opinion still existed among Protestants, the basic tenets voiced by English 
Protestant reformers of the 1530s had achieved wide acceptance by the 1570s. 
89 Carole Levin, “‘We shall never have a merry world while the Queene lyveth’: Gender, Monarchy, and the Power 
of Seditious Words” in Dissing Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana, ed. Julia Walker (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1998), 77-95.  
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beliefs that he later fully developed and outlined in The Image of Both Churches (1545), a work 
that gained him fame and notoriety in the sixteenth century.90 In Image, he provided a line-by-
line commentary on the Book of Revelation that presented an apocalyptic version of history 
focusing on the ongoing battle between the two titular churches, the beleaguered, Protestant 
church (the church of the elect), and the antagonistic, Catholic Church (the church of the 
Antichrist).91 For Bale, understanding Revelation was the key to understanding history. His view 
of history presented noteworthy events as episodes in the grand war between these two churches. 
This belief underlies King Johan, though it is complicated by Bale’s conviction that the 
metaphor of the war between the churches was not metaphor, but literal truth and undeniable 
fact. In King Johan, Bale attempted to demonstrate that the notion of the two churches is indeed 
truth, that is, he attempted to deny the metaphoricity of this allegory by naturalizing it. The 
character of Sedition is central to Bale’s intention, for he is representative of the Catholic 
Church’s corruption; through him, Bale defines his vision of King John and the English reformist 
cause in opposition to the Catholic Church.92 Bale’s goal was to promote royal supremacy by 
																																																								
90 According to John King, Image was “the first full-length Protestant commentary on Revelations” and Bale’s 
“historical vision became ingrained in the Renaissance consciousness through assimilation into such major texts as 
the Geneva Bible, Foxe’s Actes and Monuments, and Book One of Spenser’s Faerie Queene”; English Reformation 
Literature: The Tudor Origins of the Protestant Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 61, 61-62. 
King has elsewhere offered greater details concerning Bale’s impact on later Elizabethan and Jacobean authors, 
noting that “the polemical ideas of this renegade friar undergo assimilation into annotations added by the Puritan 
editors of the Geneva Bible, an unauthorized version favored by Shakespeare, Spenser, Sidney and Marlowe. 
Directly or indirectly, Bale’s Image influenced poetry written by these poets in addition to that by Donne, Milton, 
and others”; John King, ed., Voices of the English Reformation: A Sourcebook (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 6. Focusing on nation-building, Claire McEachern heralds it as “the founding typology 
of later national imaginings”; The Poetics of English Nationhood, 1590-1612 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 2; see also 26-29.  
91 Bale believed the early church was pure, but began to be corrupted during the fourth century and became aligned 
with the Antichrist in the seventh century. For a summary of Bale’s view of history as depicted in the Image, see 
Leslie Fairfield, John Bale: Mythmaker for the English Reformation (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University 
Press, 1976), 75-85.  
92 Opposing sedition to truth is an ideological position that countless individuals within the sixteenth century 
onwards, reformers and Catholics alike, have taken up. As I will demonstrate through King Johan, such a position is 
ultimately untenable, for both “sedition” and “truth” are unstable categories, each subject to continual revision as the 
particular needs of the moment demand. 
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recasting the embattled 13th century king as a virtuous martyr and tragic prototype for Henry 
VIII, thus providing the current monarch with a historic precedent for his break with Rome.93 
Henry VIII’s religious beliefs have sparked much debate among historians. As E.W. Ives 
succinctly states, one camp argues that Henry believed in “‘catholicism without the pope’” while 
“others have argued that he followed a middle course, between traditional religion and reform.” 
Ives concludes that “what neither explanation takes proper account of is the king’s determination 
to take charge and direct the church.”94 Henry did take a personal interest in establishing 
England’s new religion, but progress was inconsistent (in turn, affecting determinations of 
sedition). The initial burst of reform saw the dissolution of the monasteries, destruction of 
shrines and preaching against relics, yet these events were later tempered by the Six Articles of 
1539, as well as Henry’s refusal to allow clerical marriage. After the execution of the reforming 
Thomas Cromwell, Secretary of State and Viceregent of Religious Affairs, in June 1540, Henry’s 
final years displayed a more conservative mindset. Political expediencies, domestic and 
especially international, greatly affected religious decisions, yet events such as those of July 30, 
1540, when six individuals were all executed “in an act of grotesque symmetry,” three 
																																																								
93 Honor McCusker successfully demonstrated that Bale’s depiction of John as a righteous king forced to submit to a 
corrupt papacy is partly derived from William Tyndale’s Obedience of a Christian Man (1528), from which Bale 
“borrows several pages’ that appear “in a versified form” near the end of the play; John Bale: Dramatist and 
Antiquary (Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania: 1942), 90-94. Both Leslie Fairfield and Peter Happé have argued that Bale 
helped to create a Protestant martyrology; see Fairfield, John Bale: Mythmaker for the English Reformation, 89; and 
Happé John Bale (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 139. Bale’s main contributions to this nascent martyrology 
were: A brefe Chronycle concernynge the Examinacyon and death of the blessed martyr of Christ syr Johan 
Oldecastell (1544), The first examinacyon of Anne Askewe (1546), and The lattre examinacyon of Anne Askewe 
(1547). King Johan can be read as contributing to this emerging body of works. See also Rainer Pineas, “The 
Polemical Drama of John Bale,” Shakespeare and Dramatic Tradition: Essays in Honor of S.F. Johnson, ed. W.R. 
Elton and William B. Long (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989), 194-210. Pineas argues that “Bale’s 
overriding and constant concern was anti-Catholic polemic” and that he “sacrificed consistency, historical accuracy, 
dramatic forms and traditions, save those which served him polemically, and interest in biblical dispensations or 
periodization of prophecy except to use them as polemical weapons” (194). Bale’s whitewashing of John’s character 
is evidence of this single-minded pursuit. 
94 E.W. Ives, ‘Henry VIII (1491–1547),’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/view/article/12955, accessed 3 June 2015]. Hereafter cited as 
DNB. 
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Protestants having been burnt and three Catholics having been hanged, drawn and quartered, 
made it difficult to tell exactly where Henry stood.95 Whether one views Henry as essentially 
Catholic, or a moderate reformer, Bale was more committed to the reforming cause than his 
monarch.  
Born in 1495, Bale spent his early life as a Carmelite friar. In 1514, he enrolled in Jesus 
College, Cambridge, eventually earning a Doctorate of Divinity. He converted to Protestantism 
in 1533 through the influence of Thomas, Lord Wentworth, and, shortly thereafter, married a 
woman named Dorothy (about whom not much else is known). Following his conversion, Bale 
became an ardent and often, vitriolic, critic of the Catholic Church. Due to this outspokenness, 
he periodically found himself in conflict with the more conservative members of his community. 
He was twice questioned for heresy, in 1534, by Edward Lee, the Archbishop of York, and again 
in January 1537. Cromwell intervened on his behalf on both occasions. Most Bale scholars agree 
that Bale went on to participate in Cromwell’s propaganda campaign for the Reformation, 
though when and the extent to which he contributed to the campaign has been a matter of 
question.96 That he earned a certain notoriety among conservatives and Catholics is clear, for his 
works were twice outlawed; “on 7 May 1546, the Privy Council ordered the Lord Mayor of 
London to investigate the importation of ‘certain heretic books of Bale’s making’ and his work 
was condemned again in a proclamation of 8 July.”97 His works were outlawed by royal 
																																																								
95 Dermot Cavanagh, “The Paradox of Sedition in John Bale’s King Johan” in English Literary Renaissance 31.2 
(Spring 2001): 171-91, 185, fn 41. Cavanagh draws on John Foxe’s account of the event in Acts and Monuments, V, 
439; Robert Barnes was one of the three reformers burnt at the stake. 
96 See Seymour Baker House, “Cromwell’s Message to the Regulars: The Biblical Trilogy of John Bale, 1537.” 
Renaissance and Reformation/Renaissance et Reforme 15.2 (1991): 123-38; see also Paul Whitfield White who 
directly addresses the question as to how Bale “fit” within Cromwell’s propaganda campaign, arguing that while 
Bale was “still too controversial” in 1534 to be placed “on the Crown’s payroll” (15), it is safe to assume that he was 
directly patronized by Cromwell between early 1537 and early 1540 (16); Theater and Reformation: Protestantism, 
Patronage and Playing in Tudor England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12-41, especially 13-18.  
97 W.T. Davies, A Bibliography of Bale (Oxford: Printed for The Society at The Oxford University Press, 1940), 
217. Davies quotes from the Acts of the Privy Council, 409.  
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proclamation for a second time in June 1555.98 Additionally, he twice fled to the Continent, the 
first time from 1540 to 1548 following Cromwell’s execution. Having returned to England, he 
was appointed Bishop of Ossory in late 1552 and left for Ireland with Dorothy on January 21, 
1553. Once again his outspokenness and inability to compromise did not help endear him to his 
new community and he was forced to flee for his life following Mary’s accession, returning only 
after Elizabeth gained the throne.99 Even near the end of his life, Bale was involved in two 
slander suits that revolved around his reformist beliefs.100 Despite his age and that he no longer 
preached, he continued to lend his efforts to spreading Protestant beliefs until his death in 
1563.101  
I will briefly summarize King Johan before turning to my analysis of the play’s depiction 
of sedition as a danger to the nation and reforming monarchs. It is important to note that although 
the play is set during John’s reign, its context is the struggle to reform religion that was occurring 
within England in the late 1530s. The play keeps one eye on the past and one on contemporary 
events, thus bridging the two historic periods and emphasizing Bale’s view of history as a war 
between the two churches, represented here as Sedition and Holy Church (Catholicism) versus 
Verity and the true Church of England. The play opens with King John declaring his intention 
“to reforme the lawes” so that “trew justyce” be readily available throughout England (20, 21).102 
On cue, a personified England enters seeking his assistance. She informs John that her widowed 																																																								
98 See Tudor Royal Proclamations: Volume I, The Early Tudors (1485-1553), ed. Paul L. Hughes and James F. 
Larkin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 373-76. 
99 Once safely on the Continent, he wrote The Vocacyon of Johan Bale to the Bishoprick of Ossorie in Ireland 
(1553) detailing his time in Ireland and his harrowing journey to Germany. Because of the incredible series of events 
involved in this journey, he quite boldly depicted himself as a present-day St. Paul. 
100 A detailed account of these two slander cases can be found in Leslie Fairfield John Bale: Mythmaker for the 
English Reformation, 145-49. The first slander case seems to have been spurred by Bale’s attempt to have a friar’s 
garment made for a play he meant to stage at Mr. May’s house. A few months later, he was accused of being a 
“heretic and an Anabaptist.” 
101 For the bibliographic details of Bale’s life, see Davies, A Bibliography of Bale; and Jesse W. Harris, John Bale: A 
Study in the Minor Literature of the Reformation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1940).  
102 All citations are to The Complete Plays of John Bale, Peter Happé, ed., vol. I (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1985). 
Hereafter cited by line number. 
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state is the result of the clergy who have not only impoverished her, but also exiled her husband, 
God, by refusing to preach the Scriptures. As England pleads her case, she is continually 
interrupted by Sedition, the central Vice and a representative of Holy Church. Determined to 
fulfill his duty, John agrees to help England by reforming the church and he summons the three 
estates, Nobility, Clergy, and Civil Order, to help him do so. Though each displays some degree 
of reluctance in curbing the church’s liberty, all promise to obey the King and aid England. 
Clergy quickly proves a traitor, sending word to Rome of John’s actions. The scene then 
unexpectedly switches to Rome, where we are introduced to the other Vices: Dissimulation, 
Private Wealth, and Usurped Power (shortly revealed as the Pope). At the end of Act I, the Vices 
plot to defeat John, by excommunicating him, offering absolution to all who will defy him, and 
encouraging foreign invasion. To carry out their plans, the Vices assume additional roles as 
historical personages in Act II: Usurped Power as Pope Innocent III; Sedition as Stephen 
Langton, whose appointment to the Bishopric of Canterbury against John’s wishes was 
(historically) the catalyst for John’s disagreements with the church; Private Wealth as Cardinal 
Pandulphus, the individual who excommunicated John (historically not a Cardinal); and 
Dissimulation as Raymundus, the individual delegated by Pope Innocent III to rally foreign 
powers to invade England. Dissimulation later assumes a third role, Simon of Swinsett, a 
fictional name for the monk who poisoned John. 
Act II returns to England where Sedition quickly wins the loyalty of the three estates. 
John is further isolated when Commonalty, England’s blind and impoverished son, abandons 
him. Faced with overwhelming odds, John submits to the Pope in order to spare his people from 
slaughter. Not sufficiently satisfied, Dissimulation plots and succeeds in assassinating John by 
offering him a poisoned drink. Following John’s death, the play leaps forward to the late 1530s 
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when Verity, personified truth, and Imperial Majesty, simultaneously an allegorical depiction of 
sacred monarchy and an idealized version of King Henry VIII, enter the play.103 Working 
together, Verity and Imperial Majesty make the three estates acknowledge the error of their ways 
and pledge their assistance in the reformation of religion. The play ends with the hope that 
Elizabeth I and her future heirs will continue the work of the Reformation.  
As a result of being defined in opposition to the true church, the portrayal of Sedition 
differs from prior iterations of Vices. Sedition is blatantly evil (with the brief exception of his 
disguise as “Good Perfection”) and openly decries Holy Church’s corruption, presenting the 
fantasy that evil confesses itself. Such impudence is meant to be symptomatic of Holy Church, a 
parasitic, foreign body that seeks only power and wealth to the complete disregard of those under 
its care, as literalized by the impoverished bodies of Widow England and Commonalty. Despite 
Bale’s heavy didacticism, the weight placed upon his vision of history, the metaphor of the two 
churches, creates an instability at the center of the play.104 The portrayal of Sedition (and Holy 
Church) is inconsistent because sedition is not the opposite of truth; moreover, if truth were self-
evident, then sedition would be unnecessary. The play’s final movements display how the lines 
between truth and sedition (or what gets labeled “truth” or “sedition”) require constant vigilance 
																																																								
103 John is linked to Henry VIII through the actor’s doubling as Imperial Majesty. This connection is emphasized 
early in the play through John’s decision to “put downe” any monastic houses where he finds Sedition (256), 
Sedition having admitted that he frequently hides within monastic houses (253-54). John’s declaration to destroy 
such houses is seen as a reference to the dissolution of the monasteries by Henry, a move greatly desired by 
Protestant reformers who viewed monastic houses as dens of iniquity. 
104 David Scott Kastan makes a similar argument, though he locates the play’s instability in its attempt to deny itself 
as a play, whereas I find the root of this instability in the metaphor of the two dueling churches. Kastan’s argument 
is that the play “reveals an instability in its own polemical assertions” in that “King Johan enacts Bale’s apocalyptic 
vision of history in John’s heroic resistance of the papacy, but it always threatens to collapse its fundamental 
opposition between goodly rule and papal duplicity in the very conditions of its enactment. If papal untruth is 
presented in terms of its manifest “ipocrysy” (432), its deceptive “serymonys and popetly plays” (415), the singular 
truth of John’s proto-Protestantism can be maintained only by impossibly asserting it as something plain and 
immediate, as something unfeigned; that is, it can be maintained only by repressing the fact of the play itself.” 
““Holy Wurdes” and “Slypper Wit”: John Bale’s King Johan and the Poetics of Propaganda” in Rethinking the 
Henrician Era: Essays on Early Tudor Texts and Contexts, ed. Peter C. Herman (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1994), 267-82, 272. 
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and renegotiation. Thomas Betteridge argues “there is a textual relation between the role of 
Sedicyon and that of Veritas, if only because Imperyall Majestye appears to depend on one or the 
other of them to tell him what is happening in the country.”105 Among their various roles, 
Sedition and Verity each relate information about the state of the country. This shared duty 
underscores the relation between sedition and truth, emphasizing how sedition can hamper the 
truth, yet can also be the truth. Moreover, the role of Verity was doubled with that of Sedition; 
the actor’s body thereby made physical the overlap between truth and sedition.106 The story of 
Sedition within King Johan, and, to some degree, throughout early modern England, is not one 
of stability, but of flux, as such varied factors as the monarch’s temperament, an individual’s 
beliefs, or the political events of the day all play a role in defining the words and acts that get 
labeled “sedition.”107 I argue that Sedition/sedition within King Johan is unstable yet informative. 
I will demonstrate how Bale’s attempt to define Sedition/sedition as unnatural and antithetical to 
truth is repeatedly undermined through the course of the play and that Sedition proves a 
necessary evil as both John and Imperial Majesty learn the true workings of Holy Church in 
England only through conversation with him. 
In his article, “The Paradox of Sedition in John Bale’s King Johan,” Dermot Cavanagh 
argues that “Sedition colludes in exposing the church as a sinful and partisan body and such acts 
of self-disclosure create an unsettling proximity between Bale’s polemical intentions and the 
																																																								
105 Tudor Histories of the English Reformations, 1530-83 (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 
1999), 72. Betteridge’s larger point is that the process of reform remains incomplete at the end of the play.  
106 See The Complete Plays of John Bale, Happé, Appendix 4, 152-53. Happé’s doubling scheme conflicts with 
certain of the manuscript’s stage directions, yet his goal is to make sense of what appears to have been Bale’s desire 
to stage the play with four rather than five actors. Several scholars reference Happé’s doubling scheme indicating 
that it has achieved acceptance.  
107 Though it is possible to identify certain patterns, particular variables that are generally considered when weighing 
a statement’s potentially slanderous nature, or how certain monarchs, like Henry VIII, were quicker to punish 
slander than others, what gets labeled sedition varies greatly from reign to reign. 
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Vice’s effects.”108 Though fiercely loyal to the Pope, Sedition ironically acts as a mouthpiece for 
the reformers. His disclosures of the church’s myriad abuses confirm John’s allegations against 
the institution while also revealing that the contagion runs far deeper than imagined. Throughout 
the course of the play, each side accuses the other of heresy and sedition. Borrowing from the 
morality play tradition, the psychomachia further demonstrates the instability and reversibility of 
such categories as “reformer” or “heretic” and the judgments applied to those positions, “truth” 
versus “sedition.” Although in early modern England the monarch generally was the individual 
who set the definition for “sedition,” John is unable to enforce his will. The historical King John 
was not a reformer, but the play’s idealization of Henry VIII, Imperial Majesty, is. Bale 
emphasized the struggle to cement reformed religion in England in order to urge political and 
social leaders to help the monarch establish reform through constant vigilance.  
While I agree with Cavanagh’s assessment concerning the paradoxical depiction of 
Sedition, his argument needs to be extended. It is not simply Sedition, but also the personified 
three estates, Nobility, Clergy, and Civil Order, which together undermine the differences 
between the two systems of belief (Catholic and proto-Protestant) thereby demonstrating the 
reversibility of accusations of sedition.109 Their temptation and eventual conversion derive from 
the morality play tradition that Bale utilizes, yet their commitment to the Reformation at the end 
of the play remains uncertain. As Greg Walker contends, “as befits a play which was the product 
of a continuing and only partially complete reformation, the final mood is not one of 
complacency in a job well done, but of caution and warning.”110 The play ends with the hope that 
																																																								
108 “The Paradox of Sedition in John Bale’s King Johan,” 175. 
109 Throughout my discussion of King Johan, I will refer to John’s attempt to reform the church as proto-Protestant. 
When discussing Bale’s beliefs and that of the character of Imperial Majesty, I will use the more accurate 
“Protestant.” 
110 Plays of Persuasion: Drama and Politics at the Court of Henry VIII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 177.  
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Elizabeth will continue the struggle against the Anti-Christ, yet Imperial Majesty’s repeated 
urgings to the three estates to remain faithful to the reforming cause undercuts the victory that 
has ostensibly just been achieved. Rather than celebrating, Imperial Majesty’s evident concern 
regarding the three estate’s fidelity demonstrates the ease with which the advancements made by 
reformers could be washed away, a fact attested by the conservative mood of Henry VIII’s final 
years and by Mary Tudor’s temporary reestablishment of Catholicism.  
The vicissitudes of the English Reformation are a well-studied subject, yet Bale’s 
experiences document the era’s religious strife on a personal level. The sum of his experiences 
inevitably left an indelible mark upon his outlook, which must be borne in mind when reading 
King Johan. Written between the later 1530s and revised post-1558, the play’s development 
bookends Bale’s two exiles and his many adventures in between.111 Such breadth, Cavanagh 
argues, “allowed [Bale] an insight into shifting government policy, and the changing fortunes of 
the Reformation, that is often assumed to be solely the prerogative of his successors.”112 Bale’s 
panoramic view of the Reformation is felt in the play’s restrained ending. 
The play’s long gestation period witnessed four different rulers and a couple of changes 
in religion, yet King Johan’s focus is on the late 1530s. Walker has shown that the vast majority 
of the play was written in 1538, with the epilogue having been written after September 1560, but 
before Bale’s death on November 15, 1563.113 This long development is borne out by the material 
conditions of the manuscript; its pages are numbered 1 through 63 and it is written in two 
hands.114 The first part, pages 1-22, 24-25, and 27-38, which were written and later revised by an 																																																								
111 I will discuss the development of King Johan in further detail below. 
112 “The Paradox of Sedition in John Bale’s King Johan,” 174.  
113 Plays of Persuasion, 169-78. 
114 In the description of the manuscript that follows, I follow the suggestions made by Barry B. Adams in the 
introduction to his edition of the play (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 1-69, with the exception of his 
dating of the manuscript. This edition includes the fullest description of the material conditions of the manuscript; 
see especially pages 1-17. See also The Complete Plays of John Bale, Happé, vol. I, 9-11. Jeffrey Leininger has 
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unknown scribe, are referred to as the A-text; pages 23 and 26 had become detached, but were 
later added by Bale, and are considered part of the A-text. The A-text’s attention to stage 
directions and the doubling scheme suggests that it may have been prepared for performance. 
The B-text is composed of pages 39-63 and was written by Bale himself.115 The date of the 
watermark on pages 39-63 demonstrates that he did not transcribe his work until after 1558. Bale 
began by simply correcting minor mistakes in the A-text, adding some new material as well; 
found on pages 11, 29, 32, 35 and 37, the new material consists mainly of lengthened speeches. 
The most significant revisions occur at the end of the A-text. Bale began writing lengthy 
additions on page 38, which carried over onto pages 39-40. It seems the additions became too 
unwieldy, for he then cancelled these last two pages and began a clean version of these insertions 
on page 41. The new material, which incorporated nearly every line of the cancelled A-text 
material, lengthened the drama by about a third. 
There is only one documented performance of King Johan, before Archbishop Cranmer 
in Canterbury on January 2, 1539. Other performance dates have been suggested, including St. 
Stephens, Canterbury, in September 1538,116 at King Edward’s VI’s coronation, and before 
Queen Elizabeth I at Ipswich in August 1561. It has also been hypothesized that the friar’s cloak 
Bale attempted to have made in Canterbury, 1560, may have been in anticipation of a 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
recently sought to establish the date of the A-text as “probably prepared in 1537, and not 1538-1539 as has been 
argued”; “The Dating of Bale’s King John: A Re-Examination.” Medieval English Theater 24 (2002): 116-37, 116. 
115 Davies was the first to note the development of Bale’s handwriting while on the Continent during his first exile, 
as well as its relevance to the dating of King Johan; see A Bibliography of Bale, 244-46. 
116 Spectators for this performance included Henry VIII and most of his court. Seymour Baker House argues that the 
play performed was probably the lost On the treasons of Beckett on the grounds that the performance took place on 
September 8, 1538, the evening “after England’s most famous shrine [Beckett’s] had been dismantled there.” See 
Seymour Baker House, “Cromwell’s Message to the Regulars,” 125. Given Henry’s known dislike of Thomas 
Beckett, this may have been a wiser choice of play than King Johan, which urged further religious reform and 
critiqued aural confession, a sacrament in which Henry believed.  
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performance of King Johan.117 None of these suggestions have been conclusively proved. The 
play exists in only one manuscript, preserved in the Huntington Library, MS. HM 3; it was not 
printed until 1838.118 Though the facts suggest that the play languished in obscurity, a letter from 
Cranmer to Cromwell providing pertinent details for an inquisition sparked by the play’s only 
documented performance leaves one to wonder what might have been had the play been staged 
more regularly and/or printed during Bale’s lifetime.119 Cranmer’s letter is unique, for it confers 
upon King Johan the status of being “the only extant play-text of the reign for which a precise 
date of performance can be determined,” while concomitantly detailing audience reaction.120  
With his letter, Cranmer included the bill of the depositions of three witnesses detailing 
their discussion of the play. These witnesses included an eighteen-year-old named John Alforde, 
a fifty-year-old named Thomas Browne of Shawlteclyfe, Kent, and, Henry Totehill, a shipman 
from the parish of St. Katherine’s by Tower Hill. After witnessing the play, Alforde told Browne 
“that it ys petie that the Bisshop of Rome should reigne any lenger, for if he should, the said 
Bisshop wold do with our King as he did with King John,” prompting Totehill to respond “That 
it was petie and nawghtely don, to put down the Pope and Saincte Thomas; for the Pope was a 
good man, and Saincte Thomas savid many suche as this deponent was from hangyng.” Thomas 
Browne felt the play was  
																																																								
117 King Johan is one of three extant Bale plays for which the friar’s cloak would have been required. The others 
include Three laws (written circa 1536, published 1548) and The Temptation (written 1538, published 1547); Happé 
John Bale, 24. 
118 John Bale’s King Johan, Adams, 1-69. Happé, notes that revisions to the manuscript suggest that it may have 
been prepared in anticipation of performance and/or printing; see John Bale, 24, 90-91.  
119 Miscellaneous Writings and Letters of Thomas Cranmer, ed. J.E. Cox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1846), 387-88. 
120 Walker, Plays of Persuasion, 171. Walker goes on to argue that Henry Totehill, the individual under inquisition, 
probably did not see the play, contending that Totehill’s remark “is more likely to have referred to recent steps taken 
by the Crown to enforce the repudiation of papal authority and the vilification of Becket rather than to the specific 
content of King Johan” (174-75). Adams has also noted that the responses of these witnesses “fit no other known 
play of the period”; John Bale’s King John, 20.  
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one of the beste matiers that ever he sawe, towching King John; and than sayd 
that that he had harde divers tymes preistes and clerkes say, that King John did 
loke like one that hadd run frome brynnyng of a house, butt this deponent knewe 
now that yt was nothing treu; for, as farr as he perceyved, King John was as noble 
a prince as ever was in England; and thereby we myght perceyve that he was the 
begynner of the puttyng down of the Bisshop of Rome, and thereof we myght be 
all glad. Then answerd the said Totehill, that the Bisshop of Rome was made Pope 
by the clergie and by the consent of all the Kinges Christen. Than said this 
deponent, Holde your peace, for this communication ys nawght. Than said 
Totehill, I am sorye if I have said amysse, for I thought no harme to no man. 121 
 
The play achieved the results that Bale desired, for Browne’s response portrays the play as an 
edifying experience, Browne “knewe now” the truth. Alforde likewise seems to have taken the 
play to heart, associating King Henry VIII with King John, while viewing the Pope as a 
treacherous enemy. Yet truth, like sedition, can be relative. Totehill’s reaction underscores this 
point. His attempted apology, “I thought no harme to no man,” suggests that commoners were all 
too aware of the potential hazards of “casual” conversation, that is, that any conversation was 
subject to policing, for one individual’s truth was another’s sedition and that it was all too easy to 
offend or cause “harm.” This conversation demonstrates that just as the monarch did, commoners 
likewise monitored their speech. 
 
“Serche and ye shall fynd”: Sedition in King Johan 
Near the end of Act I, during the brief interval in Rome, Bale concocts three versions of the 
Vices’ genealogy and allegorical relationship, depicting Sedition as a foreign body. In the first 
version, Sedition and Dissimulation are revealed to be cousins who “cum of two bretherne” 
(673), Dissimulation of Falsehood and Sedition of Petty Treason; their grandfather was Infidelity 
and they all descend from the Antichrist, “The great Pope of Rome or fyrst veyne popysh prist” 
(673-78). In the second version of the Vices’ allegorical relationship, Sedition explains “False 																																																								
121 Miscellaneous Writings and Letters of Thomas Cranmer, Cox, 388. 
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Dyssymulacyon doth bryng in Privat Welth; / And Usurpyd Powre, which is more ferce than a 
Turcke, / Cummeth in by hym to decayve all spyrytuall helth; / Than I by them bothe, as clere 
experyence telth” (771-74).122 Dissimulation is then revealed to have originally entered through 
the work of the devil (779-80). This redefinition of the Vices’ relationship is itself subject to 
almost immediate revision when Sedition asks Usurped Power to exit and reenter carrying him. 
Usurped Power hesitates, afraid Sedition will prove too heavy, prompting Dissimulation to state, 
“we shall bare hym all thre, /…/ For ther is non of us but in hym hath a stroke” (799, 801). In the 
first version, Sedition’s connection to the Antichrist reinforces the character’s birthplace as 
Rome. This connection, together with the link to the devil in the other versions, also emphasizes 
Holy Church’s nature as the Church of the Antichrist, antagonist to the church of the elect. The 
second and third versions further underscore sedition as an imported, invasive force. Usurped 
Power’s prodigious fierceness, greater than a Turk’s, stresses the foreign nature of the Vices.  
The various genealogies also present a couple of discrepancies or paradoxes in regard to 
sedition. While previously associated with Dissimulation, emphasizing sedition’s often-secretive 
nature, Sedition’s request to be carried in on the Pope’s back is impudent, demonstrating how 
sedition can be both clandestine and audacious. Furthermore, in the first version, sedition appears 
to be a lesser evil. While it is nonetheless an example of the devil’s power on earth, it is depicted 
as less serious than petty treason, parallel to or on equal grounds with dissimulation. In contrast, 
the second and third versions depict it as the culmination of the other evils, the other Vices. 
Lastly, the link to falsehood again attempts to present Sedition as antithetical to Veracity, an 
opposition that the play simply cannot maintain.  
																																																								
122 This explanation is preceded by Sedition’s direct address to the audience, “Sures, marke well this gere” (770), 
ensuring that the audience both pay close attention and understand how these Vices work.  
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In order to promote royal supremacy, the play depicts any loyalty to Holy Church as 
unnatural. It does so through an escalating accretion of associations that argue that devotion to 
Holy Church, as opposed to the king, is seditious, unpatriotic, and, ultimately, unnatural. At the 
start of the play, England vehemently rejects the English clergy as her children, claiming “Nay, 
bastardes they are, unnaturall by the rood!” (69). She later threatens her poor, blind son, 
Commonalty, that “Yf thow leve thy kyng take me never for thy mother” (1610). Sedition 
similarly denies any relation to England, furiously stating “I am not her chyld: I defye hyr, by the 
messe!” (179). Finally, Verity echoes this notion declaring the three estates betrayal of John as 
an “unnaturall doynge” (2266). By arguing that any display of loyalty to Holy Church is a 
revocation of one’s English identity, the play reduces the struggle to reform the church to the 
following equation: devotion to Holy Church/Catholicism as unnatural, devotion to the 
king/reformed religion as natural. It creates the illusion that any seditious behavior stems from 
foreign influence. In seeking to set these beliefs in diametrical opposition, the play denies the 
possibility of any middle ground and, in the process, disregards the permeability and instability 
of the definition of “sedition.”  
This oversimplified concept of sedition is continually undermined by the action of the 
play. By deeming devotion to the Holy Church as unnatural, the play concomitantly elevates any 
actions that go against its interests, such as critique or exposure of its corruption, to the status of 
patriotism, the expected actions of a natural-born Englishman. Yet this simply does not hold for 
Sedition, who is happy to spill church secrets. He does so not out of loyalty to England, or a 
sense of right, but because of his and Holy Church’s overweening pride, their misguided belief in 
the church’s unassailable power. Sedition’s actions begin to blur the lines between unnatural and 
patriotic actions. When the three estates eventually turn against Holy Church, echoing some of 
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Sedition’s earlier allegations, they are seen as finally fulfilling their divinely ordained roles. Yet, 
as discussed below, when Imperial Majesty questions the sincerity of their recommitment, it 
further undercuts the concept of Catholicism as unnatural by suggesting the ease with which one 
can backslide, thereby demonstrating that the categories of Catholicism and Protestantism are 
more fluid than the equation reveals. The actions of these characters show that there is middle 
ground between these two poles and that the beliefs that are defined “sedition” or “patriotic” are 
constantly being renegotiated.  
While the concept is strained by the actions of Sedition and the three estates, it is 
demolished by John’s submission in Act II. Knowing he has no choice but to surrender, John 
asks England to “shewe now thyselfe a mother” by compassing his submission (1717), actions 
that theoretically reverse the equation. Bale’s later additions emphasize that John submits solely 
out of a desire to save his people from slaughter. Inspired by love of country, his action is thus 
both thoroughly patriotic and seditious, as he acknowledges Holy Church’s supremacy—“Here I 
submyt me to Pope Innocent the Thred” (1725). Bale was aware of this tension, for his additions 
reveal his efforts to absolve John of any possible critique; lines 1534-44, 1640-49, and 1666-
1704 emphasize John’s isolation and his desire to protect his people. Yet England’s lament 
following the submission clearly critiques the king and is nearly seditious, “ye have done sore 
amys; / Of a fre woman ye have now mad a bonde mayd. / Yowre selfe and heyres ye have for 
ever decayd” (1766-68). Moreover, immediately following his surrender, John is tested by the 
appearance of a treasonous priest, aptly named Treason. His order to execute the priest displays 
his desire to continue reforming the church, a desire that is again quashed by Cardinal 
Pandulphus/Private Wealth. John’s instincts to continue to curb the church’s liberties clearly 
demonstrate the instability surrounding religious reform and, thus, sedition. Perhaps this is why 
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the notion of Catholicism as unnatural, which is repeatedly voiced near the beginning of the play, 
is only referenced once in the B-text and not at all in the A-text revisions.123 The equation is too 
simplistic to work in an environment where beliefs are being constantly questioned, adapted, and 
redefined, in turn, redefining what constitutes “sedition” and “truth.”  
Within King Johan, Bale is at pains to depict papal supremacy as a seditious belief, 
contending that it divides one’s loyalty by establishing a competitor to the monarchy and, worse, 
imposes the belief that loyalty to Holy Church supersedes loyalty to one’s prince. Nobility 
corroborates this fear when, dismayed at John’s uncompromising stance against the church, he 
states, “I toke a great othe whan I was dubbyd a knyght / Ever to defend the Holy Churches 
ryght” (362-63). Torn between his duty to the prince versus the church, Nobility is easily won to 
the church’s fold once Sedition dangles the carrot of remission of sins. In contrast to Nobility, 
Sedition holds no love for domestic rulers. Having been born in “the holy cyte of Rome,” he 
holds “pynces in scorne, hate and dysdayne” (183, 188). His actions portray the definition of 
“sedition” as slandering the king. Sedition’s words and actions ultimately stem from belief in the 
church’s supremacy. The allegations spoken by the Vices (and the characters they trick) are 
therefore political critiques that emerge from the power struggle between King John and Holy 
Church. These allegations result from John’s attempt to curtail church abuses, which the Vices’ 
interpret as an attack on Holy Church’s many liberties. The play also upholds another definition 
of sedition, that as a divisive force. For this reason, Sedition, who proudly claims to be the 
Pope’s man, displays no compunctions when revealing church secrets, or when he gleefully 
mocks his fellow Vices (845-54, 865-66, 892-93). Near the end of the play, he even acts as an 
informer against Holy Church in order to avoid execution, thereby exposing the church to further 
																																																								
123 The one mention in the B-text is Verity’s pronouncement on the three estates cited above (2266). 
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critique. Sedition is thus as prone to act divisively within Holy Church as without it. Though he 
prefers to undermine princes’ power, he is just as prone to poke fun of the Vices. 
Bale literalizes the contemporary understanding of sedition as a divisive force through 
John’s critique of the clergy for its abandonment of Scripture. He links this appalling neglect to 
Holy Church’s subsequent creation of myriad monastic orders, claiming 
Yt was never well syns the clergy wrowght by practyse 
And left the scriptur for menns ymagynacyons, 
Divydyng them selvys in so many congrygacyons 
Of monkes, chanons and fryers of dyvers colors and facyons. (334-37) 
 
According to John, Holy Church is seditious on two accounts, internally and externally. 
Internally, its monastic orders are varied, each following its own discipline and code. Sir Richard 
Morison, who like Bale formed a part of Cromwell’s Protestant propaganda campaign, voiced a 
similar opinion in his political treatise, A Remedy for Sedition (1536). Urging the need for 
obedience to the King and for religious unity, he contends, “Christen men are to soore divided. 
The fryers of Saint Fraunces skare love the domynycans, the Jacobites love not the Brigetines, or 
if they doo love, they wolde love moche better, if they were al of one sort.”124 This division is 
further emphasized, John argues, through the differing colors of the many sects. Though color 
distinguishes the many orders, according to Dissimulation, they share a common goal of 
undermining domestic princes.125 Externally, these colors serve “to blynd the peple” (725), aiding 
the promotion of seditious practices within foreign countries.  
																																																								
124 Richard Morison, A Remedy for Sedition (London: 1536), E. The treatise was addressed to the participants of the 
Pilgrimage of Grace and was a sequel to his earlier Lamentation in whiche is Shewed what Ruyne and Destruction 
Cometh of Seditious Rebellyon (1536), written to the Lincolnshire rebels; Jonathan Woolfson, ‘Morison, Sir Richard 
(c.1510–1556),’ DNB (Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2015). 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/view/article/19274, accessed 12 March 2015]. 
125 Nay, dowst thow not se how I in my colours jette?” Dissimulation asks (724), only to reveal “We have many 
rewlles, but never one we kepe /…/ We resemble sayntes in gray, whyte, blacke and blewe, / Yet unto prynces not 
one of owre nombre trewe” (730, 732-33). 
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 Taking offense at John’s insinuations, Clergy tries to argue for the beauty of diversity. He 
claims, “A quene, sayth Davyd, on thy ryght hond, lord, I se, / Apparrellyd with golde and 
compassyd with dyversyte,” which he interprets to signify “This quene ys the Chyrch which 
thorow all Cristen regions / Ys beawtyfull, [deckyd] with many holy relygyons” (436-37, 439-
40). He proceeds to list a plethora of monastic sects, believing that each of these orders functions 
as a jewel, decking and beautifying Holy Church.126 Given John’s faith in the Bible, this attempt 
to convince him by citing Scripture is not ill conceived, yet Clergy’s misinterpretation of the 
passage undercuts his position. Civil Order correctly states these orders did not exist in David’s 
time and John argues that David simply meant a diversity of virtues (462, 463-65). Clergy’s 
vision of these orders also comes dangerously close to idolatry. Delighted by their sundry colors, 
he fails to recognize their lack of substance. Clergy falls into the trap that Protestants preached 
against, for he too is “blynd[ed]” (725). This minor debate emphasizes Bale’s critique; though 
short-lived, Holy Church’s seditious view of monastic orders engenders disagreement among the 
individuals whose duty it is to work as a cohesive unit for the good of the country.  
While John appears to get the better of Clergy in this argument, the debate ultimately 
undermines John (and Bale’s) position. Throughout, John attempts to bolster his claims by 
insistently turning to Scripture, presenting the Bible as offering self-evident truths. His response 
to Clergy’s misinterpretation is that his own reading “in the sayd psalme…is evydent to see” 
(464). Holy Church’s main tactic in the ongoing war with the church of the elect is thus “to 
supprese the Gospell,” “for if that were knowne than woulde the people regarde / No heade but 
their prynce” (1014, 2512-13). Interestingly, however, both Clergy and the Vices quote from 
Scripture numerous times. The above-cited discussion is representative of Bale’s views of Holy 																																																								
126 In the B-text, Bale inserted an additional twelve lines to the list of monastic orders, more than doubling its initial 
length. For more on the list of orders, some of which are fictitious, see The Complete Plays of John Bale, Happé, 
109-11; and John Bale’s King Johan, Adams, 156-57.  
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Church’s interpretations of Scripture. It demonstrates how the two sides use the Bible as a tool to 
support their positions. More importantly, it leads to a discussion of Scripture in which each 
side’s representatives argue for a particular interpretation of the verse in question. That a 
discussion of the verse’s meaning is necessary underscores the fact that Scripture is not self-
evident. As David Scott Kastan has argued, “John’s interpretation is no more “evydent” than 
Clergy’s, no more plainly present in the text.”127 This has crucial implications for the depiction of 
sedition, for John’s Scriptural interpretations are depicted as truth, while Holy Church 
characters’ views are held as seditious (in that their incorrect interpretations uphold papal 
supremacy). Despite his polemical intentions, Bale’s text demonstrates that determining “truth” 
and “sedition” is inherently an interpretative, and, therefore, unstable act. 
At the beginning of the play, one of the distinguishing factors between King John and the 
Vices is seemingly the use of language. Befitting a virtuous and noble king, John’s plain speech 
is rarely ornamented. When he cites precedent, it is nearly always Scripture to which he turns, 
emphasizing that he only speaks the truth. However, he is also capable of the sort of anti-
Catholic invective typical of Bale’s style, prompting Nobility to comment “Sur, yowre sprytes 
are movyd I persayve by yowre langage (476). The Vices, in turn, are quick to utilize ambiguous 
language. They lie, utter oaths, make bawdy or scatological jokes, and deliberately misconstrue 
language. However, the distinction between the characters’ respective linguistic tendencies 
quickly collapses. Within their first encounter, the neat binary between John’s honesty and 
Sedition’s eagerness to “tell tales” is undermined (43). When asked who he is, Sedition responds 
“I am Sedycyon, that with the Pope wyll hold / So long as I have a hole with in my breche” (90-
91). Part of what makes Sedition such a tricky character is his penchant for telling the truth when 
the mood strikes him, even if that truth is conveyed in a coarse manner. Although Bale sought to 																																																								
127 ““Holy Wurdes” and “Slypper Wit,”” Herman, 277. 
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demonize Sedition, the character has more depth than a one-dimensional villain. Betteridge is not 
alone in arguing that “the language of the vices is marked as inherently untruthful and 
incoherent,” “comic,” and “carnivalesque”.128 Unlike England and Verity who speak the truth out 
of a fervent desire for reformation, Sedition’s revelations ultimately reveal Holy Church’s proud 
belief in its own invulnerability. Despite his motivation, Sedition paradoxically becomes a 
messenger of truth, for his admissions open John and Imperial Majesty’s eyes to the severity of 
church corruption and the ongoing need for reform, thereby prompting both figures into 
continued action. Both characters use Sedition to gain valuable information about the state of 
their respective churches. Sedition thus becomes an inadvertent agent for the Reformation, 
blurring the lines between the established church and the proto-reformers. I will first focus on 
Bale’s demonization of Sedition and his language before demonstrating his unintended yet 
crucial contributions to reform and truth.  
Sedition’s irreverent language takes on a darker hue in his many attacks on Widow 
England. When he critiques her, his allegations combine religious attack with sexual slander. He 
hurls a litany of abusive terms at England, including: “Wylly Wat” (cunning person (60)), 
“whore” (88), “wedred wytche” (95), “harlot” (1757), “queane” (1907), and callet (1940). He 
turns her “heavyness” over the current situation into an offensive pregnancy joke (136), and tries 
to degrade her further by ordering her on her knees (1715). The calumnies spoken against 
England, the only female character in the play, demonstrate women’s susceptibility to sexual 
critique. Sedition’s use of sexual slander seeks to discredit England and, through her, the 
reformed church as well. In The Image, the two churches are each aligned with a female figure; 
the church of the elect is represented by the chaste Woman clothed with the Sun, and the church 
of the Antichrist (presently Holy Church) with the Whore of Babylon. By seeking to undermine 																																																								
128 Tudor Histories of the English Reformations, 1530-83, 76. 
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England’s chastity, Sedition applies the same language of invective that reformers utilized to 
critique Holy Church as the Whore of Babylon. Moreover, Sedition insults England only after 
she has critiqued the church. Sedition’s invective therefore becomes another example of the 
reflectivity of the language of abuse, which in turn demonstrates that Holy Church and the 
nascent reformed church are not as distinct as Bale would care to admit.129 
 
Agents of the Reformation? 
As a set, the Vices are astonishingly candid about church corruption, corroborating John’s view 
of Holy Church as “cormerantes” who have “impoveryshyd / And mad a begger” of England 
(483, 478-79). They freely admit that relics, indulgences, and masses for the dead are all ploys to 
enrich the church. Even Latin is employed for this purpose; “Ther ys no Englyche that can soche 
profyghtes compasse” as the church’s use of Latin (717). In order to gain Englishmen’s money, 
the Vices must first earn their dupes’ trust. This is accomplished through their abuse of auricular 
confession, a practice Bale rejected because he believed that an individual did not need an 
intercessor when confessing to God.130 The Vices use the notion of absolution to lure a subject’s 
loyalty away from the king to the church, while availing themselves of the confessional’s secrecy 
to promote disloyalty.131 Sedition admits that the notion of indulgences and clean remission of sin 																																																								
129 McEachern briefly discusses how language and its uses undermine the differences between the two churches; The 
Poetics of English Nationhood, 26-29. 
130 For more on the presentation of auricular confession in King Johan, see Edwin Shepard Miler, “The Roman Rite 
in Bale’s King Johan.” PMLA 64.4 (September 1949): 802-22; and Walker, Plays of Persuasion, 211-14. Walker 
notes that Bale followed Tyndale’s lead and refashioned the debate concerning auricular confession into a political 
rather than a religious one within King Johan. He was nonetheless “advancing the views of more progressive 
reformers, and going further than royal proclamations and directives would permit” (213). White argues that had it 
not been for Cromwell’s protection, Bale would have been imprisoned, if not executed, “on grounds of heresy”; 
Theater and Reformation, 18. Both White and Walker point to Henry’s views on auricular confession as 
demonstrated by the “Ten Articles” (1536). 
131 Following his conversion, Clergy declares the church’s abuse of confession as passing “all other traytery” (2659). 
Examples include: Sedition’s winning over the three estates through remission of sins and absolution; the priest 
Treason claiming “Twenty thousande traytour I have made in my tyme / Undre Benedicite between high masee and 
pryme” (1817-18); and Dissimulation revealing his plan to assassinate John under cover of the confessional’s 
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is worthless (971), yet he and the other Vices portray the absolution they offer as if it were a “get 
out of purgatory free” card. Preying on characters’ fear of damnation, it proves an incredibly 
effective strategy for undermining patriotic allegiance. 
In their first encounter, John prompts Sedition to say more about confession, “that I may 
understond the” (265). Happily complying, Sedition divulges that Holy Church uses its 
sacrament of Reconciliation to spy on foreign powers, “For by confession the Holy Father 
knoweth / Throw owt all Christendom what to his holyness growyth” (272-73). Through this 
practice, priests display loyalty to the Pope rather than to king and country. Obligated to keep 
parishioners’ sins, they gladly convey to Rome any information that may be prejudicial to the 
Pope. This point is further emphasized near the end of the play in the following exchange: 
Sedicyon: I wyll tell to yow suche treason as ensewthe; 
Yet a ghostly father ought not to bewraye confessyon. 
Imperyall Majestye:  No confessyon is but ought to discover treason. 
Sedicyon:  I thynke it maye kepe all thynge save heresye. 
Imperyall Majestye:  It maye holde no treason, I tell the verelye, 
And theffor tell the whole matter by and bye. (2498-2503) 
 
According to Sedition, any knowledge of heresy dictates immediate action; it is the only 
condition under which a priest can betray the secrecy of confession. In contrast, Imperial Majesty 
states that treason must be revealed, because its concealment would only cause harm. Like John, 
he urges Sedition to share Holy Church’s secrets. Their conversation stresses Holy Church’s 
disinterest in the welfare of a country’s subjects. Whereas a divinely ordained monarch’s prime 
responsibility is to care for those individuals, Holy Church cares only for its survival. Holy 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
secrecy, obtaining pardon before committing treason (2014-49). Bale parodies the Catholic sacrament through a few 
significant changes to the required formula: in each of the staged confessions, the role of confessor is played by 
Sedition, absolution is granted through the Pope’s authority (1186, 1786-1805), and granted from penalty and guilt 
without the requirement of penance. For more on Bale’s parody of confession, see Miler, “The Roman Rite in Bale’s 
King Johan,” 807.  
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Church thus plays fast and loose with its rules for confession, allowing its required secrecy to be 
broken when it is beneficial to itself and mandating secrecy on all other occasions.  
Sedition implies that John is ignorant of the way things really work. Early in the play, 
Sedition asks John if he is “well content that bysshoppes contynew styll?” (235). John’s reply, 
“We are so in dede, yf they ther dewte fullfyll,” leads Sedition to jubilantly exclaim, “Nay than, 
good inowgh! Yowre awtoryte and power / Shall passe as they wyll; they have sawce bothe swet 
and sowre” (236, 237-38). His statement underlines two important points. John overestimates the 
clergy’s loyalty to the monarch, expecting them to obey without hesitation, and bishops play a 
crucial role in any attempted reformation of the church. While bishops themselves do not receive 
sustained attention throughout King Johan, Bale includes a few pointed comments about their 
actions that display his disillusionment with their reluctance to aid the Reformation and his belief 
that the reformist cause can succeed only with their help.  
Two of the Vices are bishops. Sedition emphasizes his relationship with monks and 
bishops (253-54, 296-99), later assuming the additional role of Stephen Langton, Bishop of 
Canterbury. Private Wealth is also a bishop and “lyke to be a cardynall” (745-46). Unlike some 
of his fellow reformers, Bale did not believe that the position of bishops had to be eliminated. He 
later held a bishopric for a short time. His experiences did impose on him an awareness of 
bishops’ ability to aid or hamper the English Reformation. Perhaps for this reason, English 
bishops’ refusal to support the reformation is referenced several times in the B-text. Alluding to 
Henry VIII’s 1536 Injunctions, Sedition gloats how bishops declined to enforce them, 
necessitating the 1538 Injunctions (2508-10). He tells Imperial Majesty that regardless of the 
latter’s commands, “Some of the byshoppes at your injunctyons slepe, / Some laugh and go bye 
and some can playe boo pepe; / Some of them do nought but searche for heretykes” (2524-26). In 
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fact, the bishops purposefully “vex” Verity in order to promote Sedition (2518-20), a fact Verity 
corroborates (2339-40). Sedition goes on detail how conservative bishops actively work against 
reformers, providing false witnesses to accuse faithful subjects of heresy (2534-37). The bishops 
simply play along, biding their time until they can reestablish papal supremacy. Lastly, Sedition 
proclaims that “in some byshoppes howse ye shall not fynde a testament, / But yche man readye 
to devoure the innocent” for the bishops ultimately “lyngar a tyme and loke but for a daye / To 
sett upp the Pope if the Gospell woulde decaye” (2548-51). By linking the actions of 
conservative bishops with Sedition, Bale proposes another definition for sedition: the refusal to 
teach reformed religion. Conservative bishops promote sedition through their actions against the 
faithful, and/or by hesitating to enforce Henry’s legislation.132 
The notion of interpretation is further underscored following John’s death, when Verity 
enters the play to praise the fallen monarch. Verity’s speech critiques Polydore Vergil and other 
chroniclers for their ill reporting of John (2193-96), and he musters his own list of historians who 
attest to the late king’s quality (2200-06). As many scholars have noted, Verity’s speech is itself 
a fabrication, for the authorities he cites offer little in the way of support for John.133 Verity is 
only onstage for a short time. His duty is to make the three estates recommit to the task of 
reforming religion and to report the outcome of his efforts to Imperial Majesty. Because of the 
doubling scheme (Sedition and Verity played by the same actor), the three estates are convinced 
to uphold first papal and then royal supremacy by the same person. Imperial Majesty similarly 
																																																								
132 Bale’s disillusionment with conservative bishops would only strengthen as time wore on. He critiqued English 
bishops, taking particular aim at Edmund Bonner and Stephen Gardiner, in A Man of Sin (1543) and The Epistle 
Exhortatory (1544). During his second exile, Bale translated De vera Obedientia (1553), Gardiner’s 1535 tract in 
support of royal supremacy, for which Bonner had written an introduction for the 1536 reprinting. The translator 
(1553) is listed as “Michael Wood,” though several scholars believe the work to be Bale’s. The printer was Hugh 
Singleton, who years later printed Stubbs’s The Discovery of the Gaping Gulf. Bale’s 1553 translation included his 
own introduction and comments throughout. His intention was to humiliate Gardiner (and Bonner), thereby 
exposing the treachery of Mary I’s Lord Chancellor. See Harris, John Bale, 50; Happé John Bale, 40-41.  
133 For example, see John Bale’s King Johan, Adams, 30-31; and The Complete Plays of John Bale, Happé, 135. 
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gets his news from the same person, as he learns about the state of England first from Verity and 
then from Sedition. 
 The three estates enter in the midst of Verity’s speech and weakly attempt to reiterate 
their criticisms of John. Verity easily dominates the encounter, lecturing the three estates on the 
issues of royal supremacy and their ill treatment of King John for over 80 lines of dialogue with 
only minor interruptions (2222-2305). Beaten into submission, the three estates relent: 
Nobylyte: For Gods love, nomore! Alas, ye have sayde ynough. 
Clergye: All the worlde doth knowe that we have done sore amys. 
Cyvyle Order: Forgyve it us so that we never heare more of thys. 
Veritas: But are ye sorye for thys ungodly wurke? 
Nobylyte: I praye to God, els I be dampned lyke a Turke.134 
Veritas: And make true promyse ye wyll never more do so? 
Clergye: Sir, never more shall I from true obedyence goo. 
Veritas: What saye yow, brother? I must have also your sentence. 
Cyvyle Order: I wyll ever gyve to my prynce due reverence. 
Veritas: Well, than, I doubt not but the Lorde wyll condescende 
  To forgyve yow all, so that ye mynde to amende. 
  Adewe to ye all, for now I must be gone. (2306-17) 
 
Though the three estates acknowledge their wrongdoing, one cannot help but suspect that their 
initial reason for capitulating was not guilt, but a fervent desire to stymie Verity’s harangue and 
save their reputations. Verity himself appears doubtful. Rather than simply accept their responses 
at face value, he questions their sincerity, making sure to hear from all three. His questions aim 
to determine if there is true repentance and the hope of reform. Moreover, his assessment of the 
matter is conditional. He states that they will be forgiven only if they “mynde to amende.” The 
three estates, it seems, have been offered parole, pending good behavior.  
Bale’s growing disillusionment with Henrician political leadership is already present in 
the conclusion to King Johan. In Reformers and Babylon, Paul Christianson argues that by the 
time Bale wrote The Image (1545), he “placed very little reliance in the apocalyptic leadership of 																																																								
134 This wish equates disloyalty to the monarch to the eternal damnation awaiting heretics, in this case, the 
formidable Turks, again linking religious difference with foreignness.  
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established social or political forces.” He further contends that while “Bale portrayed king and 
nation in a much more favorable light in his popular plays,” The Image “reflects the great 
disappointment for English protestants of the intervening period.”135 Because Bale did not believe 
in critiquing the monarch, he whitewashes John’s character, displacing his criticisms unto the 
three estates. Likewise, Sedition attacks conservative bishops for their refusal to act. An 
idealized version of Henry, Imperial Majesty is a fervent reformer eager to exile the Pope from 
his lands. Gone is the historical king’s hesitancy to commit to reformed religion; instead, 
Henry’s balancing of political exigencies is projected unto the three estates. Yet this idealized 
representation only highlights Bale’s disappointment at Henry’s lack of commitment to reform.  
Acknowledging Imperial Majesty’s royal supremacy, and at his request, Clergy agrees to 
ban the Pope. Instead of stemming from a sincere desire to promote truth, Clergy quickly 
demonstrates that his actions are merely to please his king (2387-90). Chastised for doing the 
right thing but for the wrong reason (2391-99), he replies “Both Daniel and Paule calleth [the 
Pope] Gods adversarye / And therfor ye ought as a devyll hym to expell” (2400-01). At first 
glance, Clergy’s use of Scripture for guidance seems encouraging. However, the bible passages 
to which he refers, Daniel 7:23-26 and Thessalonians 2: 2-12 name God’s advisory as the 
Antichrist, not the Pope. Clergy’s statement is thus another act of interpretation, one which 
sparked considerable controversy. Thora Balslev Blatt argues that the notion was referenced “so 
often that it lost force, and [Protestant reformers] incurred the risk of being identified with 
Antichrist themselves by their Catholic opponents.”136 Additionally, Clergy’s previous 
knowledge of this verse implies that the clergy are willing to pay lip service to the current 																																																								
135 Christianson, Reformers and Babylon, 19, 20. By the time he wrote The Image, Bale believed that ordinary 
reformers would play a larger role in bringing forth the millennial than the monarch. Christianson’s argument has 
recently been echoed by Peter Happé, “A Reassessment of John Bale’s Rhetoric: Drama, Bibliography, and 
Biography.” SEL 53.2 (Spring 2013): 259-75, see page 271.  
136 The Plays of John Bale: A Study of Ideas, Technique and Style (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad Publishers, 1968), 168. 
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monarch, appeasing him or her to avoid punishment, until they can reveal their true loyalties, a 
tactic also used by the English bishops (2540-51). This overlap raises the question of the 
sincerity of Clergy’s reformation. Like Imperial Majesty, the reader must ask, “Knewe ye thys 
afore and woulde it never tell?” (2402).  
Clergy’s misguided attempts to please his king prompt Imperial Majesty to question the 
other two estates. Nobility’s response, which reiterates John and England’s allegations against 
the Pope, satisfies Imperial Majesty. He states, “It is a clere sygne of a true nobilitye / to the 
wurde of God whan your conscyence doth agree” (2415-16). This moment is a clear echo of 
John’s earlier statement, “A clere tokyn that is of trew nobelyte,” which utterance had followed 
Nobility’s complete rejection of Sedition and those of his “condycyon” (332, 330). Yet between 
these two moments, Nobility not only failed to recognize Sedition, but also fell in league with 
him after obtaining confession from this chief Vice, causing John to chastise his erstwhile 
follower, “Oh, this is no tokyn of trew nobelyte / To flee from yowre kyng in his extremyte” 
(1452-53). In the morality play tradition, the recommitment of the tempted, but ultimately 
redeemed protagonist brings hope and closes the play on a victorious note. Here, the estates’ flip-
flopping inspires doubt, not trust. The play ends casting a hopeful eye toward the future, yet one 
must wonder whether Imperial Majesty will have cause to issue a similar lament.  
Civil Order, unlike Clergy, gives a satisfactory answer to Imperial Majesty’s request to 
ban the Pope; yet Imperial Majesty requests further assurance, again questioning if the three 
estates “are all of one mynde” (2431), before ordering them all to swear “to take me for your 
heade” (2435). Moments later, after having heard Sedition’s revelations, Imperial Majesty 
reiterates the critiques against the three estates and orders them to “shewe your selves herafter 
more sober and wyse” (2593-2601). His final words of the play, “And above all thynges 
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remembre our injunction” (2648), recalls Sedition’s earlier comment concerning the bishops’ 
sluggishness in implementing Henry VIII’s Injunctions. Similarly, Verity’s final speech begins 
with the heartfelt plea, “For Gods sake obeye lyke as doth you befall” (2346), concluding with 
the charge, “To gyve to your kynge hys due supremyte” (2359). The entrance of Verity and 
Imperial Majesty is meant to establish good order by re-imposing monarchic control. Their exits 
should mark the completion of their task. Neither character exits convinced of success; each 
hesitantly entrusts matters to the three estates. Taken as a whole, Imperial Majesty’s questions 
and repeated urgings, together with Verity’s repeated lecturing, displays great doubt, thereby 
undercutting the play’s “happy” ending. 
Imperial Majesty’s treatment of Sedition further sours the mood. The three estates urge 
their king to exile the Vices. Instead, Sedition manages to strike a bargain with Imperial Majesty, 
revealing church duplicity in exchange for a pardon. Imperial Majesty, who moments earlier had 
threated Sedition with torture (2478), fails to uphold his end of the deal when he orders the latter 
to be executed, callously decreeing that “For doynge more harme thu shalt sone pardoned be” 
(2582). Scholars often comment that Imperial Majesty’s behavior toward Sedition is reminiscent 
of Henry VIII’s with regards to the Pilgrimage of Grace. Having invited Robert Aske, the leader 
of the movement, to London, Henry appeared receptive to Aske’s cause. However, he was 
merely playing for time, for once Aske ordered the participants of the Pilgrimage of Grace to 
disband, Henry had Aske arrested and eventually executed as a traitor.137 In this scenario, 
Sedition assumes Aske’s position. The duplicitous bargain he receives is troubling because it is 
behavior associated with the Vices. Imperial Majesty’s equivocal definition of “pardon” is the 
																																																								
137 See Harris John Bale, 95-98. Additionally, Cavanagh draws attention to the directions Henry gave to the Duke of 
Norfolk, ordering the Duke to make concessions he never intended to honor; “The Paradox of Sedition in John 
Bale’s King Johan,” 189, fn. 46. 
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sort of wordplay expected of Sedition.138 Though callous, the decision is politically expedient. 
Sedition is a corrupt influence that must be dealt with, but rather than simply executing him, 
Imperial Majesty first makes use of the Vice. Sedition has proven the best-informed character of 
the play—the source of religious subversion in England, he nonetheless understands the English 
clergy and their tactics better than either of the monarchs—Imperial Majesty thus first gathers 
Sedition’s knowledge before ridding himself of this dangerous agitator. Bale seems to champion 
such decisiveness, but it does not mitigate its distasteful nature to modern readers and the 
incident adds to the play’s growing list of broken promises.  
As the play ends before Sedition’s execution is carried out, I venture that he escapes 
punishment, like he did early in the play when John was unable to restrain him (300-13), because 
of the doubts surrounding the three estates’ conversion.139 Following their conversion, the three 
estates echo many of John’s critiques against Holy Church, critiques that they previously labeled 
heresy, yet these criticisms are corroborated by Sedition and the Vices’ admissions. This 
situation, in which the same comments are alternately labeled “sedition” or “truth,” demonstrates 
the instability of these categories, as they are constantly being reinterpreted and redefined 
according to the ebb and flow of the English Reformation. The concluding paean to Elizabeth 
coupled with the mention of sectarians and Anabaptists (2626-31, 2680-81) is a call to action that 
underscores the struggle surrounding reform.140 The doubt surrounding the three estates’ 
conversion demonstrates that so long as uncertainty remains, so will sedition. Because no 
																																																								
138 Cavanagh argues, “Intriguer and sovereign appear to have changed places as one now becomes the victim of the 
other’s manipulation of language and expectations in a way associated elsewhere in the play with tyranny”; 
“Reforming Sovereignty: John Bale and Tragic Drama,” in Interludes and Early Modern Society: Studies in Gender, 
Power and Theatricality, ed. Peter Happé and Wim Hüsken (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 2007), 191-209, 205. 
139 Happé sees Sedition’s preposterous dreams of becoming a saint as a “comic apotheosis” that “anticipates the 
conventional motif whereby the Vice lives to fight another day,” The Complete Plays of John Bale, 140. 
140 Cavanagh likewise interprets the Elizabethan epilogue as an acknowledgment “that Sedition may well return and 
that Anabaptism is a continuing threat. Its final prayer is a testament to the unpredictability of history and to the 
uncertain fate of reform”; “Reforming Sovereignty,” 207. 
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success is final and because Sedition still retains use value by revealing necessary information, 
Sedition/sedition will always escape to once again threaten good order.  
 
“A Trump of Sedition Secretly Sounding in every Subject’s Ear”: John Stubbs’s The 
Discovery of a Gaping Gulf  
Like Bale, John Stubbs sought to underscore the fragility of Protestantism in England. He 
attempted to demonstrate the threat a Catholic marriage posed to reformed religion and, for his 
efforts, his work was labeled seditious. This next case study investigates what happens when a 
subject attempts to directly counsel his monarch. The response surrounding The Discovery of a 
Gaping Gulf (1579) emphasized the various coexisting levels of judgment that existed in early 
modern England, evidencing that when there is a conflict of opinion, the “truth” gets determined 
by the highest-ranking member involved in the incident. It further showed how written sedition 
was taken more seriously than verbal sedition, for the act of setting a critique down on paper 
made that statement public, extending its range and longevity by sparking further conversation, 
discussions that the government was eager to quell. By analyzing Stubbs’s polemic and the royal 
proclamation issued in response to it, I will demonstrate how these two documents engaged in a 
heated, public exchange concerning whose actions threatened to tear the realm apart.141 
In 1579, François Hercule, Duke of Alençon, nicknamed “Monsieur” by Queen Elizabeth 
I, was engaged for the second time in ongoing marriage negotiations for Elizabeth’s hand with 
her government. He was the younger broker of the French king, Charles IX, and the heir to the 
throne. He was the fourth son of detested Catherine de’ Medici, who had solidified English 																																																								
141 Daniel Ellis likewise focuses on the public nature of this exchange his article “Arguing the Courtship of Elizabeth 
and Alençon: An Early Modern Marriage Debate and the Problem of the Historical Public Sphere.” Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 42.1 (Jan. 2012): 26-43, though his argument focuses on the argumentative strategies adopted by Stubbs 
in his polemic and Elizabeth in the royal proclamation and the relation of these strategies to the emergence of a 
public sphere. 
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enmity for her role in the slaughter of French Huguenots, better known as the St. Bartholomew's 
Day massacre, in 1572. Stubbs’s tract was printed shortly after the supposedly secret arrival in 
London of Alençon, who came with the hope that his visit would lead to the successful 
conclusion to the negotiations. The work, as suggested by its title, “was a carefully planned 
political act, calculated to blow wide open the ‘secret’ of Monsieur’s visit.” Furthermore, “the 
sensational, highly symbolic title implies that the country is about to be swallowed or split 
asunder to satisfy someone’s voracious appetite.”142 The title was clearly meant to stir the 
nation’s xenophobic fears. The metaphoric gulf menacing England paradoxically threatened to 
swallow the country whole and to rip it asunder in the process. Sadly for Stubbs, the title proved 
ironic. The Elizabethan government, at the Queen’s insistence, convicted him of sedition, a 
crime that was thought to tear the social fabric, the very fate he believed would befall England 
were the French marriage to occur. The government’s response portrayed the country as a united 
community and Stubbs as a dangerous instigator threatening national harmony. 
When Stubbs wrote The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf, the crime of sedition was still 
regulated by the 1554 statute of sedition. The statute was reinforced during Elizabeth’s first 
year.143 In 1581, a new and more severe sedition bill was initiated by the House of Lords in 
response to negative public commentary concerning the proposed marriage of Elizabeth and 
Alençon.144 Stubbs’s polemic was one of the most vocal arguments against the marriage, which 
lacked popular support. Though Stubbs was not alone in the sentiments he conveyed, he made 
the mistake of committing his ideas to paper and publishing them. He produced a well reasoned, 
intelligent tract, one that rehearsed many of the arguments against the French marriage 																																																								
142 Ilona Bell, “‘Sovereign Lord of lordly Lady of this land’: Elizabeth, Stubbs, and the Gaping Gulf,” Walker. 99-
117, 99 and 109, respectively.  
143 1 Eliz., c. 6, Statutes of the Realm (9 vols., 1810-1825). 
144 Annabel Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early Modern 
England (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990) (1984)), 34, 33-34.  
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mentioned in the Privy Council, a fact that led Elizabeth to suspect that one of her councilors 
may have had a hand in the creation of Stubbs’s polemic.145 The pamphlet additionally raised a 
number of legitimate concerns about the Queen’s potential fiancé, such as the fact that Alençon’s 
past relations with the French Huguenots casted doubt upon his loyalty and reliability.  
Stubbs’s rhetoric, though impassioned and motivated by love of country, did nonetheless 
leave him vulnerable to the charge of sedition. The opening sentence draws an unfavorable 
comparison between Elizabeth’s councilors and heathens, claiming,  
In all deliberations of most private actions, the very heathen are wont first to 
consider honesty and then profit…Oh, the strange Christianity of some men in our 
age, who in their state consultations have not so much respect to piety as those 
first men had to honesty, nor so much regard to honesty as they had to profit, and 
are therefore justly given up of the Lord our God to seek profit where indeed it is 
not, and deceived by their lusts to embrace a showing and false good instead of 
that which is the good end of a wise man.146 
 
Whereas the first men had the integrity to measure honesty before profit, contemporary 
councilors ignore their duties to realm and queen and seek only the false god, profit. Addressing 
Elizabeth directly, Stubbs warns her to “stop your Majesty’s ears against these sorcerers and 
their enchanting counsels,” for such advice will only bring ruin to the realm (30). These false 																																																								
145 Wallace T. MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572-1588 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1981), 256. Cyndia Susan Clegg has cautiously noted that “Stubbs’s highly specialized knowledge about 
arguments advanced in the Privy Council and events at Court points to backing from, or at least access to, high 
levels of government”; Press Censorship in Elizabethan England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
131. Kenneth Barnes argues that Stubbs’s polemic was “part of a general propaganda exercise with high-level 
backing,” an assessment with which many scholars have agreed; “John Stubbe, 1579: the French Ambassador’s 
Account.” Historical Research 64 (1991): 421-26, 423. See also Susan Doran, “Why Did Elizabeth Not Marry?”, 
Walker, 30-59. Natalie Mears notes that Elizabeth’s “suspicion” is one that “Stubbs himself appeared to substantiate 
by alleging that an unidentified councilor had foreknowledge of the tract but failed to limit the political fall-out from 
its publication”; “Counsel, Public Debate, and Queenship: John Stubbs’s The Discoverie of a Gaping Gulf, 1579.” 
The Historical Journal 44.3 (September 2001): 629-50, 631-32. However, Mears’s main argument counters the 
notion that Stubbs’s polemic was part of a propaganda campaign against the French marriage, contending that 
Stubbs’s tract instead issued from his own, genuine concern over the state of England. In an additional article on the 
French marriage negotiations, Mears argues that Elizabeth ultimately chose not to marry the Duke of Alençon 
because she was unable to resolve her own doubts concerning the personal and political issues stemming from this 
matrimonial alliance; “Love-making and Diplomacy: Elizabeth I and the Anjou Marriage Negotiations, c. 1578-
1582.” History 86.284 (October 2001): 442-66. 
146 All references to Stubbs’s polemic are to Lloyd E. Berry’s edition, John Stubbs’s Gaping Gulf with Letters and 
Other Relevant Documents (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for the Folger Shakespeare Library, 1968), 
1-93, 3. Hereafter cited by page number. 
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councilors are eventually converted from heathens to sorcerers, a highly offensive and 
unflattering comparison given that magic was seen as allied with the Devil. Somewhat 
appropriately, Stubbs’s first reference to Alençon depicts the French heir as “the old serpent in 
shape of a man” who intends “to seduce our Eve, that she and we may lose this English paradise” 
(3-4). Because France is “a kingdom of darkness” and a proud member of the idolatrous Catholic 
Church, the church of the Antichrist, to ally oneself with France is to align with the Devil (7). 
Stubbs thus suggests that any counselor who supports the French match works for the interests of 
France and, ultimately, the Devil. Such individuals are not true Christian Englishmen.  
Jacqueline Vanhoutte has demonstrated how Stubbs “establishes a ‘natural and 
brotherlike’ standard of behavior for Englishmen against which the queen’s pro-French 
counselors, and the queen herself, may be measured; again and again, he accuses these 
counselors of lacking in ‘natural sense’ and duty to England.”147 Stubbs’s use of the trope of the 
motherland suggests that were Elizabeth to marry Alençon, she would prove an unnatural 
mother, contrary to her role as mother of the country, while those who support the match would 
reveal themselves as unnatural sons.148 The royal proclamation dated September 27, 1570, which 
was issued in response to The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf, attacked this very logic, stressing 
Stubbs’s portrayal of the “undutiful offices and unnatural intentions of her councilors, both 
against God, Queen, realm, and people.”149 
Stubbs again leaves himself open to the allegation of sedition when he announces to his 
fellow countrymen,  																																																								
147 “Queen and Country? Female Monarchs and Feminized Nations in Elizabethan Political Pamphlets” in Elizabeth 
I: Always Her Own Free Woman, ed. Carole Levin, Jo Eldridge Carney and Debra Barrett-Graves (Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 7-19, 8. 
148 For further discussion concerning how the trope of the motherland could be used to either bolster or critique the 
reigning monarch, see Vanhoutte Strange Communion: Motherland and Masculinity in Tudor Plays, Pamphlets, and 
Politics (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003).  
149 Tudor Royal Proclamations: Volume II, The Later Tudors (1553-1587), ed. Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 449.  
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Therefore, albeit I wot well you understand already in general what is that great 
calamity thus imminent over our heads whereof I speak…in regard of the great 
danger thereby coming to her royal person, yet to the end our minds may be the 
more earnestly stirred up by more particularly weighing the evils of this matter, 
we will enter into the parts of this practice and gauge the very belly of this great 
horse of hidden mischiefs and falsehood meant to us. (4-5, emphasis added) 
 
Because of the multiple dangers this proposed alliance would entail, not least of which include 
the hazards to Elizabeth’s own person, Stubbs means to stir up the minds of his fellow 
countrymen against the marriage. His choice of verbs is unfortunate, for “stir” calls to mind the 
“stirring up” of sedition and possibly rebellion, a notion that the royal proclamation took pains to 
emphasize. Although at the end of his tract, Stubbs instructs “the meaner sort” and “all private 
ones” to know their place and only “with [their] prayers to solicit the Lord for his church, for this 
commonweal, and for the Queen,” his previous image of he and his fellow countrymen together 
inspecting and determining the merits of the alliance implies a more active role for his fellow 
Englishmen (92). His pronoun use of “we” in the phrase “we will enter into the parts of this 
practice” conceives an ambiguous role for his fellow countrymen who are both led by Stubbs 
through his analysis of the French match yet simultaneously accompany him on this exploration 
of “the very belly of this great horse of hidden mischiefs.” Such an equivocal role gave cause for 
concern.  
Stubbs additionally contends that no good has ever come from a matrimonial alliance 
with France, England’s traditional enemy. To support his argument, he turns to historical 
precedent, recalling the marriages of Henry II to Eleanor of Aquitaine and the unfortunate 
Edward II to Isabel, among others. He also employs metaphor. In addition to his depiction of 
Alençon as the serpent, he intimates that the French marriage is nothing more than a Trojan 
horse. This infamous “gift,” whose interior hid the Greek warriors that burned Troy, becomes a 
metonymy for the gaping gulf into which England will be plunged if it goes through with this 
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marriage, a maw that can only be sated by devouring England itself. He suggests that England, a 
self-professed second Troy, must learn from history if it hopes to survive.  
In addition to the country’s depiction as a new Troy, Protestant authors believed that the 
English were God’s chosen people and that England was a new Israel. Because of the difference 
in religion between Elizabeth and Alençon, Stubbs contends that the sin of marrying “one of 
Israel’s daughters to any of Hamor’s sons” would bring God’s vengeance upon England and 
result in Elizabeth being lead “as a poor lamb to the slaughter” (6, 4). He boldly declares, “We 
do not love her, whatsoever we say, when flattering her, perhaps, in other vanities, we do not fall 
down before her with tears, bewailing the wrath of God kindled against her, if by her advised 
permission, and by means of her marriage, God should be so highly dishonored in this kingdom 
wherewith he hath honored her” (16-17). Stubbs again critiques Elizabeth’s councilors for 
employing flattery rather than the truth, yet he reserves his harshest criticisms for the monarch. 
Whereas Christ selflessly died to save mankind from sin, Stubbs implies that Elizabeth’s 
decision to marry Alençon would express astonishing ingratitude for the honors that God has 
bestowed on her. This decision would cause England to bleed and would reduce Elizabeth to a 
creature with no agency or control, for Alençon would “as owner possess our Queen” and either 
“for fear or love he will rule her and the whole land for her sake” (37, 38). His misogynist 
attitude preemptively reduces a married Elizabeth to a figurehead.  
Not only is Stubbs incapable of conceiving a scenario where a married Elizabeth would 
maintain sovereignty, he further insults her through the contention that, as a woman, she is 
incapable of making a proper choice of husband and must therefore be advised by men.150 He 
explains that as every daughter must be suitably counseled about marriage before entering into 																																																								
150 Bell argues that it was Stubbs’s “overt paternalism and barely concealed antifeminism,” which sought to deny 
Elizabeth the right to choose her husband (which she had fought for since her accession) that most offended her; 
“‘Sovereign Lord of lordly Lady of this land.’” Walker. 101.   
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the state, so “it is a faithless, careless part to leave [Elizabeth] helpless in her choice of the 
person and personal conditions of her husband to her own only consideration, which, howsoever 
sufficient it be, so much the more hath she need of help as the matter is more weighty in her than 
in common matches” (70). Depicting the Queen’s acumen as “sufficient” is hardly 
commensurate to a monarch who had received the best humanist education available, spoke and 
wrote several languages, and had successfully ruled a country for over twenty years. Moreover, 
Stubbs’s lip service to her intelligence is immediately undercut by the following clause, which 
argues that it is insufficient in this weighty matter, suggesting that while she’s capable of 
handling common matters, Elizabeth falls short when confronted with matters of state. This 
perceived need for male guidance is underscored in the work’s full title, The Discovery of a 
Gaping Gulf Whereinto England is Like to be Swallowed by Another French Marriage if the 
Lord Forbid Not the Banns by Letting Her Majesty See the Sin and Punishment Thereof, which 
highlights Elizabeth’s faulty vision and her lack of comprehension of the danger at hand. 
Presumably, the Lord was attempting to correct her narrow-sightedness through Stubbs’s effort. 
Elizabeth understood that the multiple allegations leveled against her, her councilors, and 
Alençon reflected upon her political judgment.151 If her choice of husband were truly as 
inappropriate as Stubbs declared him to be, then her desire to marry such a disreputable figure 
would only prove Stubbs’s argument concerning Elizabeth’s inadequacy with regard to judging 
matters of state.152 The Queen made it clear that her subject had overstepped his bounds, utterly 
rejecting his attempt to style himself her councilor. Infuriated by the assault upon her royal 
																																																								
151 Debra-Barrett-Graves considers the importance of the concept of honor in relation to the ongoing marriage 
negotiations with France, finding in this concept a partial explanation for Elizabeth’s “furious reaction” to “‘the 
slanders and reproaches’ heaped on the Duke of Anjou” which “by association, transfer to Elizabeth, whose 
reputation likewise suffers”; “‘Highly touched in honour’: Elizabeth I and the Alençon Controversy.” Levin et al. 
43-60, 50, 51. 
152 For examples of Stubbs’s many allegations against Alençon, see pages: 23-25, 28, 71-72, 75-78, 80, 88. 
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prerogative and the insult to the house of Valois, Stubbs’s polemic drew a lengthy response in 
the form of a royal proclamation.153 Entitled, “Denouncing Stubbs’ Book, The Discoverie of a 
Gaping Gulf,” the proclamation called in all copies of the work. Its first sentence strikes a 
defensive tone, reminding the English people of the various successes of Elizabeth’s rule as well 
as her commitment to “the true Christian religion.” The document betrays Elizabeth’s anger and 
anxiety, offering a variety of reasons that appear self-justifying. It explains that the Queen 
“would have been loath to have on her own behalf made any mention” yet she fears that “the 
malice of some lewd disordered persons” may case “evil effect,” such as “seditiously and 
rebelliously stirring up all estates of her majesty’s subjects to fear their own utter ruin and 
change of government,” imprinting “a present fear in the zealous sort” concerning a change in 
religion, and causing “a general murmuring and misliking in her loving people concerning her 
actions in this behalf.”154 The proclamation’s rhetoric transfers the necessity of this response unto 
the people. Elizabeth was “loath” to address the issue, but had to because of the fear Stubbs’s 
work had engendered. Additionally, Stubbs is scapegoated and blamed for the public’s negative 
reaction to the marriage negotiations. It is he who has created a breach between the monarch and 
“her loving people.” The underlying sentiment is that he has committed sedition.  
As Susan Doran has noted, Elizabeth’s various marriage negotiations often generated 
disputes concerning the adequacy of the proposed candidate and “in 1579 preachers and 
polemicists brought a wider public into the debate on the Alençon marriage.”155 This was simply 
unacceptable for Elizabeth; having once forbid Parliament from discussing such a sensitive topic 
as the succession, the Queen was not going to allow her potential marriage to become common 
																																																								
153 For a brief consideration of the degree to which Elizabeth may have been behind the rhetoric of this proclamation 
see Ellis, “Arguing the Courtship of Elizabeth and Alençon,” 36 fn.9. 
154 Tudor Royal Proclamations: Volume II, ed. Hughes and Larkin, 445-49.  
155 “Why Did Elizabeth Not Marry?” Walker. 51. 
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talk. Though I believe the royal proclamation’s tone is defensive, I nonetheless agree with 
Cyndia Susan Clegg’s argument that it also “laid the groundwork for a government legal case 
against the author, printer and disseminator of the ‘libel.’”156 The proclamation claims this “libel” 
sought only “to diminish her majesty’s credit with her good people,” “to set all at liberty for 
some monstrous, secret innovation,” and “to prepare their minds to sedition, offering to every 
most meanest person of judgment, by these kind of popular libels, authority to argue and 
determine in every blind corner at their several wills of the affairs of the public estate.”157 The 
rhetoric implies the threat of revolution through the pejorative term “innovation,” calling to mind 
the notion of a monstrous body politic. The image of a multi-headed body politic was meant to 
remind subjects of their proper place. Untrained in statecraft, it would be presumptuous to 
discuss the Queen’s marital status, a matter that entailed delicately balancing the intricacies of 
domestic concerns and foreign policy.  
Although the quality of Stubbs’s tract reveals that it was aimed at a learned audience, the 
proclamation reduces its readers to “zealots” and “the meanest person[s] of judgment,” declaring 
Stubbs’s rhetoric to be nothing more than slander. Ellis argues that “Elizabeth’s proclamation 
exposed his text’s basis on the same linguistic framework to which she herself was appealing by 
pointing out that Stubbs’s pamphlet did not operate in a realm of absolute logical certainty but 
through persuasive appeal to popular feeling.”158 Thus both sides appealed to the English’s sense 
of loyalty, Stubbs to their allegiance to mother England, and the royal proclamation to their 
duties to the Queen. The proclamation additionally critiques Stubbs for his depiction of 
Elizabeth, which lacked “so much as a supposal touched of any motherly or princely care to be in 
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her majesty.”159 Although the royal proclamation attempted to recast Stubbs as a seditionist, its 
tone suggests that Stubbs’s polemic found a warm reception among the public. Perhaps because 
of this worrisome realization, the proclamation went so far as to reference Elizabeth’s 
metaphoric role as the mother of the country, a role she had abandoned in the early 1560s 
because of the ease with which it could be manipulated against her.160 
Elizabeth’s anger at Stubbs for his candid and public discussion of her affairs is expected, 
but the proclamation’s tone hints that she may also have been left feeling vulnerable as a result 
of his scrutiny and the conversations it sparked. Clegg notes that “at home the French marriage 
was widely regarded as grounds for popular rebellion. Stubbs’s book not only fanned this fire, 
but its international dissemination threatened an international incident.”161 The combination of an 
unstable domestic environment together with the tract’s international dissemination and 
offensive depictions of all involved in the marriage negotiations necessitated a quick response. 
Elizabeth did not hesitate to act. Lloyd Berry explains that  
Besides the actual publication and distribution of the proclamation, Elizabeth and 
the Privy Council attempted to “cut short the sensation caused by the book” in 
three ways: by directing the Lord Mayor of London to command the various 
guilds to confiscate all copies of the book owned by any of the members; by 
ordering the Archbishop of Canterbury and the bishops of the Church to use their 
influence to command the loyalty of the clergy and the people; and by the prompt 
arrest and trial of Stubbs, Chamberlain, Singleton, and Page. (xxvii)162  
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The Queen not only demanded harsh punishment against Stubbs and his fellow perpetrators, she 
sought to root out Stubbs’s work in its entirety. According to the French ambassador, Castel de 
Mauvissière, she tried to have all three perpetrators put to death even though the 1554 statute of 
sedition under which the perpetrators were convicted did not allow for the death penalty.163 It was 
only with the 1581 sedition statute that written sedition became a felony punishable by death. 
Unfortunately for Elizabeth, the attempt to “cut short the sensation caused by the book” 
did not have the intended results. Bernadino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, writing to 
King Phillip II on October 16, 1579, relates, “The proclamation I sent on the 29th, instead of 
mitigating the public indignation against the French, has irritated it and fanned the flame.”164 The 
irony of the situation is that while Elizabeth and Stubbs argued over whose actions threatened the 
social fabric, Stubbs’s tract succeeded in further uniting and rousing public opinion against the 
marriage, whereas Elizabeth further distanced herself from the people in her desire to punish 
Stubbs. Stubbs’s track did not simply imagine an English community united against the 
marriage, it spoke for this community. Nonetheless, on the morning of Tuesday, November 3, 
1579, Stubbs and Page were taken to the market place in Westminster where they each had their 
right hands removed by a cleaver. Elizabeth had commanded that they be punished in front of 
her palace in London.165 The 1554 sedition statute stated that punishment be carried out in the 
marketplace of the locale where the offence occurred. Her request that it take place before her 
palace emphasized the political importance she placed on the punishment and further reinscribed 
her authority on the offending bodies. Her “victory” was short-lived. Bell writes that 																																																								
163 Barnes, “John Stubbe, 1579: the French Ambassardor’s Account.” 425. Elizabeth sought to “hang them by royal 
prerogative but agreed to their trial for felony”; Natalie Mears, ‘Stubbe [Stubbs], John (c.1541–1590),’ DNB, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, Sept 2010. 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/view/article/26736, accessed 2 July 2015]. 
164 Qtd. in Berry, Introduction. Berry. xxxiii. 
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“Elizabeth’s advisors disapproved. Her lawyers resisted. Two judges who declared the verdict 
illegal were imprisoned. But most important of all, her subjects were appalled.”166 William 
Camden, who witnessed the event, relates that the gathered crowd “was deeply silent” suggesting 
that it was “either out of an Horrour at this new and unwonted kind of Punishment; or else out of 
Commiseration towards the man, as being of most honest and unblameable Repute; or else out of 
Hatred of the Marriage, which most men presaged would be the Overthrow of Religion.”167 
According to Mendoza, even Alençon “was very sorry they had cut off the hands of the men 
concerned with the book, and he would indeed be glad if he could remedy it, even at the cost of 
two fingers of his own hand.” Alençon attempted to secure pardon and recompense for Stubbs 
and Page, perhaps hoping to engender some much needed goodwill towards himself and his 
matrimonial suit.168 The response to Stubbs and Page’s punishment portrays the varying levels of 
judgment in early modern England. The public supported Stubbs, Elizabeth’s lawyers and at 
least two judges denied Stubbs’s guilt, and Alencon, as much a subject of the tract as Elizabeth, 
apparently regretted the turn of events. Only Elizabeth, in her role as the country’s highest-
ranking judge, deemed Stubbs guilty of sedition. While it appears that everyone else disagreed 
with her course of actions, her opinion was ultimately the only one that counted.  
Elizabeth claimed her pound of flesh, allowing her to save face with the French and 
serving “her interest in achieving a French alliance whether or not the marriage proceeded,” yet 
it came at a high cost.169 She used her position to secure Stubbs and Page’s conviction, 
demonstrating that the highest-ranking individual determines what constitutes slander (or in this 
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case, sedition). Yet it was Stubbs who won the hearts and sympathy of his fellow countrymen, a 
task that had always been of prime importance to Elizabeth, when, mere moments after his right 
hand had been removed by the third blow of the cleaver, he “put off his Hat with his Left [hand], 
and said with a loud voice, ‘God save the Queen.’”170 Christopher Haigh said it best when he 
described the incident as “a public relations disaster for Elizabeth.”171  
 
 “Mommie Dearest”: Elizabeth I and the Infanticide Rumors of the 1590s 
Between the years 1590 and 1600, at least three allegations of infanticide were hurled against 
Elizabeth by three separate individuals. My analysis of these rumors172 will reveal how slander, 
in the hands of common folk, could be wielded as a tool for political commentary. Through a 
detailed exploration of these allegations, I will demonstrate how they critiqued her iconography, 
manipulating her metaphorical motherhood in an attempt to replace this powerful image with one 
of their own, that of Elizabeth as a murderous mother. These subjects’ slander reimagined the 
country as a family, one that had been directly harmed by the actions of an uncaring mother. 
While few early modern subjects dared openly critique the sovereign, those who did showed that 
a ruler’s metaphorical depiction could be turned against him or her, thereby exposing how far a 
ruler fell short of that glorified depiction. 
Throughout her life, Elizabeth was continually plagued by slanderous statements that 
focused upon her allegedly illicit sexual behavior. These rumors began when she was a young 
princess living in the household of her stepmother, Katherine Parr, and continued until her death. 
Although the undercurrent of critique was fairly consistent, the calumnies about the Queen did 																																																								
170 Camden, The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth, MacCaffrey, 138. 
171 Haigh, Elizabeth I. 2nd ed., (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 1998), 80. 
172 In this section, I consciously use the terms “slander” and “rumor” interchangeably as the charge of infanticide 
was alleged by more than one individual and, during this period, rumors always had the potential to be slanderous 
and seditious (depending on the subject).  
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periodically escalate in intensity. I believe it is possible to identify three waves of slander. The 
first wave circulated from the late 1540s through the end of the 1570s. These aspersions 
primarily focused upon Elizabeth’s supposed promiscuity. There were, however, a couple of 
exceptions asserting that Elizabeth had borne an illegitimate child, an allegation that would form 
the hallmark of the next wave of critiques. In the 1580s, a second series of slanders emerged 
claiming that Elizabeth had given birth to numerous illegitimate children.173 Robert Dudley, Earl 
of Leicester, was most often identified as the father. The third wave of slanders emerged in 1590 
and was characterized by the horrific claim that Elizabeth and Dudley had murdered their 
children in order to keep their relationship secret. These slanders culminated in a tale that 
asserted that Elizabeth and Dudley not only disposed of their child, but also assassinated a 
subject to ensure her silence.  
These rumors sought to turn the image of the Virgin Queen, the loving mother of the 
realm, into “a counter-image of authority” by arguing that Elizabeth had directly attacked her 
family, murdering her own children and completely annihilating any trace of their existence 
through fire.174 While these accusations are undoubtedly false, they should not be dismissed as 
merely the idle products of malicious minds. Alastair Bellany, Tim Harris, and Andrew McRae 
have demonstrated how the spreading of rumors and the penning of libels were political acts.175 
The infanticide rumors were an expression of popular critique, one that took aim at several of 																																																								
173 For a brief overview of these rumors see David Cressy, Dangerous Talk: Scandalous, Seditious, and Treasonable 
Speech in Pre-Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 70-75; and Carole Levin, “Heart and 
Stomach of a King”: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1994), 65-90. 
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Elizabeth’s official personas. Monarchs’ symbolic roles are dependent upon metaphor and, as 
those who appropriated a sovereign’s image in order to critique it prove, a ruler’s metaphorical 
depiction is not the exclusive property of that ruler. These slanders distorted the Queen’s image 
to show that Elizabeth failed to meet these lofty standards. Through her research on early modern 
slander litigation, Laura Gowing has demonstrated how some individuals used slander “to define 
and enforce the moral character of their neighborhood.”176 Kenneth Gross similarly contends, 
“One danger implicit in rumors is that they let people think they can know and judge the acts of 
those in authority.”177 Those who fabricated rumors or slanders about the Queen used slander as a 
policing technique, extending it to its furthest reach, in an attempt to hold Elizabeth responsible 
for her actions by publicizing her moral failings. In so doing, they claimed the right to appraise 
their social superiors. Their actions radically propose and ultimately testify that the passing of 
judgment was a two-way street, generated by government officials and commoners alike. 
Both early modern men and women used rumor and slander as a vehicle for political 
commentary.178 Drawing on the work of A.N. McLaren, Vanhoutte argues that the reigns of the 
Tudor queens proved “watershed periods in the transformation of English subjects into citizens.” 
Furthermore, “gynocracy encouraged the development of a gendered political discourse, in 
which the role of the godly counselor was to compensate for his monarch’s feminine 
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weakness.”179 However, as Stubbs and others learned, offering the ruler unsolicited advice was a 
risky proposition, for the counsel presented could be interpreted as slander. The individuals who 
fabricated rumors about Elizabeth did not fancy themselves counselors, for they offer no advice. 
Yet their slanderous statements reveal a belief that they could talk about, and thus assess, their 
superiors, a conviction that identifies them as closer to citizens than mere subjects. While 
Vanhoutte and McLaren argue that the reigns of the Tudor queens were watershed periods for 
English men, critiquing powerful figures through slander was an action available to all 
individuals.  
The public slandering of a ruling monarch was not the crucial step that metamorphosed 
subjects into citizens, nor did critiquing the sovereign lead inevitably to the civil wars. Yet the 
willingness to criticize a reigning monarch was an action that entailed considerable risk to life 
and limb. It was an important step in transforming subjects into citizens, helping develop new 
forms of public speech. Subjects’ insistence on using their voices—an act that was theoretically 
prohibited and effectively discouraged—deserves serious consideration. While some subjects 
used their voices to offer the ruler advice, others merely voiced their displeasure at the 
sovereign’s actions.  
The three infanticide rumors I examine are not merely false statements, but narratives that 
systematically critique several of Elizabeth’s figurative roles. In each case, the slanderer has 
invented a secret history focusing upon Elizabeth’s illegitimate children (potential brothers and 
sisters within the framework of the metaphoric family), or those unfortunate souls caught up in 
these state secrets. Before turning to the slanders themselves, I will first explore the main target 
of these attacks, Elizabeth’s image as the virgin mother of the realm.  
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During the first five years of her reign, as she was continually urged to marry and provide 
an heir, Elizabeth sought to deflect these pressures by depicting herself as the mother of her 
people. In the Cambridge manuscript version of her first speech to Parliament, the Queen 
declares that in the matter of her marriage she would never “conclude anything that shall be 
prejudicial to the realm, for the weal and safety whereof, as a good mother to my country, will 
never shun to spend my life.”180 Elizabeth consciously evokes symbolic motherhood in order to 
underscore the power dynamic in this relationship. This figurative familial bond could be 
mutually beneficial, but only if each party properly fulfilled its role. Elizabeth reiterated these 
sentiments a few years later in a speech delivered to Parliament on January 28, 1563. 
Responding to the House of Common’s request that she marry, she “determined in this so great 
and weighty a matter to defer mine answer till some other time because I will not in so deep a 
matter wade with so shallow a wit,” yet concluded by stating “yet shall you never have any a 
more mother than I mean to be unto you all.”181 Paradoxically, Elizabeth styled herself as the 
perfect mother by her refusal to immediately bear children. 
Although figurative motherhood had its advantages, Christine Coch contends that 
Elizabeth abandoned the “metaphor sometime after 1563” because it “provided a subject for 
male manipulation.” Coch points to the 1563 Parliamentary session in which the House of 
Commons, “By defining a mother’s duty as the protection of her children/subjects” tried to force 
Elizabeth to address its concerns by settling the succession.182 The House of Lords went a step 
further, for their petition to Elizabeth threatened that “the Spirit of God promiseth by the mouth 																																																								
180 Delivered February 10, 1559, two other versions of this speech survive; “Queen Elizabeth’s First Speech before 
Parliament,” Elizabeth I: Collected Works, ed. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 56-60, 58 fn. 9. 
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of Saint Paul to Timothy that whosoever maketh not due provision for his family is in danger to 
Godward.”183 Both Houses imply that Elizabeth will fail in her duty as the mother of the realm if 
she remains single. Moreover, in the Lords’ Petition, her marriage becomes not only a political 
necessity, but a religious one as well. She must marry, or risk incurring God’s displeasure; there 
is no middle ground. Both Houses employ religious rhetoric in an attempt to regulate the 
Queen’s behavior, much like commoners who used slander hoping to achieve these same ends. 
As King Johan and countless other polemics have shown, religious rhetoric and slander could 
easily overlap. Yet while individuals like Stubbs insulted the queen’s honor, Parliament 
maintained a civil tone, however disagreeable the underlying suggestions may have been. 
Moreover, their positions as members of Parliament gave them the right to discuss such matters, 
even if it occasionally upset Elizabeth.  
Despite the lack of success, Parliament continued to apply pressure upon Elizabeth and 
her figurative motherhood. Helen Hackett points to a petition that was composed, but never 
delivered, by the 1566 members of Parliament who attempted to affirm their privilege of 
freedom of speech while in session by presenting themselves as her “children.”184 Hackett refers 
to a second speech “probably at the same Parliament” that attempted to blackmail Elizabeth into 
naming an heir. The speech declared that if she fulfilled this duty, “then doth she declare herself 
to be a deare mother,” while failure to do so “will (without the assistance of God’s grace) coole 
the heate of love in any, how fervent so ever it be.”185 It appears that Parliament’s love for its 
“mother” was conditional. On November 29, 1566, Parliament took its most audacious step yet 
in its attempt to force Elizabeth to settle the succession. The members sent Elizabeth a subsidy 																																																								
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184 Virgin Mother, Maiden Queen: Elizabeth I and the Cult of the Virgin Mary (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 
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bill instructing her to name a successor in writing. This was the condition upon which Parliament 
would grant the Queen the subsidy that she required to run her government. Elizabeth was not 
amused. Her written response stated, “I know no reason why any my private answers to the 
realm should be made for prologue to a subsidies…Shall my princely consent be turned to 
strengthen my words that be not of themselves substantives?”186 The members of Parliament had 
grown bold in the years between 1563 and 1566. For a brief moment, they attempted to hold the 
government hostage in order to get its way. 
Although Elizabeth refrained from depicting herself as the mother of the country after the 
first few years of her rule, her symbolic motherhood nonetheless “became a commonplace” 
during the 1560s and 70s.187 Like Hackett, I believe that the emphasis upon Elizabeth as a “chaste 
and loving matron” was partially in response to the rumors concerning the Queen’s supposed 
licentious affairs.188 As Elizabeth’s personal mythology grew and became more elaborate, 
particularly in the 1570s and beyond, the calumnies against her intensified. The more she was 
hailed as a ruler of near mythic proportions, the more her critics attempted to tear her down by 
besmearing her reputation. This clash helped lead to the vitriolic allegations of infanticide.  
In 1590, an Essex widow by the name of Dionisia Deryck asserted that Elizabeth and 
Dudley’s relationship was anything but innocent, contending that the Queen “hath already had as 
many children as I, and that two of them were yet alive, one a man child and the other a maiden 
child, and the others were burned.” She claimed that Dudley “wrapped them up in the embers 
which was in the chamber where they were born.” Carole Levin notes that we do not know how 
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many children Deryck bore, making it impossible to determine how many illegitimate children 
Elizabeth is accused of having killed.189 However, given that Deryck uses the plural “others,” it 
can be deduced that Elizabeth has allegedly birthed at least four illegitimate children, only two of 
whom have survived. Also in 1590, an Essex husbandman named Robert Gardner stated that of 
Elizabeth and Dudley’s children, “three were daughters alive, and the fourth a son was burnt.”190  
The final story is from 1600, when the slanders circulating about the Queen reach their 
crescendo with Hugh Broughton’s tale of murder and intrigue. While travelling in Germany, 
Broughton related the following narrative to a fellow Englishman, William Knight, who in turn 
reported the tale to the Privy Council.191 According to Broughton, a midwife was taken into a 
secret room where she was ordered to save an unnamed woman giving birth. Though unnamed, 
the woman was clearly Elizabeth. The midwife managed to save both the mother and child, at 
which point, the newborn daughter was burnt, while the midwife was given gold and a poisoned 
drink. She died six days later after sharing her story.192 
As punishment, Deryck and Gardner were each made to stand in the pillory for two hours 
wearing paper caps acknowledging their transgressions.193 They uttered much worse allegations 
than Stubbs, yet suffered a significantly lighter punishment. Unlike Stubbs, they would have 
been tried under the harsher 1581 statute of sedition. According to this statute, those found guilty 																																																								
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of fabricating a slander would have faced the pillory and loss of both ears, unless they could pay 
a fine of £200 within two months of conviction, followed by six months imprisonment.194 Given 
their occupations, it is unlikely that either Deryck or Gardner could have paid the fine, yet both 
avoided mutilation. Their lesser punishment for the more damning aspersion highlights the 
importance of certain criteria when judging slander. Stubbs earned a harsher punishment for two 
main reasons; first, he wrote and printed his ideas, while the infanticide rumors were verbal and 
reached far less people. Second was the sociopolitical climate. When Stubbs wrote his polemic, 
the political climate was rather tense and, given his insulting treatment of the French royal 
family, Elizabeth seems to have been concerned that the tract could have affect international 
relations between the two countries. Perhaps the reason Deryck and Gardner avoided mutilation 
was that the government simply was not that concerned by their stories. Perhaps it viewed them 
as too wild for belief.    
What exactly prompted these commoners to invent such vituperative stories about their 
Queen is hard to say. Without further details concerning the context in which these slanders were 
voiced, we may never know. My argument concerning the nature of these stories is therefore 
speculative, yet I believe these tales allow their listeners to tease out a certain logic behind them. 
Given the manner in which these individuals distorted Elizabeth’s iconography, especially her 
symbolic motherhood, it appears that they felt betrayed by the unsettled succession. With regard 
to her role as the phoenix, these attacks seem to be religiously motivated.195 It is possible that 
these individuals also felt moral indignation at the allegedly brazen woman who flaunted herself 
as a virgin, as suggested by Elizabeth’s apparent lack of self-control within Deryck and 
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Garnder’s tales.196 Theodora A. Jankowski contends that virginity in early modern England 
“represented a queer space” that allowed women the possibility of escaping the patriarchal 
constructions and sexual economy of women, a place in which a woman could construct her own 
identity. Yet she cautions that, “in considering Elizabeth as a virgin, one must consider her as 
unlike any other mortal virgin; she was the exception that proved the rule that earthly marriage 
was the lot of every other Englishwoman. For Elizabeth, being a virgin meant, in part, being a 
totally anomalous figure, a human without peer.”197 The infanticide rumors sought to shift the 
ground under Elizabeth’s feet, forcing her back in line with the patriarchally constructed roles for 
women. As a Queen, it was her duty to marry and bear children, yet her status allowed her to 
govern men. As a woman, though, she was subject to the same misogynist rhetoric of the era that 
held it a universal truth that all women were weak creatures governed by passions, unable to 
resist any man’s advances.  
While these slanders may have stemmed from the period’s contemporary misogynistic 
culture, they are more than simply unfocused misogynistic statements; these tales exhibit a 
certain focus, intimating the thought that went into their fashioning. These slanders do more than 
claim that Elizabeth engaged in illicit sexual activity. They present scenarios that are calculated 
to demolish her glorified, semi-mythological roles, making it impossible to hide behind the 
“façade” of the Virgin Queen. Discussing the work of Samaha, Gross states that Samaha 
argues that in reading the “slanders” recorded in…trial reports, we should listen 
for the otherwise silenced voice of social protest. In the words of a man like 
Smithe—or of others accused of spreading news of royal crime and scandal—we 
might hear not private malice or voyeurism, but a desire for truth, a way of calling 																																																								
196 While this close relationship incited much commentary, Dudley was dead by the time of these rumors were 
spread. However, as Curtis Perry has demonstrated, Leicester’s ghosts had a long afterlife; Literature and 
Favoritism in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 22-54. Another possible 
reason is the dire economic situation of the 1590s, although I do not wish to urge this possibility too strongly, as the 
temporal connection is tenuous.  
197 Jankowski, Pure Resistance: Queer Virginity in Early Modern English Drama (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 5-8, 13. 
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those in authority to task, asking that rulers themselves be responsible to the laws 
they impose on their subjects.198  
 
These slanders portray Elizabeth as an anomalous figure, but not in the way she desired. By 
referencing several of her personas and disclosing her inability to behave in a manner fitting 
these figurative roles, these slanders display the authors’ desire to hold her responsible for her 
actions. These tales seek to reveal a hidden “truth,” that Elizabeth has failed to follow 
contemporary morality laws and to protect her family—the country—by providing an heir. Their 
“truth” was in turn exposed as government slander.  
By presenting Elizabeth as an aberrant and unfeeling mother, these three stories negate 
one of the central concerns of the monarchy, the ruler’s capacity to act as caretaker of the people. 
Not only was Elizabeth the mother of the realm, she was also viewed as her people’s nurse; the 
two roles were mutually reinforcing. According to Thomas Bentley’s The Monument of 
Matrones (1582), God chose Elizabeth “and anointed [her] with holie oile, to be thy Queene, the 
Mother, and the Nursse of my people in Israel.”199 Peter McClure and Robin Headlam Wells 
point to Isaiah 49.23, noting that the notion of queens as nurses was not a novel idea, though 
Elizabeth’s virginity certainly changed the dynamics of this long-standing association.200 Beyond 
the biblical connection is the more immediate biological context that mothers nurse their children 
and care for their wellbeing.201 As political commentary, the infanticide rumors depict Elizabeth 
focusing on the carnal desires of her body natural to the neglect of the necessities of the body 
politic, namely the succession. In Broughton’s tale, she is also an accessory to the murder of one 
of her subjects. The midwife is killed to safeguard her secret, as if it were a political 
																																																								
198 Shakespeare’s Noise, 53. 
199 Thomas Bentley, The Monument of Matrones (1582), 307; see also Munday, A Watch-woord to Englande. 
200 “Elizabeth I as a second Virgin Mary.” Renaissance Studies 4.1 (March 1990): 38-70, 41-44, especially 42. 
201 Early modern aristocratic women, however, did not nurse their children themselves. The children were given to 
wet nurses.  
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assassination. These rumors imply that Elizabeth does not fulfill her divinely ordained roles, 
exemplified by her failure to value human life.  
While these allegations differ concerning the number of illegitimate children that 
Elizabeth has borne and murdered, they are all in accordance as to the method of disposal—fire, 
a particularly gruesome fate. Though grisly, fire is a smart choice in that it consumes the 
evidence. Yet why both Gardner and Deryck state that some of Elizabeth’s children, the evidence 
of her guilt, have survived is puzzling. These rumors grant Elizabeth and Dudley some 
awareness of their sins, hence the infanticide, so why they allow some of the children to live is 
inexplicable. Did they honestly believe someone could come forth claiming to be the child of this 
illicit union?202 Or did they simply fail to think this important detail through? It is another piece 
of the puzzle that will probably never be solved. 
The fact that three separate individuals chose fire illustrates that it was not an arbitrary 
choice. Fire recalled the Marian religious executions, suggesting that the flames perhaps should 
be redirected at more appropriate targets, the children of Protestantism and, more importantly, its 
Supreme Governor. While most English Catholics remained loyal to their queen, continental 
Catholics were eager to disparage Elizabeth’s reputation, yet rumors about her supposed 
indiscretions likewise circulated among Protestants. Without further information concerning 
Deryck, Gardner, and Broughton as well as the conditions that prompted their statements, it is 
impossible to say if they were recusants.203 What I believe can be safely surmised is that these 
																																																								
202 In 1587, an Englishman arrested in Spain claimed to be Arthur Dudley. Phillip II had him questioned and he was 
never heard from again. See Levin, The Heart and Stomach of a King, 81-82. Throughout the early modern period, 
various individuals claimed to be a deceased member of the royal family. Perhaps most famously, Perkin Warbeck 
claimed to be Richard, Duke of York, one of the missing princes in the tower. Not only did rumors persist of the 
survival of Edward VI during both Mary and Elizabeth’s reigns, but a couple of individuals also claimed to be 
Edward VI. See Anthony Fletcher and Diarmaid MacCulloch, Tudor Rebellions, 5th edition (Harlow, England: 
Pearson Longman, 2008), 124-25; Levin, The Heart and Stomach of a King, 91-120.  
203 It is worth noting that both Deryck and Gardner were from Essex, a county with a history of religious dissent 
heralding back to the Lollards. The county was home to both radical Protestants and famous Catholic families 
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individuals put thought into crafting these tales, for these narratives weave together various well-
known elements of Elizabeth’s mythology. A possible reason these rumors focused on burning is 
that the phoenix was an important part of Elizabeth’s iconography. It is featured in her Phoenix 
portrait and the Phoenix medal, both from the 1570s, as well as in the Drake Jewel; alongside the 
pelican, it also appears in two popular prints from the 1590s.204 McClure and Wells note, “the 
Phoenix was another emblem of the Virgin.”205 Drawing on their work, Hackett adds that the 
phoenix “had been associated with Christ’s resurrection, and with the chastity and uniqueness of 
the Virgin.”206 This mythological creature is unique because only one of its kind exits at a time. A 
chaste hermaphrodite, it reproduces parthenogenically, bursting to life from its own ashes. It is 
possible that Elizabeth chose this emblem as a symbol of her fortitude and endurance. Haigh has 
argued that its use “may have signified her recovery from the disaster of Anne’s execution.”207 
According to the rumors, Elizabeth’s actions were motivated by the fear of scandal, one possibly 
worse than that which destroyed her mother. Even a phoenix would not be allowed to rise from 
its ashes in this scenario; consequently, its children (though not all of them) were sacrificed so 																																																																																																																																																																																		
during Elizabeth’s reign; Samaha, “Gleanings from Local Criminal-Court Records,” 66. Equally important is the 
fact that many individuals who expressed religious dissent in Elizabethan Essex were found “not guilty” when tried 
and even some of those convicted were released, leading Samaha to argue that there was some “tolerance of 
religious dissent”—tolerance which was not extended to those who directed political critique against Elizabeth’s 
right to rule (71, 77). Thus, if Deryck and Gardner’s seditious statements were motivated by religious dissent, they 
were interpreted first and foremost as political critique and only secondly (if at all) as religious dissent.  
204 Roy Strong, Gloriana: The Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I (London: Pimlico, 2003. (1987)). 83. The symbol is 
not confined solely to pictorial images. Depictions of Elizabeth as a phoenix can be found in such varied works as: 
Thomas Churchyard, A handeful of gladsome verses, giuen to the Queenes Maiesty at Woodstocke this prograce. 
1592. By Thomas Churchyarde (Oxford 1592); Richard Harrington depicts the Queen as “A Phenix of moste noble 
minde” in A famous dittie of the ioyful receauing of the Queens moste excellent maiestie…1584 (London 1584); 
Lodowick Lloyd declares Elizabeth “the Phoenix of the world” in An Epitach upon the death of the honorable, syr 
Edward Saunders, Knight…1576 (London 1576); and “A Phenix fine” in A Dittie to the tune of Welshe Sydanen 
(London 1579); George Peele proclaims “Live longe the noble Phoenix of our age” (1235) in The Araygnement of 
Paris (London 1584); and George Whetstone refers to Elizabeth simply “as Phenix of the worlde” (C3) in The 
Censure of a Loyall Subiect (London 1587). 
205 “Elizabeth I as a second Virgin Mary,” 44. 
206 Virgin Mother, Maiden Queen, 81. Hackett, though, is careful note that emblems usually associated with Mary, 
like the phoenix, “were not solely Marian, having wider associations with pagan goddesses, courtly mistresses, and 
other idealizations of femininity” (27). The point remains, though, that the image of the phoenix was traditionally 
associated with uniqueness.  
207 Elizabeth I, 3-4. 
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that it might live. These slanders beg the question, how can Elizabeth care for her metaphorical 
children when she burns her biological ones? 
Like the phoenix, the closely related symbol of the pelican is another of Elizabeth’s 
images that appears to come under fire in these rumors. The pelican was said to pierce its heart, 
feeding its children with its own blood. It signified charity and redemption.208 Moreover, “as an 
image of self-sacrifice, it was therefore primarily associated with Christ, while as an image of 
self-denying maternal care it could also be associated with the Virgin.”209 The pelican imagery 
portrayed Elizabeth as a selfless mother, sacrificing her life’s blood to ensure her people’s 
survival. Given the connection to Christ and that the heart is the seat of love, this emblem may 
also recall Christ’s message to love thy neighbor, a message best exemplified in his sacrifice. If 
there is no greater love than to sacrifice one’s life for a friend, then perhaps there is no greater 
betrayal than to destroy one’s own progeny, thereby also endangering an entire country. 
The authors of these slanders were not the first to manipulate Elizabeth’s symbolic 
motherhood. Parliament did so on various occasions. Perhaps Deryck, Gardner, and Broughton 
simply availed themselves of (and exaggerated) an existing strand of political commentary. 
Vanhoutte claims that contemporaries challenged Elizabeth’s assumption of symbolic 
motherhood “by playing a variation on her theme,” complicating “Elizabeth’s familial analogies 
through reference to reconstituted families.” They depicted her not as a mother, but a stepmother, 
an unflattering term associated “with usurpation and tyranny.”210 Elizabeth’s symbolic 
motherhood seems to have been as much a liability as it was a strength. The infanticide rumors, 																																																								
208 Strong, Gloriana, 83. 
209 Virgin Mother, Maiden Queen, 80-81. 
210 “Elizabeth I” 317, 325. She also argues that Shakespeare obliquely characterizes Elizabeth as a “stepdame” in 
Midsummer Night’s Dream (1590-1596) through Theseus’s critique of the “old moon” that delays his desire. In 
contrast, John Lyly’s Endymion (1588) displays that “Cynthia is no stepmother,” but only because Cynthia grants 
male desire “through the suppression of feminine desire” (318). Thus, according to Vanhoutte, Elizabeth could only 
play the mother so long as her actions accorded with the desires of her male subjects. Aylmer and Stubbs’s political 
tracts are more equivocal, implying that Elizabeth’s symbolic status as a mother is dependent on her behavior.  
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though tactless and extreme, were a part of the social commentary upon Elizabeth’s persona of 
“good ol’ mum.” Yet these tales were quite personal in their attacks, critiquing and distorting 
four of Elizabeth’s famed roles: the mother of the country, the Virgin Queen, the phoenix, and 
the pelican. The authors of these rumors attempted to hold Elizabeth responsible for her 
shortcomings, arguing that she was unfit to govern because she failed the foremost 
responsibilities of the sovereign, to act as a caretaker for her people and provide an heir. If “the 
reputation of the house itself rested on women” as Gowing contends, then, by extension, the 
reputation of the country rests with the queen.211 Deryck, Gardner, and Broughton would have us 
believe that England’s reputation was not as sterling as the image of Elizabeth enthroned at 
Whitehall palace; rather, it was as polluted as the fireplaces that housed the ashy remainders of 
Elizabeth’s children.  
 
Conclusion 
The language of slander is ultimately that of truth and falsehood, but it is also indelibly marked 
by the numerous, additional, and often competing variables that are taken into account when 
passing judgment on a potentially slanderous statement. Motivation, the current climate, and the 
status and reputation of the speaker all remain important considerations. Written slander 
continues to be judged more harshly today than verbal slander, as evidenced by the countless 
“tweets” that result in public-relations dilemmas for individuals in the public eye. As King Johan 
and Stubbs’s The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf have shown, the truth/slander binary is insufficient 
in itself to define slander. Determining “truth” is an interpretative act, particularly in regard to 
religion. One person’s truth is not that of another’s and the “truth” can change over time. While 
the authors of the infanticide rumors offered no proof for their claims, their slanders aimed to 																																																								
211 “Language, power and the law,” 30. 
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disclose a hidden truth. These slanders point to an antithesis at the heart of slander’s definition, 
one that remains today. As Lindsey Kaplan has noted, the OED provides opposing definitions for 
the term “slander.” The first sense of the term offered in the OED describes slander as a “false 
statement.” The third definition states that slander is “discredit, disgrace, or shame, incurred by 
or falling upon a person or persons, esp. on account of some transgression of the moral law, 
unworthy action, or misdemeanor.”212 These opposed definitions can be seen at play in all three 
case studies, with one side claiming the statement to be false and malicious, and the other 
asserting that it is the rightfully deserved ignominy for wrongdoing.  
To return to the deposition sparked by King Johan’s sole documented performance, in 
addition to monarchs, commoners were sensitive to potentially offensive language, monitoring 
their own and others’ speech. The development of sedition as a political crime raised the stakes 
of slander even for commoners by creating the obligation to report upon seditious (or potentially 
seditious) allegations, or risk being seen as the author of said allegations.213 The following 
chapter will consider Elizabeth’s successor, King James VI and I’s varying reactions to slander, 
as well as the different tactics that commoners, fictional and historical, used in the hopes of 
avoiding punishment for slanderous words or writings.  
  
																																																								
212 Qtd. in Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 13. 
213 See the introduction for more on how authorities attempted to trace the authorship of seditious allegations. 
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Chapter 2 “‘Stop Their Mouthes’: Mediating Responses to Slander” 
The previous chapter explored three case studies of sedition from the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth I. Chapter 2 focuses on case studies of slander against a reigning monarch, King James 
I and IV, investigating the real and imagined physical and social effects of slander as well as the 
range of responses that slander could elicit.214 By way of introduction, I will briefly examine 
James’s published views on slander in Basilikon Doron (1598), his book of advice to his son, 
Prince Henry, instructing his heir how to rule wisely. James’s work is among the most explicit 
considerations of slander by a ruling monarch. It reveals his personal discomfort with slander as 
well as his recommended public response to such criticism. Its ideas were put to test by my two 
case studies, the anonymous libel, “The Five Senses” (1621-1623), and William Shakespeare’s 
Measure for Measure (1603-04), which were published roughly at the end and start of James’s 
tenure as English king, respectively. Notwithstanding his published views on slander, James did 
not always respond to criticism with force, thus exhibiting an unexpected difference between 
theory and practice. While Elizabeth’s gender and family history made her position more 
susceptible to critique, James’s temperament suggests that personal inclination is just as crucial 
in determining a ruler’s response to criticism. 
In 1603, various English editions of Basilikon Doron were published in anticipation of 
the new king’s arrival. James’s opinion about slander (and governance in general) was thus well 
known in England and undoubtedly influenced the depiction of Duke Vincentio in Measure.215 It 
																																																								
214 Throughout this chapter, I will predominantly use the term “slander” rather than “sedition” because James chose 
to let the sedition statutes enacted under Elizabeth expire with her death. He did not enact any new sedition statutes 
during his reign as an English king.  
215 In the additional material to the Bedford edition of the play, Ivo Kamps and Karen Raber state that “at least as far 
back as 1766, critics have argued that Measure for Measure has a special connection to King James I, and that 
James’s Basilikon Doron, in particular, may have been a source for Shakespeare’s play” (Boston: Bedford St. 
Martins, 2004), 125. For more information concerning the English editions of Basilikon Doron, see Jenny Wormald, 
“James VI and I, Basilikon Doron and The Trew Law of Free Monarchies: the Scottish context and English 
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has long been a critical commonplace to acknowledge the similarities between the King and the 
Duke. J.W. Lever succinctly summarized the matter in his introduction to the Arden edition of 
the play:  
to see the Duke in Measure for Measure as an exact replica of James I would be 
to misunderstand both Shakespeare’s dramatic methods and the practice of the 
contemporary stage. But to suppose that no parallel was to be drawn between the 
two characters, or that, according to the familiar formula, ‘any resemblance to any 
living person was purely accidental’, would seem to be just as untenable.216  
 
Despite the shadow of Basilikon Doron, the Duke (like James himself) exhibits a surprising 
variety of responses to slander throughout the play, including fear, annoyance, and even restraint. 
In addition to its focus on a ruler’s sundry responses to slander, Measure introduces the metaphor 
of the tongue as the heart’s messenger, a metaphor that was continually employed by period 
authors of slander and tongue treatises to emphasize how slander created dissention within a 
community or nation. This dissension was mirrored in the body of the slanderer through a 
disconnect between the heart and tongue, organs that were expected to work cooperatively to 
promote truth and health.  
My first case study, the anonymous “The Five Senses,” presents none of the anticipated 
reactions to slander, instead offering a potentially imagined response that allows a glimpse of a 
regular subject’s view on written slander. While the case studies from Elizabeth’s reign 
examined in Chapter 1 centered on religiously motivated sedition, revealing how the current 
socioplitical culture affected the punishments meted out for verbal crimes and the lengths to 
which a monarch could go to try to silence critique, this chapter portrays a wider range of 
responses elicited by slander, from pained lamentations to vengeful monarchic sentencing and 																																																																																																																																																																																		
translation” in The Mental World of the Jacobean Court, ed. Linda Levy Peck (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 36-54, especially page 51. 
216 Introduction to Measure for Measure. The Arden Shakespeare Second Series, ed. J.W. Lever (London: Methuen, 
2006 (1966)), l. Of course, not all literary scholars have agreed with Lever’s assessment, as the topic continues to 
attract critical attention. 
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even flippant disregard. These case studies illustrate that the stakes for uttering slander against a 
reigning monarch remained high and were internalized by individuals such as the clergyman, 
John Rous, who preserved a copy of the libelous poem “The Five Senses.”217 Yet, as I will show, 
these same individuals imagined narratives that placed a positive spin on their actions, which 
they hoped would allow them to avoid punishment for having broken the same slander laws they 
feared. 
 
The King’s Speech: James I’s Basilikon Doron 
The critical reevaluation of King James I and VI that has taken place in the last half century has 
emphasized James’s various successes, including that he really was a good Scottish king. When 
he left for England, Scotland was significantly more stable than it had been when he inherited the 
throne from his mother, the deposed Mary Queen of Scots. For example, James not only curbed 
the powerful Scottish aristocracy, but also affirmed monarchic authority over the church.218 
James VI wrote Basilikon Doron in Middle Scots in 1598 about his experience as king of 
Scotland, commenting on both his successes and his missteps. Only seven copies were initially 
printed.219 After the death of Queen Elizabeth I, the English were naturally curious about their 
new king. Multiple editions of an English translation of Basilikon Doron were reprinted in 
England and eagerly read in the hopes of getting a glimpse of the new ruler’s beliefs.  																																																								
217 For example, according to the Edward Coke’s case “De Libellis Famosis,” which came to define the crime of 
libel (written slander), an individual found guilty of libel would be punished “according to the Quality of the 
Offence,” including “Fine or Imprisonment, and if the Case be exorbitant, by Pillory and Loss of his Ears”; The 
Reports of Edward Coke (London: printed for H. Twyford et al, 1680), Vol. 5, 125-26. These punishments were 
nearly identical to the punishments meted out under Elizabeth’s draconian sedition statutes. 
218 For more on James’s success as king of Scotland, see Maurice Lee, Jr., Great Britain’s Solomon: James VI and I 
in His Three Kingdoms (University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago, 1990), esp. Ch. 3, “Kingship and 
Kingcraft,” 63-92. 
219 While James had seven (Anglicized) copies of the text secretly printed in 1599, each of which was intended for a 
particular individual, knowledge of the text nonetheless seeped out from the narrow constrictions James had placed 
upon his work. Johann P. Sommerville writes that “even before the book was printed it had come to the notice of the 
Presbyterian minister Andrew Melville, who had seen a copy of the manuscript”; King James VI and I: Political 
Writing, ed. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), xviii.  
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In the classic 1966 study Measure for Measure as Royal Entertainment, Josephine 
Waters Bennett describes Basilikon Doron as a “highly idealized, official portrait” of James’s 
style of governance. She notes that although James treated his work “as if it were an official 
statement of his policies,” time would eventually demonstrate that “it was not a blueprint of the 
new reign” as “his practice fell short of his avowed principles.”220 This discrepancy is partly 
explained by James’s ability to distinguish between “principles” and “practice,” especially with 
regards to his deeply held beliefs concerning absolutist political theory, a difference that his 
English subjects did not fully appreciate.221 More importantly, Basilikon Doron was not intended 
for a general audience. While as a ruler he did not always follow the advice offered within his 
work, it did reveal James’s sensitivity to slander, sensitivity that he continued to display as king 
of England. In Basilikon Doron, this concern focused upon a particular type of critique, 
religiously motivated criticism from individuals he characterized as “proud Puritans.”  
According to James, Puritans were unruly, hypocritical individuals who sought to impose 
their opinions upon the whole land, including the king.222 He perhaps gave freer vent to his 
frustrations with Puritans because of the text’s initial, tightly controlled publication, yet James 
did not mitigate his annoyance in later editions. His irritation with those who would tried to 
dictate religious policy is clear from the start of the work, in his address “To the Reader” 
included in both the 1603 and 1616 editions. James explained that the purpose of his address was 
to respond to criticism he received following the work’s initial publication, including the 
																																																								
220 Bennett, Measure for Measure as Royal Entertainment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 85. 
Chapter VI, “The Duke,” focuses on exploring the connections between Basilikon Doron and the character of the 
Duke from Measure for Measure.  
221 See Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-
1642 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993). 
222 For example, James writes, “And what is betwixt the pride of a glorious Nebuchadnezzar, and the preposterous 
humilities of one of the proud Puritanes, claiming to their Paritie, and crying, Wee are all but vile wormes, and yet 
will judge and give Law to their King, but will be judged nor controlled by none?” All references to Basilikon 
Doron King James VI and I, ed. Sommerville, 1-61, 44.  
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calumnies put forth by Puritans that he wavered in his devotion to Protestantism. He later tried to 
claim that by “Puritans” he meant only “that vile sect amongst Anabaptists, called the Family of 
love,” but as Maurice Lee, Jr. has stated, “This was obvious nonsense, but the English Puritans 
knew what James meant by it: he did not mean to repress them.”223  
James further clarified that by “Puritan” he meant the “kinde of men” who “refuse to 
obey the Law, and will not cease to sturre up a rebellion,” men who prompted James to write 
against them “the more bitterly, in respect of diverse famous libels, and injurious speaches spred 
by some of them” that dishonored “all Christian Princes” and was “even reprochfull to our 
profession and Religion.”224 The troublesome Puritan, therefore, was defined not by his beliefs, 
but by his actions. James, who loved to engage in debate on numerous subjects, including 
religion, was not bothered by a difference in opinion with fellow Protestants. Rather, he took 
offense when individuals publicly spoke or wrote against him, or the established practices of the 
Scottish church. He believed such actions threatened the country’s peace by encouraging 
division among its members.225 James went so far as to state that Puritans were entitled to their 
contrary opinions, so long as they “content themselves soberly and quietly,” never “resisting” 
authority nor “sturring any rebellion or schism.” Or, if those opinions were shared, they should 
be founded upon “well grounded reasons” and that if “they see better grounds on the other part, 
not to bee ashamed peaceably to incline thereunto, laying aside all preoccupied opinions.”226 
James’s comments were rather lenient for the era, perhaps stemming from his enjoyment of 
religious debate, or the knowledge that he had already asserted his authority over the church. 																																																								
223 Basilikon Doron, 6; Great Britain’s Solomon, 87. 
224 Basilikon Doron, 7. 
225 James’s differing reactions to the voicing versus printing of contrasting opinions correlates with the harsher legal 
consequences for printing slanderous comments as opposed to merely speaking them. While the government often 
utilized print to reach a wider audience, such as with royal proclamations, it was keenly aware that its critics often 
used print for the same purpose.  
226 Ibid., 7. 
		 98	
Years later, as head of the English church, James would demonstrate that he could employ 
bishops whose religious beliefs differed not only from each other, but even, at times, from his 
own (provided those bishops were politic enough to keep quiet about such). The view of James 
that emerges from his letter “To the Reader” is of a ruler who merely required outward 
conformity. Much like his predecessor, he had no desire to judge men’s souls.  
In the second book of his treatise, “Of a King’s Dutie in his Office,” James warns his son 
that to “one fault is all the common people of this Kingdome subject…to judge and speake rashly 
of their Prince.”227 He offered the uninspired advice that  
(besides the execution of Lawes that are to be used against unreverent speakers) I 
know no better meane, then so to rule, as may justly stop their mouthes from all 
such idle and unreverent speeches; and so to prop the weale of your people, with 
provident care for their good government, that justly Momus himself may have no 
ground to grudge at.228 
 
To rule in a manner that would stop all ungracious mouths would, presumably, be achieved by 
following James’s advice. He immediately added the caveat, “yet so to temper and mixe your 
severitie with mildness, that as the unjust railers may be restrained with reverent awe” and 
faithful subjects may be inspired to “open their mouthes in just praise of your so well moderated 
regiment.”229 While a monarch must not hesitate to enforce the country’s slander laws, James 
emphasized that the best restraint for loose tongues can be found in the ruler’s behavior. This 
advice centers on the image of the subjects’ mouths, mouths that should be shut from critiquing, 
but opened for praising the ruler. James draws upon a classic, idealized notion of kingship, the 
idea of a just ruler above critique, to offer his son the practical advice, “do not give them 
anything to complain about.” His advice to temper “severity” with “mildness” similarly 
underscored the notion that magnanimity can produce more positive, profound effects than 																																																								
227Ibid., 30.  
228 Ibid., 30-31. Momus is the Greek god of mockery and ridicule.  
229 Ibid., 31. 
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punishment. James, however, did not provide specific examples of when it would be appropriate 
to show mercy, which is why we must turn to case studies.  
James’s list of unpardonable crimes is well known and frequently cited.230 Less often 
quoted is the following paragraph, where James expresses a desire to add another crime to the 
list, “if I should not be thought partiall: but the fatherly love I beare you, will make mee breake 
the bounds of shame in opening it unto you. It is then, the false and unreverent writing or 
speaking of malicious men against your Parents and Predecessors.”231 Of course, his reasons for 
adding this crime were “partial,” as it would theoretically protect his own reputation. James 
followed his own advice in this matter. Once he began ruling in his own person, he guarded his 
predecessors’ reputations, especially that of his mother. In 1585, the Scottish Parliament declared 
slander of the monarch treasonous; a subsequent act in 1596, two years before he wrote Basilikon 
Doron, “extended the offence to cover remarks made about the king’s parents and ancestors.”232 
He continued to protect his predecessors’ reputations as king of England, guarding Elizabeth’s 
name against detractors, despite her role in Mary’s execution.  
James’s belief concerning the reputations of his forerunners thus qualifies his earlier 
advice, “to temper and mixe your severitie with mildness.” Seditionists who critiqued the royal 
lineage were not worthy of mercy.233 This belief also explains why he spoke so strongly against 
the owners of works deemed libelous. Emphasizing the need to be familiar with “authentick 
histories,” James nearly allowed his passion to run away with him, arguing vociferously against  
such infamous invectives, as Buchanans or Knoxes Chronicles: and if any of these 
infamous libels remaine untill your dayes, use the Law upon the keepers thereof: 
For in that point I would have you a Pythagorist, to thinke that the very spirits of 																																																								
230 These crimes include witchcraft, willful (premeditated) murder, incest, sodomy, poisoning, and counterfeiting 
money; Ibid., 23.  
231 Ibid., 23. 
232 William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, ed. N.W. Bawcutt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 4-5.  
233 Basilikon Doron, 31. 
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these archibellouses of rebellion, have made transition in them that hoardes their 
books, or maintaines their opinions; punishing them, even as it were their authors 
risen again.234 
 
His ire partly stemmed from personal experience with these two individuals. While the views 
expressed above demonstrate James’s lifelong distrust of unofficial or unlicensed histories, they 
should not be read as his general viewpoint upon libel. James selected Buchanan and Knox as 
representative of “infamous invective” because neither kept secret their pejorative view of Mary 
Queen of Scots and, worse, each sought to place limitations on royal authority, an idea that was 
anathema to a divine right ruler like James. Buchanan’s De Juris Regni apud Scotus tried to 
prove that the Scottish constitution allowed for the deposition of a monarch if  “the majority of 
the Scottish people found him unsatisfactory,” while Knox’s History of the Reformation in 
Scotland argued that a monarch could be deposed on religious grounds.235 Although his rhetoric 
implies that libelous works house the spirits of rebel rousers, as if such texts lay dormant waiting 
for someone to unleash their spirit, in practice, James was more tolerant of libel (and the owners 
of libel) so long as the work did not inveigh against his predecessors, seek to limit royal 
authority, or attempt to dictate policy. Censorship under James, as with Elizabeth, occurred on a 
case-by-case basis rather than as a matter of policy.236 
Despite his pronouncements on slander, James did not always reply punitively. He often 
displayed a degree of patience absent in Basilikon Doron’s musings on Puritans, as when he 
penned a poem in 1622-23 in response to public critique, or, as we will see below, in his alleged 
dismissal of “The Five Senses.” Of course, he was capable of anger; Causabon Regia (1615), an 
anonymous play written in Latin, incensed this peace-loving king and resulted in his interference 																																																								
234 Ibid., 46 
235 For more on James’s views concerning these two works and his tutelage with Buchanan, see Lee, Jr., Great 
Britain’s Solomon, 31-36.  
236 For more on censorship in Jacobean England, see Cyndia Susan Clegg, Press Censorship in Jacobean England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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in the Spanish Netherlands.237 The fictional Duke of Shakespeare’s Measure reflects James’s 
complicated views on slander. The play demonizes slander, yet simultaneously acknowledges 
that this verbal phenomenon is inevitable, a tension that remains unresolved and is met with the 
gathered characters’ palpable silence at the end of the play. 
 
God Save the King: James I and “The Five Senses” 
The libelous poem “The Five Senses,” considers the gap between James I’s printed position on 
slander and his practice. A historical ruler with a known dislike of slander, his alleged reply to 
this slanderous poem is surprisingly tolerant. Yet, as I will show, this tolerant response 
nonetheless attempts to silence discussion of this libel. By analyzing the extent of the poem’s 
critique of James, as well as his purported response it, I will show the range of possible 
responses to slander, including how James’s alleged reply reveals the conflicting feelings that 
libel could elicit in those who ran the risk of keeping these forbidden texts. As discussed in 
greater detail below, unlike Measure’s Lucio, those who skirted early modern slander laws did 
not all derive such glee from their actions. To avoid confusion, I define libel as a written or 
visual text that meets one of the following criteria: (1) maliciously motivated writing or visual 
text; (2) writing or visual text critical of another’s wrongdoing, whether true or false; (3) written 
or visual fabrications meant to entertain; (4) written or visual texts that cause offense.238 My 
definition for libel is remarkably similar to my definition for slander (a potentially offensive 
																																																								
237 Styled as a mock-panegyric, the text’s excessive, personal assault led James to demand the author’s punishment; 
he even sent an envoy to the Continent to achieve this goal. The author ultimately escaped punishment and his 
identity remains a topic of scholarly debate. J.P. Sommerville briefly discusses the matter in “James I and the Divine 
Right of Kings,” Levy Peck, 55-70, especially 61. Dana F. Sutton comments on the matter in the short introduction 
to the hypertext edition of the play Causabon Regia, The Philological Museum, posted June 27, 2011; online edn. 
[http://www.philological.bham.ac.uk/corona/intro.html, accessed 29 Jan. 2015]. 
238 Libel was often described as a written slander, a picture, or a sign; Sheppard, Action upon the Case for Slander, 
115. The term “libel,” however, had not yet been distinguished from “slander.” It was not until the late seventeenth 
century that libel began to be defined separately, as written, as opposed to verbal slander. 
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verbal statement); the choice is deliberate, as I want to acknowledge the interchangeability of the 
two terms during the period while simultaneously providing a fine distinction between the two 
for ease of reference. 
Early modern English libel was seen as mean-spirited, vituperative in tone, and prone to 
attacking identifiable individuals. But it was also a vehicle for popular political commentary. It 
was often anonymous and circulated through manuscript publication. As demonstrated by recent 
research on early modern libel, these two conditions provided authors a greater openness for 
dialogue. Pauline Croft argues that period libels prove “the existence of a lively and informed 
body of public opinion which relished political gossip and subjected famous figures to a far-
from-deferential scrutiny.”239 Marcy L. North similarly contends that placing defamatory libels 
alongside poems that praise public figures presents “voices in a dialogue rather than…voices in 
rebellion.”240 And as Andrew McRae asserts, “the libel should therefore be situated in a 
peculiarly licensed discursive space,” a space from which we can glimpse and appreciate 
anonymous citizens’ attempts to speak their minds about topics of political concern in a manner 
not determined solely by the era’s conceptions of deference and paternalism.241 Libel, like satire, 
could display a biting tone, but it could also exhibit an interest in improvement, using critique to 
promote change, to voice behavioral ideals.  
																																																								
239 “The Reputation of Robert Cecil: Libels, Political Opinion and Popular Awareness in the Early Seventeenth 
Century.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Sixth Series 1 (1991): 43-69, 44. 
240 North’s focus is on the compilation process itself and the compiler’s accountability for the manuscript collection. 
She investigates how private manuscripts can provide a degree of safety, yet the variety of works collected and their 
organization can change the meaning of a work, or frame a reader’s response to a particular piece. See “Queen 
Elizabeth Compiled: Henry Stanford’s Private Anthology and the Question of Accountability,” in Dissing Elizabeth: 
Negative Representations of Gloriana, ed. Julia Walker (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 185-204, 203-04.  
241Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 34. 
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An anonymous manuscript libel, “The Five Senses” survives in over 40 manuscripts, an 
astounding number that attests to its popularity.242 “The Five Senses” belongs to an ongoing 
conversation critiquing James’s private behavior and official policies. The Suffolk clergyman 
John Rous records (alongside his copy of the poem) that when James read a copy of it, he 
allegedly replied in a sarcastic manner, dismissing the libel’s critique. While scholars 
occasionally note this purported reply, to my knowledge, it has not been critically examined. The 
most extended treatment it has received is from Alistair Bellany, who writes that “John Rous, 
always anxious to explain away libels, heard that when a copy was shown to James, ‘he made 
light’ of the verse and said that ‘this fellow wished good things for him.’”243 I argue that this 
response is worthy of consideration because it provides insight into how common subjects tried 
to justify actions they knew were prohibited by slander law. Regardless of whether James’s 
reaction was accurately reported or merely a figment of Rous’s imagination, the reply reveals 
that powerful individuals could respond to libel and slander in a surprising number of ways, 
beyond the usual manner of detection and public punishment. 
Under the flimsy guise of a prayer for the king’s well being, “The Five Senses” boldly 
attacks King James’s policies and behavior. McRae has argued that the libel was “most likely 
written by William Drummond in 1623,” but this assessment has not achieved scholarly 
consensus.244 The poem critiques James’s relationship with his favorite, the reviled George 
Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, depicting these powerful men as two of the greatest dangers 
facing the nation. Moreover, it portrays England’s vulnerability to internal and external threats, 
which directly result from the susceptibility of James’s own body to these hazards. The poem’s 
																																																								
242 See Joshua Eckhardt, Manuscript Verse Collectors and the Politics of Anti-Courtly Love Poetry (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 188-89, fn.27 for a list of the manuscripts in which the libel survives. 
243 The Politics of Court Scandal, 258. 
244 Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State, 75. 
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slanderous nature lies in the argument that James allowed these threats to take root in England by 
his unwillingness or inability to recognize these dangers for what they are. Furthermore, by 
depicting the King’s body as the gateway through which these hazardous substances first entered 
into and continue to flourish within the realm, “The Five Senses” directly negates the metaphor 
of the king’s two bodies: these two bodies include the king’s “body natural,” that is his physical 
body, as well as the metaphoric “body politic,” in which the nation is depicted as a single entity, 
one body, with the monarch as the head. The king’s two bodies emphasized the indissolubility of 
the monarchy. In his work, Commentaries or Reports (printed 1816), the early modern lawyer 
and law reporter, Edmund Plowden contended that the body politic “is utterly void of Infancy, 
and old Age, and other natural Defects or Imbecilities, which the Body natural is subject to, and 
for this Cause, what the King does in his Body politic, cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any 
Disability in his natural Body.”245 Though the body politic was believed to counteract and repair 
the frailties of the ruler’s body, “The Five Senses” offers a darker assessment by reversing the 
formula and contending that the ruler’s defects are the very thing that endanger and pollute the 
body politic. In the process, the libel also vehemently gestures to the need for monarchs to 
practice self-government.   
 Joshua Eckhardt characterizes “The Five Senses” as an “answer-poem, a parody of a 
song from Ben Jonson’s 1621 court masque The Gypsies Metamorphosed.”246 Jonson’s song had 
blessed James’s senses, praying that he be spared such minor annoyances as “a lawyer three parts 
noise” or “bad venison and worse wine.”247 Jonson’s masque was presented by Buckingham and 
																																																								
245 Quoted in Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), 7.  
246 Manuscript Verse Collectors, 121. 
247 Ben Jonson, The Gypsies Metamorphosed, in English Drama, 1580-1642, ed. C.F. Tucker Brooke and Nathaniel 
Burton Paradise (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1993), 625-44. The lines quoted are III.51, 
78. 
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his wife in honor of James in the summer of 1621. Rous obtained a copy of “The Five Senses” in 
the summer of 1623, which narrows the date of composition to this two-year period. 248 The court 
masque was a dramatic genre typically employed to praise to the monarch, or a member of the 
aristocracy. The author of “The Five Senses” brilliantly subverts “a discourse(s) of hierarchy and 
praise” by taking a song from a masque sponsored by Buckingham and refashioning it into a 
libel that censures both the King and the masque’s sponsor.249 Given the libel’s level of 
engagement with Jonson’s song, it is possible that the unknown author witnessed the masque, or 
may simply have acquired a copy of this song.250 The sophistication of the libel demonstrates that 
its author was well educated and well informed about court life, while the length suggests that 
the poem was not meant for wide, oral distribution.251  
I quote the text of “The Five Senses” in full as each line develops the metaphors treated 
in this chapter:   
I. Seeing 
From such a face whose Excellence 
May captivate my Soveraignes sence 
And make him Phoebus like his throne 
Resigne to him younge Phaëton 
Whose skillesse and unsteaddie hand      5 
May prove the ruine of a land 
Unless great Jove downe from the skye 																																																								
248 Bellany, The Politics of Court Scandal, 258; McRae, Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State, 76. “Early 
Stuart Libels: an edition of poetry from manuscript sources,” ed. Alastair Bellany and Andrew McRae. Early 
Modern Literary Studies Text Series I (2005). http://purl.oclc.org/emls/texts/libels/.  
Eckhardt specifies that the masque was originally presented on August 3, 1621 and then “twice more: two days later 
at the earl of Rultand’s house, Belvoir, and ‘probably in early in September’ at Windsor Castle.” It was during the 
final performance that Jonson’s song was first performed. Eckhardt also suggests that the reference to the “Spanish 
treaties” in stanza two “would seem to corroborate the date of 1623 given the libel in three manuscripts”; 
Manuscript Verse Collectors, 121, 125. 
249 Andrew McRae, “The Literary Culture of Early Stuart Libeling.” Modern Philology: A Journal Devoted to 
Research in Medieval and Modern Literature 97.3 (2000): 364-92, 388.  
250 Jonson’s song seems to have been popular in its own right, for it “was excerpted from the dramatic text and 
disseminated on its own in manuscript.” The song is “preserved in at least 17 copies,” often alongside a copy of 
“The Five Senses”; Eckhardt, Manuscript Verse Collectors, 122. 
251 Bellany argues that “as a rule, the shorter the verse, the better the chance for oral circulation” and “the longer the 
poem, the more difficult oral transmission became”; The Politics of Court Scandal, 103. Although rhyme aided 
memorization and thus oral transmission, the poem is simply too long to be memorized easily.  
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Beholding Earthes Calamitie 
Strike with his hand that cannot err 
The proud Usurping Charioter      10 
And cure though Phoebus grieve our woe 
From such a face that cann worke soe 
Wheresoere thou hast a beeing 
Blesse my Soveraigne, and his seeing. 
 
2. Heareinge 
From Jeasts prophane, from flattering tongues    15 
From bawdy tales from beastly soungs 
From after supper suites that feare  
A Parliament or Councells eare 
From Spanish treaties that may wound 
Our Countries peace the gospell sound     20 
From Jobs false friends that would entice 
My Soveraigne from Heavens paradise 
From Prophetts such as Ahabs weere 
Whose flatteringes sooth my soveraignes eare 
His frownes more then his makers fearing     25 
Blesse my soveraigne and his heareinge. 
 
3. Tastinge 
From all fruite that is forbidden 
Such for which old Eve was chidden 
From bread of Laborers sweat, and toyle 
From the widdowes meale, and oyle      30 
From the [candied] poyson’d baites 
Of Jesuites and their deceipts  
Italian Salletts, Romish druggs 
The milke of Babells proud whore duggs 
From wyne that can destroye the braine     35 
And from the daingerous figg of Spaine 
Att all banquetts, and all feasting 
Blesse my Sovarigne, and his tasting. 
 
4. Feelinge 
From prick of Conscience such a sting 
As staines the Soule, heavens blesse my King    40 
From such a bribe as may with drawe 
His thoughts from equitie, and lawe 
From such a smooth, and beardlesse chinn 
As may provoke, or tempt to sinn 
From such a hand whose moyst palme may     45 
My soveraigne lead out of the way 
From things polluted, and uncleane 
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From all thats beastly, and obscene 
From what may sett his Soule a reeling 
Blesse my Soveraigne, and his feeling.     50 
 
5. Smellinge 
Where Mirrhe, and Frankinsence is throwne 
The altars built to Gods unknown 
Oh let my Soveraigne never smell  
Such damn’d perfumes are fitt for hell 
Let noe such scent his nostrills staine      55 
From smells that poyson may the braine 
Heavens still preserve him, Next I crave 
Thou wilt be pleas’d great God to save  
My Soveriegne from a Ganimede 
Whose whoreish breath hath power to lead     60 
His excellence which way it list 
O lett such lipps be never kist 
From a breath soe farr excelling 
Blesse my Soveraigne and his smelling. 
 
on all the Sences 
And just God I humblie pray       65 
That thou wilt take the Filme away 
That keeps my Soveraignes eyes from vieweing 
The things that will be our undoeing 
Then lett him Heare good God the sounds 
Aswell of Men, as of his hounds      70 
Give him a Taste and tymely too 
Of what his Subjects undergoe 
Give a Feelinge of there woes 
And noe doubt his royall nose 
Will quickely Smell those rascals forth     75 
Whose blacke deeds have ecclips’t his worth. 
These found, and scourg’d for their offences 
Heavens blesse my Soveraigne and his sences.252 
 
“The Five Senses” opens with a stanza on seeing, narrating the near apocalyptic dangers 
posed to England by the pretty face of Buckingham. The unknown author immediately reduces 
the favorite to “a face” (1, 12), later attempting to emasculate Buckingham through references to 
his “smooth, and beardlesse chin” and “whoreish breath” (41, 60). C.E. McGee argues that 																																																								
252 Qtd. from McRae, Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State, 77-79. I have followed McRae’s editorial choices 
throughout the poem. Hereafter cited in the text by line number. 
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“ocular malice was a regular feature” of libel.253 As Buckingham was known for his good looks, 
the author chose to argue that this too handsome, effeminate young man was all looks and no 
substance, demonstrated by his “skillesse and unsteaddie hand” (5). Drawing on the myth of 
Phaeton, the first stanza suggests that if James continues to grant Buckingham such wide powers, 
then the woeful nation’s only hope will be divine intervention. The underlying fear is that the 
“proud Usurping Charioter” has displaced the King’s love for his people, causing James to set 
their shared pleasures above the needs of the country (10).254 These pleasures, which are more 
explicitly addressed in later stanzas, include a predilection for “things polluted, and uncleane,” 
“beastly, and obscene” (47, 48), as well as “forbidden” desires that “may provoke, or tempt to 
sinn” (27, 44). The speaker’s use of the conditional “may” is a nicety, for James’s fondness for 
attractive young men was no secret and rumors of a sodomitical relationship between James and 
Buckingham had run rampant for years.255 Courts of the era were metaphorically conceived of as 
fountains. The ruler’s ethics and behavior would set the tone for the court, and the morals (or 
lack thereof) of the court would in turn trickle down into the country, influencing the morality of 
the nation as a whole.256 Because of the era’s persistent linking of sodomy to transgressive 
morality and pollution, the poem portrays the King’s sexual proclivities as threatening both the 
state of his soul and the state of the nation. In Basilikon Doron, James declared that sodomy was 
one of those “horrible crimes that yee are bound in conscience never to forgive,” yet for his 
																																																								
253 “Pocky Queans and Hornèd Knaves: Gender Stereotypes in Libelous Poems” in Oral Traditions and Gender in 
Early Modern Literary Texts, ed. Mary Ellen Lamb and Karen Bamford (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008), 139-
51. 
254 Paul Hammond, Figuring Sex between Men from Shakespeare to Rochester (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 
143. 
255 See Bellany, The Politics of Court Scandal, 254-261; Jonathan Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature: 
Jonson, Shakespeare, Donne, and Their Contemporaries (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 143-46. See 
also Roger Lockyer, Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham, 
1592-1628 (London: Longman Group Limited, 1981), 22. 
256 Bellany, The Politics of Court Scandal, 1-2. In Measure, the Duke notes that “Hence hath offense his quick 
celerity; / When it is borne in high authority” (4.2.93-43). 
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critics, James’s actions display a reluctance to follow his own advice, if not flagrant disregard for 
the era’s moral code.257 Like his response to slander, theory and practice are two different beings. 
The King’s unlawful inclinations are thus encapsulated in the figure of “a Ganimede” 
(59). McRae explains that “in the renaissance, the name of Ganymede, cupbearer to Zeus, 
became a popular euphemism for a ‘catamite’: the passive partner in a homosexual coupling.”258 
The fact that one of the Duke’s first positions in the court was as the King’s cupbearer proved 
too apt a coincidence for Buckingham’s detractors. Same-sex relationships were critiqued 
predominantly when they were viewed as transgressing cultural norms, when the individuals 
involved belonged to different social classes. These accusations were thus ultimately less 
concerned with sexuality than with a mixture of political, social and moral concerns that 
culminated in this most extreme form of critique.259 Curtis Perry argues that “the significance of 
erotic favoritism as a trope has to do…with its remarkable prevalence as an unofficial language 
of corruption.”260 A politically charged accusation, the threat of sodomy emphasizes the 
unnaturalness of the power-dynamic between James and the socially inferior and thus “usurping” 
Buckingham, for the older King is reduced to a love-struck fool being led about by the 
manipulative Buckingham. In the fifth stanza on smelling, the feminized favorite’s “whoreish 
breath” is depicted as possessing the unnatural “power to lead / His excellence which way it list” 
(60, 60-61). James, unable to govern his passions or to see the dangers that this pretty face poses, 
submits to the allure of a highly feminized favorite, thereby allowing himself to become 
corrupted, emasculated, and transformed into another Ganymede, the dreaded passive partner. 
																																																								
257 See King James VI and I, Sommerville, 23.  
258 McRae, Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State, 79; Lockyer, Buckingham, 17. 
259 For more on the period’s response to sodomoy, see Alan Bray, “Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friendship 
in Elizabethan England” in Queering the Renaissance, ed. Jonathan Goldberg (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1994), 40-61.  
260 See Literature and Favoritism in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 135. 
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Though Buckingham poses a hazardous menace to the establishment, he is hardly the 
only domestic danger threatening England. In the stanza on hearing, “flattering tongues” and 
“after supper suits that feare / A Parliament or Councells eare” also abound (15, 17-18). Good 
kings rule by counsel, sharing the burden of governing with a select circle of trusted advisors 
and, on a larger scale, by working in tandem with Parliament.261 Though the speaker does not 
emphasize this line of reasoning, the reference to Parliament and the Privy Council suggests a 
necessary restraint to royal prerogative and perhaps also glances at James’s prodigality and 
lavish gifts. The speaker seems to believe that if James would allow these bodies to fulfill their 
role, then Parliament and James’s councilors would act as the safeguards of the nation by 
counteracting James’s will and those of his self-interested flatterers, creatures pejoratively 
referenced as the King’s “hounds” (70).262 This oversimplified view of the relationship between 
James and Parliament emphasizes James’s desire to promote his friends at the cost of the 
country. Because proximity to the King’s ears greatly increased the likelihood of success of a 
suit that might be rejected if brought before Parliament, “The Five Senses” suggests that the 
“flattering tongues” that surround James are just as corrupting as the “Jeasts prophane,” “bawdy 
tales,” and “beastly soungs” that proliferate at his court (15, 16). 
The protections offered by sober counsel are especially needed against the other great 
danger to the King’s senses, the Spanish match. The speaker fears that this proposed marriage of 
Prince Charles to the Spanish Infanta will place the country on a slippery slope culminating in a 
return to Catholicism. This invasive, pernicious menace thus joins the assault upon James’s other 																																																								
261 According to Francis Bacon, “The wisest princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness, or 
derogation to their sufficiency, to rely upon counsel. God himself is not without, but hath made it one of the great 
names of his blessed Son; The Counsellor”; “Of Counsel” in Francis Bacon: The Major Works, ed. Brian Vickers 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 379-82, 379.  
262 Though “hounds” was meant derogatively, it was oddly appropriate for Buckingham who, on more than once 
occasion, depicted himself as James’s “dog” in the letters written to his master. For examples, see Lockyer, 
Buckingham, 22; Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature, 144, 145. 
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senses, prompting Bellany to declare that “the libeller gives greatest attention to the corruption of 
popery.”263 The third stanza of “The Five Senses,” that on tasting, provides a cornucopia of 
forbidden fruits and spiritual threats. Each of these fruits is prohibited on specifically moral 
grounds, as the first line of this stanza associates them with “old Eve” (28). Eve’s 
characterization as “old” appears to imply that individuals living in this more “modern” age 
should know better, that they in fact should have learned from her mistake. Originating in 
Catholic countries, many of the delicacies listed are depicted as numbing substances, ranging 
from Jesuit’s “poyson’d baites,” to “Romish drugs,” and “wyne that can destroye the braine” (31, 
33, 35). James, however, seems oblivious to these dangers, registering only the candy coating 
that surrounds the “poyson’d baites” of the Jesuits. Styling himself Rex Pacificus, James’s 
natural inclinations always steered towards establishing peaceful, diplomatic relations with 
Spain, England’s greatest enemy at the time. The Catholic powers’ use of sedating substances 
therefore seems oddly appropriate, as it preys upon James’s love of peace. The libel exaggerates 
James’s aversion to war, transforming diplomacy into listlessness. By lulling the King into a near 
stupor, these substances could be used to secure advantageous terms for Spain in connection with 
the proposed match. Perhaps these baits could even lure James away from Protestantism. The 
libel’s injunction against the “bread of Laborers sweat, and toyle” and “the widdowes meale” 
implies not only an indolent, but also a parasitic ruler (29, 30). The inclusion of these two lines 
within the stanza on tasting perhaps gestures to the idea that James is happy to feast upon others’ 
hard work, whether in the form of the fruits of his subjects’ labor, or the Spanish gold that would 
serve as the Infanta’s dowry. Though not directly referenced in the stanza on tasting, these 
various forbidden fruits also include Buckingham himself, who for a time supported the Spanish 																																																								
263 The Politics of Court Scandal, 259. Bellany also connects the libel’s critique of Ganymede to Catholicism 
through “the widespread perception that court sodomy could carry a popish tinge” (258).  
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match. Through the association to “Jobs false friends” (21), individuals who tempted Job to curse 
God in response to the many hardships he suffered, all who endorse the match are depicted as 
blasphemers. James’s insistence on pursuing this alliance is therefore portrayed as an affront to 
God, one that directly jeopardizes England’s standing as God’s chosen nation. 
The circulation of “The Five Senses” in 1623 may have been prompted by Buckingham 
and Prince Charles’s six-month stay in Spain that year in an attempt to conclude the marriage 
negotiations between the Prince and the Infanta. The proposed alliance ultimately came to 
naught, yet at the time, both James and Charles were willing to make wide concessions for 
English Catholics to ensure the marriage occurred.264 According to the poem, the match threatens 
James on both a political and personal level. Politically, the match was viewed as a menace to 
true religion and was enormously unpopular in England. Personally, it was dangerous because of 
the Catholics’ false promises and baits. To English Protestants, the marriage flew in the face of 
the King’s responsibility to ensure the growth of true religion. To the author, it left James 
vulnerable to the “prick of Conscience,” “a sting” that “staines the Soule” (39, 40).  
Having established that James’s choices endanger the “Countries peace the gospell 
sound” as well as its “equitie, and lawe” (20, 42), the speaker concludes his prayer in a 
conservative manner, voicing the traditional hope that if the monarch could only see and feel his 
people’s woe, then he would instantly rid himself of “those rascals…whose blacke deeds have 
ecclips’t his worth” (75-76). The poem draws upon a customary technique of voicing critique, 
where subjects direct their complaints against a ruler’s “evil counselors” as opposed to the ruler 
himself. Such a technique, of course, does not exclude the monarch from criticism. I find it 
difficult to believe in the sincerity of this conformist ending given the “harshly instructive 
																																																								
264 For an in-depth discussion of this ill-advised trip, see Lockyer, Buckingham, 134-65.  
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exposure” the speaker prescribes the King.265 The speaker’s request that God “take the Filme 
away” that blinds James to “The things that will be our undoeing” directly negates James’s role 
as his people’s judge (66, 68). To be a good judge, a monarch must possess wisdom. If James 
cannot see the multiple menaces that threaten his kingdom, then he is not a good king. In the first 
stanza, the speaker posed divine intervention as a solution to the country’s sufferings, yet by the 
poem’s end, his disillusionment with James is so complete that it appears the speaker now 
believes that even God cannot save him. The King’s inability to control his passions and resist 
temptation has allowed the corruption to spread too deep.  
Despite the libel’s relentless critique, Rous reports that James, having read the libel, 
sarcastically replied, “This fellow wished good things for him.”266 This alleged response provides 
us with a few possibilities. The first is that James truly replied as reported and Rous accurately 
preserved his monarch’s comment. If so, then James surely recognized the critique against him 
and chose to ignore it. Overlooking potentially subversive commentary should thus be 
recognized as a valid tactic for eliminating libel’s possible effects, the questions and anxieties 
that it could excite. Perry has demonstrated that “Manuscript circulation disseminated courtly 
concerns with favoritism and access to a much broader and more heterogeneous audience,” as 
exhibited by Rous, a Suffolk clergyman’s, possession of the libel.267 In this case, to acknowledge 
the poem’s condemnation would have been to perpetuate its subversive attitude and breathe new 
life into it, an adverse result for a king who did not want his subjects questioning his actions. 
																																																								
265 Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State, 81. 
266 Bellany, The Politics of Court Scandal, 258. 
267 The rest of the sentence reads “further popularizing in the process an array of lurid and scandalous attacks of 
favorites and favoritism including the figure of the sodomite king,” a form of attack that plays a prominent role in 
“The Five Senses” (1074); “The Politics of Access and Representations of the Sodomite King in Early Modern 
England.” Renaissance Quarterly 53.4 (Winter 2000): 1054-83.  
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Jenny Wormald has noted, “James was a man of wit and humor.”268 His reply exhibits his sense 
of humor. His flippancy neutralized the threat, denying it a wider celebrity. Simply because he 
wielded the sword of state did not mean he always had to employ it. 
James’s purported response demonstrates the range of methods available for handling 
slander. Celebrity cases like those of William Prynne and John Stubbs demand attention because 
of the brutality of their sentences, yet these cases are exceptions rather than the norm. Even when 
legal action was initiated against a suspected seditionist, it does not appear that those convicted 
were always punished to the full extent of the law. Additionally, the crowds did not always act as 
expected, and, similarly, law abiding subjects did not always behave as required when it came to 
slander. 
The second possibility is that Rous fabricated having heard of James’s response, or, a 
third possibility, that the second-hand story he heard was itself a fabrication. If Rous (or an 
unknown individual) invented this story, it reveals that Rous (or that unknown individual) 
recognized the subversive nature of the libel and was understandably anxious about having it in 
his possession. As discussed above, possession of a libel concerning a public person was 
interpreted as spreading sedition. In his diary, Rous frequently expressed his distaste for libelous 
critiques, going to far as to exclaim “I hate these following railing rimes, / Yet keepe them for 
president of the times.”269 The second part of his rhyme should be taken at face value. Rous 
viewed the libels he collected as cultural artifacts worth preserving—presumably James’s reply 
was too. Rous’s professed distaste for libels and his anxiety about owning them did not outweigh 
the risk he took in keeping them. He obviously thought them worth the peril. Perhaps Rous 																																																								
268 “James VI and I, Basilikon Doron and The Trew Law of Free Monarchies: the Scottish context and English 
translation” in The Mental World of the Jacobean Court. Levy Peck, 36-54, 54. 
269 This diary corresponds to a different set of years than that in which he preserved the libel. Diary of John Rous: 
Incumbent of Santon Downham, Suffolk, From 1625 to 1642, ed. Mary Everett Green (New York: AMS Press, 
1968), 109. For further examples of Rous’ attitude towards the libels he collected, see 22, 26, and 30.  
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imagined James’s response in order to dispel this anxiety. By having the ultimate authority on 
the subject, the ruler himself, interpret the work in an innocuous manner, it forecloses additional 
discussion on the poem and legitimizes Rous’s possession of the libel (at least in Rous’s mind). 
In such a scenario, to insist on the work’s subversiveness would be to directly question the 
ruler’s decree, ironically, the very thing the libel does. This possible scenario presents a fantasy 
of denial, Rous’s attempt to trick himself to ignore the evidence of his own eyes in order to 
dispel and defuse the libel’s subversive potential. What is clear is that Rous was not alone in his 
belief that the poem was worth preserving, as attested by the additional 40 manuscripts in which 
the libel remains extant. While I cannot speak to the mindset or thought process of all those who 
kept “The Five Senses,” I can conclude that the poem spoke to its Jacobean audience, finding a 
welcome reception among them. In addition to the fear and anxiety it provoked in Rous, “The 
Five Senses” and its fellow libels presumably also elicited enjoyment, perhaps even laughter, 
emotional responses that may alone have been worth the risk of owning such works. 
 James was too intelligent to miss the critique inherent in “The Five Senses”; he simply 
chose to ignore it, refusing to engage its anonymous author in conversation. His comment may 
have stymied public discussion (and a possible scandal), yet the libel continued to speak to those 
who persistently copied it into various manuscripts, to the various other works housed within 
those manuscripts, and to the countless others who have read the poem in the past 400 years or 
so. While Elizabeth’s sedition statutes, James’s Basilikon Doron, and both monarchs’ royal 
proclamations argued for severe sentences against seditionists, corporal punishment was simply 
not a practical response. It had to be used sparingly, for the government could not mutilate 
everyone who spoke against it. Whether a fictional ruler like the Duke from Measure or a 
historic ruler like James, monarchs occasionally tempered the draconian reprisals the law 
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decreed, displaying an often-surprising range of responses to slander. Similarly, subjects 
imagined narratives that would allow them to skirt the law and avoid punishment (or so they 
hoped). Some may have struggled with the matter as Rous did, but ultimately imagined libels as 
cultural artifacts worthy of preservation, presenting themselves as antiquarians. My next case 
study, Shakespeare’s Measure, moves from the senses to the body itself, considering slander’s 
effects within and between physical bodies.  
  
“Running in the Shadows”: Slander’s Role in Measure for Measure 
At the beginning of the fourth act of William Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure (1603-04), 
Vienna’s ruler, Duke Vincentio, laments,  
O place and greatness, millions of false eyes 
Are stuck upon thee; volumes of report 
Run with their false and most contrarious quest 
Upon thy doings; thousand escapes of wit   
Make thee the father of their idle dream,  
And rack thee in their fancies. (4.1.56-61)270 
 
What begins as a fulmination against the inescapability of slander becomes an incisive critique 
about slander’s ability to produce false images. The Duke’s speech argues that slander, like sex, 
has generative powers; it can produce illegitimate beings that bear a resemblance to their 
progenitor, the subject or “father” of the slander. Slander, illicit sex, and illegitimate children are 
of primary concern to the Duke from the play’s opening moments. The play’s grim depiction of 
human sexuality has dominated recent critical attention, and when slander has been noted as a 
theme, it has been treated primarily as a byproduct of illicit sex. With the exception of a chapter 
in M. Lindsey Kaplan’s The Culture of Slander and Mariangela Tempera’s book article, “Slander 
																																																								
270 All references to Shakespeare’s works are from Stephen Greenblatt et al, The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the 
Oxford Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997). Hereafter quotations are cited in the text by act, 
scene, and line numbers. 
		 117	
and Slanderers in Measure for Measure,” scholarship on the play has not taken slander as a 
primary theme.271 I will argue, however, that since the fear of slander permeates the play's action 
and is integral to its plot, any discussion of sex in this play necessitates discussion of slander and 
vice versa. We cannot fully understand Measure until we not only recognize illicit sex and 
slander as deeply entangled forces, but also their disruptive effects upon the Viennese 
community and body politic. 
Measure examines slander’s physical and social repercussions, its unsettling effects upon 
individual bodies, and the communal bonds of the body politic, on two fronts: monarchic 
defamation and slander between citizens, the latter predominantly sexual innuendo.272 This dual 
focus is achieved by foregrounding the relationship between the heart and tongue, bodily images 
that despite their frequency in the play have been under-studied.273 In various tongue and slander 
treatises of the era, authors postulated that slander disturbs the natural harmony between these 
two organs, concurrently destroying a fantasy of bodily integrity and transparency. It is my 
contention that Measure deploys these images in order to articulate the implications of this 
metaphoric, internal breakdown through Angelo’s inability to govern his desires, his threatened 
or actual use of sexual defamation, and the subsequent broken bonds between himself and 
Isabella and himself and Mariana. 																																																								
271 See Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); 
and Tempera, “Slander and Slanderers in Measure for Measure,” Shakespeare and the Law, ed. Daniela Carpi 
(Ravenna, Italy: Longo, 2003): 127-38. 
272 Slander between citizens was a concern of English contemporaries given the explosion of slander litigation in the 
1590s, a trend that continued during James’s reign. Shakespeare’s family was not exempt from this phenomenon, as 
both his daughters later experienced their own brushes with slander litigation. In 1613, roughly ten years after 
Measure, Susanna Shakespeare was involved in a defamation suit. She sued John Lane in a church court for his 
allegation that she had committed adultery; she won the case when Lane did not attend the trial. In February 1616, 
Judith Shakespeare’s husband, Richard Quiney, was accused of impregnating another woman; though she and her 
child passed away, he admitted his guilt at the trial. Prior to his daughters’ experiences, Shakespeare was involved in 
a number of legal suits throughout his life. For more on the Shakespeares’ experiences with slander, see Daniel J. 
Kornstein, Kill All the Lawyers?: Shakespeare’s Legal Appeal (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 15-21.  
273 An important exception is John L. Harrison’s “The Convention of “Heart and Tongue” and the Meaning of 
Measure for Measure,” Shakespeare Quarterly 5.1 (Jan. 1954): 1-10. Harrison argues that “the image of the heart-
tongue…reflects the justice-mercy, appearance-reality theme of the play” (7). 
		 118	
In addition to the consequences of Angelo’s internal disconnect, the various interactions 
between the Duke and Lucio, the fantastical who is the play’s mouthpiece for rumor and anti-
monarchic slander, present the legal implications of speaking one’s mind about the ruler.274 The 
conversations between these characters offer a confrontation between the slanderer and the 
slandered, while also presenting the fantasy of being able to trace slander to its roots. I contend 
that the Duke begins the play believing that the crimes of illicit sex and slander are not only 
separable, but also that the city’s illicit sexuality can be contained through routine public 
punishment, while slander can be avoided. The Duke also believes that individuals can be 
reformed. Lucio and Angelo’s stubbornly sinful behavior corrects the Duke in that some 
individuals cannot be redeemed and must instead be punished, and, furthermore, that the crimes 
of illicit sex and slander must each be punished precisely because either can engender the other. 
The Duke’s return to power is publicized through a self-directed pageant that concludes by 
portraying the punishments awaiting repeat offenders, with particular emphasis placed upon 
slanderers. This resolution acknowledges the inevitability of slander while demonstrating the 
public relations value to a forceful stance against this disruptive force.  
 
The Heart and Tongue: An Image of Bodily Integrity 
Early modern treatises focusing on topics such as the tongue, speech, slander, and related forms 
of ill speech considered the tongue to be an equivocal organ. This equivocacy was due to its 
ability to both praise God and blaspheme, to tell the truth and lie. The tongue’s double nature 
was a favorite theme, and many treatises draw upon Biblical images of the tongue, Erasmus’s 
																																																								
274 I define the term “fantastical” as a carnivalesque figure who has little respect for authority. 
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Lingua (1525), or both.275 According to Jonathan Gil Harris, St. James’s depiction of the tongue 
(James, 3:6, 9-10) as the member through which man both blesses God and curses each other 
was “one of the most popular passages from the New Testament in early modern England.”276 
Fra. Giacomo Affinati d’ Acuto’s (Jacopo Affinati d’ Acuto) The Dumb Divine Speaker or 
Dumbe Speaker of Divinity was devoted to praising silence as a means of counteracting the 
double nature of the tongue.277 As an extension of its equivocal nature, period tongue and slander 
treatises emphasize the tongue’s power over life and death. For example, in The Praise of a 
Good Name The Reproch of an Ill Name (1594), Charles Gibbon described the tongue as the 
door of life and death and Affinati d’ Acuto argued that mouths that were not kept by God were 
like open sepulchers.278 Tongue and slander treatises like Jean de Marconville’s A Treatise of the 
Good and Evell Tongue (1592), William Perkins’s A Direction for the Government of the Tongue 
according to Gods worde (1595), and Gibbon’s The Praise of a Good Name urged constant self-
government, lest one offend with one’s tongue.279 The most frequently rehearsed method of 
																																																								
275 For more on the early modern period’s interest in the ambivalence of the tongue, see Carla Mazzio, “Sins of the 
Tongue,” in The Body in Parts, ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (New York: Routledge, 1997), 53-79, and The 
Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England: Three Treatises. ed. Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin (Madison: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 2011), xvii-l. Vienne-Guerrin notes that Erasmus’s Lingua was itself “much indebted to 
Plutarch’s “De Garrulitate”’ (xxiv). See also Ina Haberman, Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England 
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003). 
276 Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic: Discourses of Social Pathology in Early Modern England (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 107. 
277 The Dumb Divine Speaker or Dumbe Speaker of Divinity, translated by A.M. (London: Printed by R. Bradock for 
William Leake, dwelling in Paules churchyard, at the signe of the Holy-ghost, 1605). 
278 The Praise of a Good Name (London: 1594), 30. Affinati d’ Acuto, The Dumb Divine Speaker, 241. 
279 Marconville says the tongue is “enclosed and hedged in with teeth and lips, as it were within a defensible 
bulwarke, that it might not be ranging unadvisedly” (12); his text is a revised and abridged translation of Erasmus’s 
Lingua, which was itself translated into English by an unknown translator circa 1592. Perkins, whose work appeared 
in various editions and translations between 1593 and 1602, describes the tongue as “compassed in with lippes…and 
teeth as with a double trench” (46); both Marconville and Perkins’s texts are reproduced in The Unruly Tongue in 
Early Modern England, Vienne-Guerrin, 1-80. Gibbon describes the tongue as hemmed in by a “double fence” (30). 
The notion of teeth as the tongue’s guard can also be seen in Thomas Tomkis’s Lingua: or The combat of the 
tongue, and the five senses for superiority: A pleasant comœdie (London: Printed by G. Eld, for Simon Waterson, 
1607) and Thomas Adams’s The Taming of the Tongue (London: Printed by Thomas Purfoot, for Clement Knight, 
and are to be sold at his shop in Paules Church-yard, at the Signe of the Holy Lambe, 1616). David’s depiction of 
the lips as the door of the mouth is repeatedly referenced throughout Affinati d’ Acuto’s The Dumb Divine Speaker. 
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control echoes David’s desire that God set a watch upon his mouth.280 Individuals were 
instructed to rely upon the body’s natural line of defense against a loose or slanderous tongue, 
the teeth and lips, to help stymie offensive language. In short, while the tongue is necessary for 
human communication, the general belief was that the tongue was ultimately untamable.281 
Because the tongue was often depicted as the messenger of the heart, lies and slander 
were interpreted as disruptions of the tongue’s ordained role. The need for the heart and tongue 
to work in tandem was continually reiterated in the era’s tongue and slander treatises as a matter 
of self-government and morality. Drawing heavily from Psalms and Proverbs,282 these treatises 
argued that the tongue should accurately report an individual’s thoughts and feelings, presenting 
a fantasy of perfect bodily integrity. This fantasy implies that the body should be transparent, 
that there should be no space for secrets or lies; of course, this transparency applies only to the 
common man, for the positions of monarch and government officials necessitate the regular 
withholding of information. Measure demonstrates that slander flourishes in the spaces where 
there is no transparency—bodily and social spaces that prove to be ungovernable. 
Slander is a focal issue in one Elizabethan and several Jacobean Shakespeare plays, 
including Much Ado About Nothing (1598), Othello (1603-4), written about the same time as 
Measure, as well as The Winter’s Tale (1609-11), and Cymbeline (1609-10). The power of 
slander is felt from the very start of this play, when the Duke decides to reinstate the city’s strict 
morality laws after years of neglect. Rather than enforcing these nearly forgotten edicts himself, 
he chooses a proxy instead for fear that his subjects will slander him. From these opening 
																																																								
280 Psalm 141 is a representative example of this biblical precedent. 
281 For instance, see Adams, The Taming of the Tongue, 27. 
282 For example, see A Plaine Description of the Ancient Pedigree of Dame Slander (Imprinted at London by John 
Harrington, 1573) and Affinati d’ Acuto, The Dumb Divine Speaker. 
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moments, it is suggested that the Duke’s primary concern is his public perception.283 This 
anxiety is further demonstrated by the Duke’s choice to move among his subjects in disguise. He 
claims the reason for his actions is a desire to observe whether his replacement, Angelo, will be 
corrupted by his new powers, to test “what our seemers be” (1.3.54). The Duke does not visit his 
royal court or the court of justice, the locations where he could best witness Angelo’s actions. 
Rather, he haunts the city’s jail where he interacts with those affected by Angelo’s strict 
enforcement of the morality laws. The Duke seeks out the very individuals most likely to critique 
the new regime; moreover, disguised as Friar Lodowick, he lulls individuals into speaking freely.  
The Duke’s imagery envisions a society run by a just ruler whose bodily integrity is 
symbolized by the perfect cooperation between the heart and tongue. For example, consider his 
metaphorical abdication of his rule. Justifying his choice to leave Angelo in his stead, he 
explains, “There is a kind of character in thy life / That to th’ observer doth thy history / Fairly 
unfold” (1.1.27-29). Disclosing his belief in his powers of observation, the Duke claims to know 
Angelo, finding the latter worthy to act as Duke during his absence. He instructs Angelo that 
“Mortality and mercy in Vienna / Live in thy tongue and heart” (1.1.44-45, emphasis added). 
The line’s structure balances mortality and mercy with the tongue and heart, aligning mortality 
with the tongue and gesturing to the potentially lethal power held by this small organ. According 
to the Duke, good stewardship necessitates that mercy and justice work cooperatively. This 
cooperation of tongue and heart should radiate outward and be mirrored by a perfectly 
harmonious community where mortality and mercy work in a similarly symbiotic relationship. 
This vision holds Angelo up to an impossible standard, expecting him to remain utterly 
transparent, at least to the Duke. Because Vienna struggles with the crime of slander as much as 																																																								
283 Kaplan likewise argues that “the Duke is clearly much more concerned about enforcing laws against criticism of 
the ruler than laws against fornication that he let slip, by his own admission, for fourteen years (I.iii.21)”; The 
Culture of Slander, 93.  
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with crimes of sexual excess, the connection between the tongue and heart is repeatedly 
emphasized as Angelo violates both these strictures. 
Not only is the Duke’s vision of governance impossible, it also quickly proves 
hypocritical. Prior to his hasty departure, he made a point of giving Angelo the “scope” “to 
enforce or qualify the laws” as Angelo sees fit (1.1.64, 65). Having read Angelo’s character, the 
Duke anticipates that Angelo will not qualify but enforce the law’s severity; after all, he self-
servingly advised his stand-in concerning the need for mercy. We quickly learn that Angelo’s 
rigorous exactness starkly contrasts the Duke’s non-existent enforcement of Viennese law. For 
example, the Duke bluntly admits to Friar Thomas his ulterior motive in promoting Angelo; it 
was not Angelo’s virtue, but his own fear of slander that dictated a temporary absence from 
office. He explains, “Sith ’twas my fault to give the people scope, / ’Twould be my tyranny to 
strike and gall them / For what I bid them do” (1.3.35-37). This rationalization reveals that his 
previous mercy effectively amounted to not only allowing his subjects to engage in illicit sexual 
activity, but also essentially commanding them to do so. His belief that insufficient policing bids 
noncompliance discloses an underlying assumption that routine public punishment is necessary 
to enforce obedience. Angelo fulfills this expectation by immediately having Claudio publicly 
arrested. 
The Duke’s hypocrisy is further displayed by his Machiavellian choice of Angelo as a fall 
guy.284 He explains to Father Thomas,  
																																																								
284 While stage Machiavels are often villains and schemers, Shakespeare follows some of Machiavelli’s advice, 
adapting it to fit a comic trajectory. Throughout the play, the Duke uses fraud and deception in an attempt to achieve 
political ends. His use of Angelo with regard to Vienna’s morality laws is reminiscent of how Cesare Borgia brought 
peace to the territory of the Romagna, as related in Chapter 7 of The Prince. Having conquered the territory, Borgia 
“gave a cruel and unscrupulous man, Messer Remirro de Orco, the fullest authority there.” De Orco brought peace 
but was despised. After de Orco achieved his mission, Borgia “wanted to show that, if any form of cruelty had 
occurred, it did not originate from him but from the violent nature of his minister.” To that end, Borgia had de Orco 
executed and his body publicly displayed. All references to The Prince are to the Oxford World’s Classics version, 
edited by Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 27. While the Duke does not purposely appoint 
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  I have on Angelo imposed the office, 
  Who may in th’ ambush of my name strike home, 
  And yet my nature never in the fight 
  T’ allow in slander. (1.3.40-43) 
 
The Duke’s martial language presents an imagined surprise attack where Angelo scores an 
unexpected victory by enforcing the royal agenda, the routine public punishment needed to 
contain the city’s illicit sexuality, while simultaneously shielding the Duke from the anticipated 
critique. His rhetoric draws upon the notion of the king’s two bodies; his name, an extension of 
the royal lineage (the immortal, political body), metaphorically arms Angelo, while Angelo 
concomitantly protects the Duke’s reputation and personal body by carrying out the dirty work. 
The lines’ tortured syntax seeks to distance the Duke’s name from his person, allowing Angelo 
to act on his behalf without those actions reflecting back upon him.  
The Duke’s primary concern that he not be slandered implies his fear that his previous 
legal laxity may be interpreted as self-interested. His inclination to mercy suggests that this past 
reluctance is a byproduct of his fear of slander and may additionally intimate a belief that mercy 
can inspire redemption. As he has already revealed, this fear of slander supersedes his 
responsibility to enforce the law. During his rushed leave-taking, the Duke admitted “I love the 
people, / But do not like to stage me to their eyes. / Though it do well” (1.1.67-69). Recognizing 
the necessity and benefit of periodically displaying himself before his people, he divulges that he 
does not enjoy performing the role of Duke. He claims not to seek “loud applause” or “Aves 																																																																																																																																																																																		
a “cruel and unscrupulous man,” he does manipulate the action from behind the scenes, achieving his desired end 
while distancing himself from Angelo’s actions.  
The issue of whether the Duke can be considered a Machiavel, or whether he simply employs certain of 
Machiavelli’s recommended techniques, is one that has stirred much scholarly debate. For example, in the additional 
material to the Bedford edition of the play, Ivo Kamps and Karen Raber include a section on Machiavelli with 
excerpts from The Prince (including the above excerpt). Briefly comparing Richard III to the Duke, they raise the 
following inquiry, “Audiences and readers of Richard III know that the Duke of Gloucester’s piety is just a cynical 
charade, but we may well ask ourselves if Shakespeare’s Duke of Vienna could be not a caricature of the Prince but 
an authentic Machiavel, a calculating politician whose deceptions and manipulations do not reach the level of excess 
that makes Richard III ultimately so despicable”; Measure for Measure, ed. Ivo Kamps and Karen Raber (Boston: 
Bedford/St. Martins, 2004), 134. 
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vehement” and distrusts those who “affect it” (1.1.70, 71). His refusal to act the part through 
self-presentation coincides with his fear of slander and confirms it as an inherent fear of 
judgment, which he allows to limit his role as Duke. Angelo’s later refusal to honor his 
arrangement with Isabella not only shocks the Duke, who did not anticipate his deputy’s 
spectacular abuse of power, but also obliges him to “stage” himself to his people.  
 The Duke’s justification for his promotion of Angelo—the protection Angelo offers from 
the inevitable critique that will follow the reinstatement of the morality laws—is the first time 
illicit sex is linked to slander, an association to which the play consistently returns. In her essay 
on slander in Measure for Measure, Tempera likewise emphasizes this connection, arguing that: 
The playwright could not say outright that almost everybody enjoys a juicy bit of 
gossip and that the line between objectionable and actionable language is very 
hard to draw. He therefore chose to displace this piece of common sense onto the 
field of the sexual crimes and misdemeanors which trigger all the major plot lines 
in Measure for Measure … By the end of the play, all the protagonists appear to 
have engaged at some point in their lives in either illicit sex or slander (or both). 
Instances of both kinds of reprehensible behavior are staged or related very much 
in the same terms.285  
 
It is not enough to note that one leads to another; my essay shows why discussion of illicit sex 
nearly always leads to mentions of slander and vice versa. Many of the play’s slanderous 
allegations are of a sexual nature: several of Lucio’s aspersions about the Duke, Angelo’s 
calumny of Mariana and his threats against Isabella, even the garbled slanders concerning Mrs. 
Elbow. In the Duke’s Vienna, slander is as prevalent as illicit sex. As discussed below, the Duke 
attempts to regulate these activities because both crimes create illicit beings, eventually learning 
that neither can be truly controlled.  
Slander and illicit sex are linked in ways other than plotting, as several characters violate 
the idealized natural harmony between tongue and heart. During their first encounter, Lucio 																																																								
285 “Slander and Slanderers in Measure for Measure,” Carpi. 130.  
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admits to the novice Isabella that “’tis my familiar sin / With maids to seem the lapwing, and to 
jest / Tongue far from heart” (1.4.30-32). Although he presents his behavior as merely jesting, 
Lucio’s admitted lack of bodily integrity establishes him as a slanderer. George Webbe, a 
Wiltshire preacher, argues that an evil tongue proves “a subtill Orator, a // fraudulent 
Ambassador, and a false Interpretour” to the heart and “therefore doth deserve to be punished.”286 
Lucio’s humorous, yet honest assessment of his character anticipates his slanderous interactions 
with the Duke and his eventual punishment. Additionally, the connection between the heart and 
tongue proves crucial in Angelo and Isabella’s negotiations, providing further opportunities for 
slander. Pleading for Claudio’s life, Isabella orders Angelo to “ask your heart what it doth know / 
That’s like my brother’s fault” (2.2.140-41). She argues that if Angelo admits a “natural 
guiltiness” similar to Claudio’s, then he must “not sound a thought upon (his) tongue” against 
her brother (2.2.142-43). Like the Duke, Isabella believes that the tongue should act as an honest 
messenger of the heart. She also subversively implies that despite his role as interim Duke, 
Angelo should not judge unless he is willing to be judged by his same lofty standards.287 
The cruxes of Vienna’s woes, slander and illicit sex, are symbolically underscored by 
Angelo’s inability to regulate his tongue and penis. Hoping to awaken Angelo’s mercy through 
the “sense” of her argument, Isabella’s rhetoric instead stirs only his “sense” (2.2.144,145). 
Failing in his attempt at prayer, Angelo reveals that his attraction to Isabella has caused an 
internal breakdown of communication, for as he tries to pray, his “invention, hearing not my 
tongue, / Anchors on Isabel” (2.4.3-4). In addition, he admits that “God (is) in my mouth” while 
																																																								
286 The Araignement of an unruly Tongue (1619) in The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England, Vienne-Guerrin, 
83-134, 99. William Vaughan voices similar sentiments in his massive tome on slander, The Spirit of Detraction, 
Conjured and Convicted in Seven Circles (London: 1611). 
287 Kornstein describes the issue more forcefully in his chapter “A Scarecrow of the Law: Measure for Measure” in 
Kill all the Lawyers? (35-64) declaring that “Shakespeare asks the final, fundamental, subversive question: is any 
man or woman fit to sit in judgment on a fellow human being?” (61).  
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“in my heart the strong and swelling evil / Of my conception” (2.4.4, 6-7). Angelo’s 
unsuccessful prayer portrays the dissonance between his religious words and his lustful desires, 
the “strong and swelling evil” implying his tumescence. His admitted lack of bodily integrity, his 
inability to govern his desires, anticipates his threatened calumny of Isabella and the subsequent 
revelation of his previous use of slander. In early modern England, the tongue, because of its 
paradoxical nature, and the penis were considered the most difficult body parts to control. Many 
treatise authors echoed James 3:8, which proclaimed “the tongue can no man tame; it is an 
unruly evil, full of deadly poison.”288 Shakespeare seems to have had some familiarity with the 
era’s tongue treatises and he certainly knew the biblical passages that many of the treatise 
authors drew upon.289 Once Angelo makes the decision to yield to his desire, his lack of internal 
harmony begins to extend outward. 
Angelo’s internal dissonance is reflected in the damage he causes to the social bonds 
between ruler and subject, between himself and Isabella. Following his attempted sexual 
blackmail, he threatens Isabella that were she to make public his ultimatum, his reputation and 
position would protect him. The result of her actions being that she “shall stifle in [her] own 
report, / And smell of calumny” (2.4.158-59). Angelo reiterates this sentiment following the bed-
trick when he convinces himself that he is safe from accusation because his position ensures 
“that no particular scandal once can touch / But it confounds the breather” (4.4.26-27). Angelo’s 
behavior reveals that the fear of slander allows for sexual abuse to go unreported. Whereas the 
																																																								
288 King James Bible, http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/James-Chapter-3/#8. Originated: March 21, 2016. For 
example, see Adams’s The Taming of the Tongue. Richard Brathwaite refers to detraction as “This poison of the 
world” in Essaies upon the Five Senses: Revived by a New Supplement; with a Pithy One upon Detraction (London: 
Printed by Anne Griffin, and are to be sold by Henry Shephard in Chancery lane, at the signed of the Bible, 1635), 
161.  
289 For example, William Averell’s A Mervailous Combat of Contrarieties (London: Printed by I. Charlewood for 
Thomas Hacket, and are to be solde at hys shop in Lomberd streete, vnder the signe of the Popes heade, 1588), a 
fable detailing an imagined revolt of the body led partly by the tongue against the stomach and back, was a source 
for Coriolanus (1608).  
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Duke’s fear of slander led to Angelo’s appointment (1.3.40-43), Angelo harnesses the power of 
slander to protect himself, to shield him against complaints concerning the abuse of power.290 
Angelo treats calumny as almost tactile, a pestilential cloud that sticks to an individual 
undercutting his or her credibility, as demonstrated by the initial response to Isabella’s 
denouncing of him in Act V.291 Surprised that someone as highly respected as Angelo can 
demonstrate the dual nature of the tongue, Isabella can only lament, “O perilous mouths, / That 
bear in them one and the selfsame tongue / Either of condemnation or approof” (2.4.172-74).  
In her study of early modern slander litigation at the London consistory and archdeaconry 
courts, Laura Gowing notes that “women’s testimonies were rarely accorded the same measure 
of credit as men’s.”292 Not only do Angelo’s reputation and position protect him against 
Isabella’s testimony, but her gender also disadvantages her. Gowing explains that despite the 
church’s attempts to “stress the culpability of both men and women for illicit sex, the idiom of 
slander holds women entirely responsible for it … judg[ing] men and women by two sets of 
incommensurable values.” With regards to rape, “the early modern legal system offered most 
women little recourse,” for not only were men’s versions of events more likely to be believed, 
but also men usually sued the women who initiated cases of rape against them.293 Without the 
Duke’s help, Isabella’s plea for justice would have fallen on deaf ears, for she would not have 
																																																								
290 See my reading of 1.3.40-43 above.  
291 Angelo’s actions demonstrate that those with sterling reputations are just as likely to utilize ill speech when it 
suits their needs and that “well-seeming” slanderers are often believed precisely because of their reputations 
(3.1.218). 
292 For more on women’s complex relationship with slander litigation, see Gowing, “Language, power and the law: 
women’s slander litigation in early modern London,” in Women, Crime and the Courts in Early Modern England, 
ed. Garthine Walker and Jenny Kermode (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 26-47, 27. 
293 Ibid., 28, 37. 
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been able to produce any witnesses to bear testimony to her plight; her inevitable arrest for 
slander would have added insult to injury.294 
Angelo’s treatment of women in the play portrays how allegations of sexual impropriety 
can devastate a woman’s credibility. The Duke later reveals that Angelo broke his previous 
engagement to the loyal Marianna by “pretending in her discoveries of dishonor” (3.1.221-22). 
Angelo’s use of slander prompts the Duke to compel him to marry Mariana at the end of the 
play, for only through marriage can Angelo repair the damage he caused to her reputation, as 
well as the social rupture caused by his refusal to honor their betrothal. Whereas Isabella 
speedily finds an ally in the Duke, and even the bumbling Elbow immediately attempts to protect 
his pregnant wife’s reputation, Mariana had no such assistance when Angelo betrayed her, 
leading her to retreat from public life by cloistering herself in the moated grange.295 It is only 
through the Duke’s machinations that Mariana can rejoin society, again demonstrating women’s 
susceptibility to slander and the difficulties they faced in obtaining justice. Beatrice said it best 
when considering the damage done to Hero’s reputation in Much Ado About Nothing, declaring 
“she is wronged, she is slandered, she is / undone” (4.1.308-9).296 
Measure portrays how an internal disconnect between the heart and tongue can radiate 
outward, injuring the body politic and placing women in a particularly vulnerable position. The 
Duke’s espousal of an idealized transparency holds Angelo and himself to an impossible 
																																																								
294 Peter Lake briefly discusses the social import of female chastity as well as “the vulnerability of women’s 
reputations when they were devoid of or abandoned by male protection or sponsorship” in The Antichrist’s Lewd 
Hat: Protestants, Papists and Players in Post-Reformation England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 
635; see Chapter 15, “Measure for Measure, Anti-Puritanism and ‘Order’ in Early Stuart England,” 621-700. 
295 In his analysis of Much Ado About Nothing, Kornstein briefly considers slander as social death; Kill all the 
Lawyers?, 170-1. 
296 Much Ado About Nothing. Greenblatt, et al. Beatrice’s comment has a real-life counterpart in Elizabeth Baxter, “a 
spinster of a fairly lowly background from Long Cliffe in Yorkshire,” who in 1696, “hearing gossip that another 
woman was pregnant, upbraided the scandalmongers, and declared roundly that ‘they might as well take her life as 
her good name from her.’” Quoted in J.A. Sharpe, Defamation and Sexual Slander in Early Modern England: The 
Church Courts at York (Heslington, York: University of York, Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, 1980), 3. 
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standard that reveals both characters’ hypocrisy, yet ultimately proves instructive for the Duke. 
Angelo’s lack of bodily integrity and repeated betrayals teach the Duke that not all individuals 
can be reformed. Together with Lucio, Angelo additionally teaches the Duke the danger of 
allowing slander to spread unchecked, that both illicit sex and slander require surveillance and 
exemplary punishment. It is through Lucio’s persistent monarchic defamation that the Duke 
recognizes his own heretofore-unseen vulnerability to slander’s generative potential. His fear of 
slander is thus converted from a potential character flaw into a powerful motivator for proactive 
governance.  
 
“Geld all the Youths”: Lucio and the Duke 
By focusing on the Duke and Lucio’s relationship, I will reveal how their interaction walks a fine 
line between slander law and policy. The concern with slander develops throughout the play, 
remaining integral to the end. In the classic 1966 study Measure for Measure as Royal 
Entertainment, Josephine Waters Bennett notes “that it has been suggested” that Lucio sees 
through the Duke’s disguise, an idea she immediately dismisses as a “mistake.”297 In his 1965 
article, “Lucio and the Friar’s Hood,” Christopher Spencer took stock of the suggestion, noting 
the various scholars who had argued the position, before concluding “that there is no warrant in 
the text for assuming that Lucio does see through the Duke’s disguise” and argued that Lucio 
merely has a “habit of releasing bits of ‘knowledge’ obscurely and in such a way as to suggest 
that he knows much more than he tells.”298 Yet for Lucio to recognize the Duke and consciously 
proceed to slander him would be blatantly unforgivable and would raise questions about the 
Duke’s later decision to spare Lucio’s life.  																																																								
297 Measure for Measure as Royal Entertainment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 92. 
298 “Lucio and the Friar’s Hood,” English Language Notes 3 (1965): 17-21, 18, 20. The scholars whose work he 
references include Nevill Coghill, W.W. Lawrence, J.A. Bryant, Jr., and Eileen Mackay. 
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Lucio is the play’s mouthpiece for the city’s rumors. Like Angelo, he appears to be 
socially elite,299 demonstrating that slanderous accusations can emerge from any rank in society. 
Several authors of period slander treatises contended that slander was associated predominantly 
with the lower classes, but this was simply not the case.300 Lucio amuses himself by inventing 
tales about other characters. Some are patent fabrications, while others hint at character traits that 
the subject of the tale would prefer to keep secret. Kaplan notes, Lucio’s “very name suggests his 
ability to reflect what surrounds him; luce means ‘light,’ as well as ‘looking glass.’”301 As 
discussed below, Lucio is a master at crafting plausible slanders; his aim is entertainment, yet he 
sometimes inadvertently reveals a hidden truth. For example, he declares to the disguised Duke 
that “The Duke yet would have dark deeds darkly answered; he would never bring them to light” 
(3.1.409-10). The Duke does bring much to light, exposing Angelo’s past and current duplicity; 
however, Lucio is correct in noting the Duke’s secretive nature. The Duke engineers the bed-
trick upon Angelo and uses deception to save Claudio; both actions suggest that Lucio’s 
impertinent depiction of the Duke as an “old fantastical Duke of dark corners” merits 
consideration (4.3.147). Lucio’s stories are naturally met with displeasure as they impinge upon 
the Duke’s royal prerogative to disclose hidden offenses, a role the Duke claims solely for 
himself in Act V. 
																																																								
299 This assumption is based on Lucio’s linguistic ability and the level of comfort he displays when interacting with 
social superiors in Act V. 
300 For example, Webbe argued that God punishes evil tongues with disgrace, poverty and misery; The Araignement 
of an unruly Tongue, 107. In A Murmurer, murmuring (a form of ill speech synonymous with slander) is described 
as stemming from “private persons.” The author does not specify, though, whether these individuals are citizens or 
subjects; attributed to Nicholas Breton (London: Printed by Robert Ravvorth, and are to be sold by John Wright, at 
his shop neere Christ-Church gate, 1607), 40. Sharpe has also demonstrated how all but the very poor were involved 
in slander litigation in the period; see Defamation and Sexual Slander.  
301 Kaplan’s observation is part of a larger argument concerning Lucio’s identification as a “fantastical,” which she 
contends “represents the figure of the poet. Furthermore, contemporary thought connects the fantastic with both a 
revealing function and with state policy”; The Culture of Slander, 93-99. 
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 Lucio is shown to have his finger on the pulse of the city’s gossip, much of it often 
correct, which makes him a threat to governmental control. Notwithstanding the Duke’s attempts 
to misinform his subjects concerning his status, it is Lucio who early on informs Isabella that  
…we do learn, 
By those that know the very nerves of state, 
His giving out were of an infinite distance 
From his true-meant design. (1.4.51-54) 
 
The accuracy of Lucio’s information suggests the ease and speed with which information seeped 
from an early modern court to the general population, or at least to the social elite. These lines’ 
point of view—the first person plural “we”—also demonstrates that Lucio is not the only 
Viennese citizen who enjoys gossip. Moreover, when the Duke later asks Lucio for news, Lucio 
informs him of the circulating rumors that the Duke is “with the Emperor of Russia” or “in 
Rome” (3.1.337, 338), emphasizing how one’s superiors (especially those who abruptly vanish—
into dark corners) are a hot topic of conversation. Lucio quickly adds his ironically apropos 
statement that “It was a mad, fantastical trick of him to steal from the state, and usurp the 
beggary he was never born to” (3.1.340-41). Ignorant that he is speaking with the Duke, Lucio 
somehow infers that his ruler has assumed the guise of a lowly traveler, inappropriate cover for 
someone of his rank. Not all the rumors about the Duke’s whereabouts that Lucio relates are 
correct, yet he nonetheless arrives at some knowledge of the Duke’s “design” (1.4.54). 
Furthermore, as the play speedily moves to its conclusion, no sooner has the still disguised Duke 
revealed that the absent Duke will be returning the next day than Lucio (who was not present 
earlier) echoes this breaking news a mere thirty lines later, declaring “they say the Duke will be 
here tomorrow” (4.3.145-46). Lucio’s pronouncements demonstrate the difficulty of controlling 
sensitive information and the ability of rumors to overlap with news, suggesting that it is possible 
to locate a seed of truth within statements labeled rumor or slander.  
		 132	
In the context of Elizabethan and Jacobean law, it seems a dangerous proposition to stage 
a scene allowing a seditionist to escape punishment. Lucio speaks indecorously of the Duke to 
Friar Lodowick, a foreigner, because he does not believe that the latter will accuse him of 
slander. According to the 1581 law of sedition, suspected seditionists had to be accused in person 
by two witnesses at both the arraignment and indictment.302 There were no other characters on 
stage for either of the conversations between Lucio and Friar Lodowick in which Lucio slanders 
the Duke.303 Thus, under normal circumstances, Lucio would not have been found guilty of 
slander, even if the friar had initiated proceedings against him. The requirement for two 
witnesses is ultimately not an issue, as Lucio uttered his slanders directly and repeatedly to the 
Duke himself. 
Slandering one’s ruler was to risk charges of sedition or verbal treason, depending upon 
the specific allegation and the current political climate. King James did not renew the 1581 
sedition statute created under Queen Elizabeth, yet his sensitivity to slander was well 
documented in Basilikon Doron.304 The brutality of this elapsed statute would presumably have 
deterred most from committing such actions. The punishments for convicted seditionists ranged 
from heavy fines and imprisonment to public maiming; those convicted of a second offense were 
hanged.305 This statute differentiated between merely repeating and inventing a seditious slander, 
yet in his law book, Action upon the Case for Slander (1662), William Sheppard explains that if 																																																								
302 23 Eliz., c. 2, Statutes of the Realm (9 vols., 1810-1825). Similarly, plaintiffs in a libel suit had to be able to 
produce a copy of the libel, or recite the words verbatim; Adam Fox, “Ballads, Libels and Popular Ridicule in 
Jacobean England,” Past & Present 145 (Nov. 1994): 48-83. Libel and slander were still interchangeable at the time. 
303 Elbow, Pompey and the Officers exit immediately preceding Lucio and Friar Lodowick’s conversation in 3.1; 
likewise, Isabella exits after line 148 in 4.3. 
304 As king of England, he would later pass a few royal proclamations concerning rumor and licentious speech. 
These include: “A Proclamation touching a seditious rumor suddenly raised” issued March 22, 1606; “A 
Proclamation against excess of Lavish and Licentious Speech of matters of State” issued on December 24, 1620, and 
essentially reissued under the same title on July 26, 1621. See Stuart Royal Proclamations: Volume I, Royal 
Proclamations of King James I (1603-1625), ed. James F. Larkin and Paul L. Hughes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1973), 134-35, 495-96, 519-21. It has long been a critical commonplace to acknowledge the similarities between 
James and the Duke. 
305 23 Eliz., c. 2, Statutes of the Realm. 
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an individual who reported a slander was unable to name its author, then that person was held 
liable as its inventor.306 Period authorities followed legal precedent by attempting to track 
slanders to their source. This mode of action, in effect, created the fantasy that slander could be 
traced to its origin,307 a fantasy brought to life in the interactions between Lucio and the Duke. 
I contend that the Duke’s treatment of Lucio is in remarkable accordance with the elapsed 
1581 sedition statute. When the Duke sentences Lucio at the end, he initially orders Lucio to be 
whipped and hanged for his slanders—the sentence for a second seditious offense—technically 
correct as Lucio twice slanders the Duke. Even Lucio admits the justness of this punishment, “If 
you will hang me for it, you may,” though he still attempts to get his sentence reduced to a mere 
whipping (5.1.498-99). The Duke claims to forgive the offense, lessening the sentence to 
marriage to the woman whom Lucio impregnated, Mistress Kate Keepdown, but Lucio responds 
by arguing that this marriage is equivalent to “pressing to death, whipping, and hanging” 
(5.1.515-16).308 The Duke’s retort that “Slandering a prince deserves it” (5.1.517) makes clear 
that he has no intention of being merciful, despite his previous assertion. The sentence collapses 
the crimes of slander and illicit sex and is a suitable punishment for Lucio’s refusal to care for 
either Kate or his child. I argue the Duke chooses this particular punishment because Lucio will 
view it as a slight upon his honor, fitting penance for his calumnies and his stubborn refusal to 																																																								
306 Action upon the Case for Slander, or a Methodical Collection under Certain Heads, of Thousands of Cases 
(London: Printed for Ch. Adams, J. Starkey, & T. Basset and are to be sold at their shops, at the Talbot in 
Fleetstreet, the Mitre near Temple-Bar, and in St. Dunstans Churchyard, in Fleetstreet, 1662), 26. 
307 Kaplan points to a statute of 1389 that “held that disseminators of defamatory stories would be punished if the 
author could not be found”, a concept that informed the period’s slander and sedition laws; The Culture of Slander, 
21.This line of reasoning can be seen, for instance, in the following royal proclamations issued by Mary Tudor, “A 
Proclamation Suppressing Seditious Rumors” issued July 28, 1553, and “A Proclamation Ordering Seditious Bills 
Destroyed” issued April 10, 1554. See Tudor Royal Proclamations: Volume II, The Later Tudors (1553-1587), ed. 
Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 4, 41. Vaughan notes that if an 
individual slanders the monarch but “is not punished within the time limited by statute .23 Eliz.cap.2. of West.1.viz. 
he shall be imprisoned until he finds the first Author that spake them”; The Spirit of Detraction, 158.  
308 Lucio’s comment refers to the legal procedure used on individuals accused of a crime who refused to enter a plea. 
Weights were placed upon the individual’s body until that person either expired or relented and entered a plea of 
“guilty” or “not guilty.” His reference is deeply ironic given that his crime is illicit speech, not silence. 
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cease slandering the Duke, as discussed below.309 As Lucio had previously insisted that the Duke 
“had some feeling of the sport” of illicit sex, Lucio’s tales are now answered by the command 
that he legitimate the daughter he refused to acknowledge (3.1.362). Moreover, as slander was a 
form of illicit judgment, this punishment correlates with the play’s emphasis on the moral “Judge 
not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what 
measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.”310 
Lucio’s sentence directly connects the crimes of illegitimate sex with slander, as does his 
unsuccessful attempt to excuse his actions, that he “spoke it but according to the trick” (5.1.498). 
As Kenneth Gross points out, “trick” is “the play’s word for both moral posturing and 
illegitimate sex.”311 This equivocal word assumes unsavory associations through its link to Lucio, 
the Duke’s “mad, fantastical trick” (3.1.340), and Angelo’s proposition to Isabella, which is 
described by Claudio as a “momentary trick” (3.1.113). The punishment additionally allows the 
Duke to address the consequences of Lucio’s illicit sex, again connecting the crimes of 
illegitimate sex with slander by underscoring the generative possibilities of both actions.  
Slander and illicit sex each possess the ability to create illegitimate beings. Slander 
creates a dark image of the slandered, a deception the Duke finds as troubling as the play’s 
metaphors for counterfeit coins, or the illegitimate children that threaten to populate the city.312 
Slander is a slippery verbal phenomenon because the dark images it creates are generally not 
																																																								
309 In “Getting Oneself Unmasked: The Duke, the “Friar,” and Lucio,” in Critical Essays on Shakespeare’s Measure 
for Measure, ed. Richard P. Wheeler (New York: G. K. Hall & Co., 1999), 217-29, Harry Berger Jr. argues that the 
Duke’s response to Lucio “is enriched and blurred by overtones of the wish to execute Lucio, cast off the burr who 
sticks to him, and get rid of the ducal complicity the burr brazenly represents. This makes the gesture of remission 
ring a little hollow, especially since the wish fuses with the Duke’s desire to seek revenge for the affronts to his 
princely dignity and personal probity” (225). 
310 Matthew 7.1-2, King James Bible. http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Matthew-7-2/. Originated: July 20, 
2014. 
311 Shakespeare’s Noise (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 76.  
312 I must thank Carol Neely for emphasizing the connection between the Duke’s fear of slanderous false images 
with the play’s depiction of illegitimate children as counterfeited coins. 
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entirely false.313 It is precisely this ambiguity that troubles the Duke. According to the era’s 
slander laws, if Lucio’s tales were true, that only made them worse; Edward Coke’s 1605 
doctrine of sedition implied that a true slander against a public person “is a greater Offense; for it 
concerns not only the Breach of Peace, but also the Scandal of Government.”314 Lucio’s slanders 
are laced with just enough truth, just enough perceptive commentary about the Duke, that 
readers, or as the Duke fears, potential listeners, cannot dismiss them as pure fabrication.315 
 It is a critical commonplace to question Lucio’s allegations against the Duke, yet literary 
scholars have predominantly accepted Lucio’s characterization of Kate Keepdown as a “punk” 
(5.1.520). No other character describes her as a prostitute and the Duke only refers to her as a 
“woman wrong’d” (5.1.507). Victoria Hayne has questioned this scholarly tendency by 
examining Kate’s connection to Mistress Overdone, arguing that the association “does not 
necessarily imply she is a prostitute.” Drawing on Houlbrooke’s Courts, she explains, “at the 
time bawdy houses served as ‘underground maternity home[s]…that pregnant girls were often 
packed off to,’ so that the man involved could avoid the sanctions the church courts would 
impose.”316 While Kate’s name suggests a certain degree of sexual freedom, Mistress Overdone 
claims that Lucio wooed Kate by “promis(ing) her marriage” (3.1.429), a fact Lucio 
corroborates. His handling of this situation is similar to the tales he spreads about the Duke. 
Lucio’s treatment of Kate is determined by self-interest, to avoid an unwanted marriage, while 																																																								
313 Dermot Cavanagh describes this as rumor’s potential to create “a counter-image of authority” in “‘Possessed with 
Rumours’: Popular Speech and King John,” in Shakespeare and History, ed. Holger Klein and Rowland Wymer 
(Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), 171-94, 183. 
314 The Reports of Edward Coke, Vol. 5, 125-26, 125. The rest of the sentence reads, “for what greater Scandal of 
Government can there be than to have corrupt or wicked Magistrates to be appointed and constituted by the King to 
govern his Subjects under him?” The scandal is further magnified if the King himself were the corrupt party, as 
argued by Lucio.  
315 Gross takes this idea one step further, arguing that Lucio is the Duke’s “ironic mirror who at once defends and 
deforms the ruler’s reputation, stealing from him his sovereign right of self-description”; Shakespeare’s Noise, 68-
101. His larger argument focuses upon how the Duke’s problematic hearing informs readers’ responses to the play.  
316 Hayne, “Performing Social Practice: The Example of Measure for Measure,” Shakespeare Quarterly 44.1 
(Spring 1993): 1-29, 8. 
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his tales about the Duke are created for fun; yet both use slivers of truth to lace their lies, making 
each tale more easily believable. Kate’s connection to Mistress Overdone does not prove she is a 
“punk,” but it certainly makes one think she could be. In the same vein, Lucio’s slanders about 
the Duke’s lasciviousness, coupled with the Duke’s non-enforcement of the city’s morality laws 
and his subsequent concern over it, could be interpreted as evidence of the Duke’s moral laxity. 
This is the barest of circumstantial evidence, yet as Shakespeare has previously illustrated in 
Much Ado about Nothing, and as he would later explore to tragic effect in Othello, when it 
comes to slander, circumstantial evidence is too often accepted as sufficient proof. 
To dismiss Lucio’s comments as pure falsehood is to miss the point and to disregard the 
anxiety that continually preys on the Duke’s mind. These shadowy images conjured by slander 
can present a greater threat than illegitimate children whose very existence flaunts the state’s 
inability to enforce its morality laws; illegitimate children can be legitimized with greater ease 
than the effort required to exorcise those given form through slander. The Duke proves up to the 
challenge at the end of Act V, yet removing the stain of slander is significantly more difficult for 
ordinary people, again as demonstrated by the fact that it is only through the Duke’s intervention 
that Mariana’s reputation is restored and Isabella’s spared, though Kate’s is left open-ended.  
Slander often proves difficult to dispel because it is fun. As illustrated by Lucio’s choice 
of the word “trick,” such enjoyment only adds to the arduous task of policing these speech acts. 
Lucio tries to depict himself as a gossip and his slanderous speeches as no more than idle and 
harmless entertainment, “pretty tales of the Duke” is what he calls them (4.3.154-55). Lucio’s 
attempt to present himself as an entertainer, to imaginatively create a space that would allow him 
to skirt slander laws, falls short because he cannot stop talking—he fails to respond to his 
listeners’ cues. When the Duke admonishes him for his ill speech, Lucio simply replies that he 
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“was an inward” of the Duke (3.1.372) and claims to know the reason the Duke left Vienna, a 
reason he refuses to share, stating “‘tis a secret must be locked within the teeth and the lips” 
(3.1.375-76). Lucio’s reference to the body’s natural line of defense against the tongue reveals 
both his knowledge of the need to control a loose tongue and his refusal to practice self-
government. Had Lucio taken his cue from the Duke and employed these natural guards by 
refraining from gossiping, he might have escaped punishment. His refusal to stay silent was a 
poor performance choice and his behavior demonstrates the dangers of partaking in gossip, how 
gossip can lead to imputations of slander. It is all fun and games until someone takes offense. 
The Duke again displays a surprising awareness of slander law in his initial response to 
Lucio’s stories. These tales imagine sexual abuse through their depiction of a lecherous Duke 
(3.1.362-70), who is also “a very superficial, ignorant, unweighing fellow” (3.1.379). The 
Duke’s immediate response is unexpectedly measured, telling Lucio that “Either this is envy in 
you, folly, or mistaking” (3.1.380). He behaves much as a judge hearing a slander case might, for 
he cites the various ways Lucio’s speech could be interpreted. The speaker’s intent in uttering 
words that caused offense was often an important consideration in the numerous slander suits 
heard in early modern England’s civil and ecclesiastical courts. This question of intent was 
foregrounded by the mitior sensus rule, which translated literally means “milder sense.” 
According to R.H. Helmholz, “That infamous doctrine allowed defendants to escape liability if 
the words were capable of a non-defamatory construction.”317 While the mitior sensus rule 
offered civil lawyers of the era the opportunity to establish inoffensive meanings for slanderous 
statements, the rule of innuendo presented an alternative. This rule allowed lawyers to argue that 
a statement’s latent implications had to be taken into consideration, that the “defendant had 																																																								
317 For more on the mitior sensus rule, see Helmholz, The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume I, The 
Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s, gen. ed. John Hamilton Baker (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 577. 
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meant the worst.” Judges usually opted to interpret words in their “most natural sense.”318 The 
Duke’s choice to give Lucio the benefit of the doubt is unexpectedly merciful, as the mitior 
sensus rule was generally applied to slander suits involving ordinary subjects, as opposed to 
criminal cases involving a subject slandering his ruler. It is only when Lucio refuses to act 
properly by ceasing his aspersions that the Duke realizes that Lucio is irredeemable. He 
consequently applies the rule of innuendo, viewing these comments as slights upon his character 
and ability to rule, and decides to punish Lucio. Ironically, Lucio believes that a lecherous, 
bastard-supporting Duke is a good thing, a kindred spirit, perhaps explaining his stubborn 
attraction to his tales and refusal to recognize that these tales can be socially disruptive. 
Through his interactions with Lucio, the Duke begrudgingly accepts slander’s ubiquity. 
Lucio tells the Duke that lechery “is impossible to extirp…till eating and drinking be put down” 
(3.1.348-49). This line of reasoning indirectly echoes the clown Pompey’s equally astute, yet 
insolent question, “Does your worship mean to geld and spay all the youth of the city?” (2.1.205-
06). The immediate context concerns Vienna’s morality laws, yet both statements are equally 
applicable to slander, especially the slander of one’s superiors. Furthermore, the Duke appears to 
echo Lucio’s sentiment when he declares (immediately following Lucio’s exit) that 
No might nor greatness in mortality 
Can censure scape; back-wounding calumny 
The whitest virtue strikes. What king so strong 
Can tie the gall up in the slanderous tongue? (3.1.416-19) 
 
Numerous slander and tongue treatises emphasize that not only is slander unavoidable, but that 
slander always attaches itself to the good and virtuous.319 The Duke’s lament underscores how 
																																																								
318 The rule of innuendo was used to interpret ambiguous statements. Helmholz provides the example, “Thou hast 
the pox,” noting that this statement could refer to either small pox or the French pox; the distinction is an important 
one, as “the former implied no moral turpitude; the latter did”; The Oxford History, 578, 577. 
319 For example, see A Plaine Description, Vaughan, The Spirit of Detraction, and Gibbon, The Praise of a Good 
Name. 
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slander respects no degree; a great equalizer, it can stick to anyone. Like the tongue, it cannot be 
“tied up” or contained. The Duke now has a greater understanding of slander than he did at the 
start, when he sought to escape critique. His depiction of calumny as “back-wounding” 
accurately portrays how slander spreads; early modern authorities feared slander precisely 
because of its ability to roam undetected, making the task of tracing it to its roots quite arduous. 
Given that he is in the (privileged?) position to witness the moments when the slanders against 
him are initially voiced, his description of calumny as surreptitious in nature, insinuates his belief 
that Lucio is not the only individual to slander him. He may very well be correct, for Lucio later 
argues that he “spoke it but according to the trick” (5.1.498) and as David McCandless notes, an 
additional meaning of the word “trick” is “custom.”320 
Lucio’s tales force the Duke to recognize slander’s pervasiveness as well as monarchic 
defamation’s popularity as a form of slander. As noted above, the Duke admits, 
O place and greatness, millions of false eyes 
Are stuck upon thee; volumes of report 
Run with their false and most contrarious quest 
Upon thy doings; (4.1.56-59) 
 
While Lucio is certainly persistent in his aspersions, he falls well short of the millions of false 
eyes envisioned by these lines.321 This complaint evokes the classical figure of Fama, whose 
myriad eyes, ears, mouths and tongues see, hear, and eagerly repeat all.322 The Duke previously 
noted that “stag[ing]” himself before his people does “well” (1.1.67, 69); he now concedes that 
																																																								
320 Gender and Performance in Shakespeare’s Problem Comedies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 
115. This is part of McCandless’s larger point that Lucio works as “the Duke’s discredited double” (115).  
321 Various scholars have noted the similarity between the Duke’s soliloquy and his previous speech about slander at 
3.1.416-19. William Warburton was the first to speculate that these later lines had been shifted from the earlier 
speech. For example, see J.W. Lever’s introduction to the Arden Edition, xx-xxii. N.W. Bawcutt, drawing on 
Warburton, suggests that Measure may have been revised by “someone other than Shakespeare”; Measure for 
Measure, ed. N.W. Bawcutt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 68. For a competing view, see Gross who 
contends that the Duke’s soliloquy “really is in the right place”; Shakespeare’s Noise, 71-73. 
322 Kaplan also notes the connection to the figure of Fama in her reading of these lines; The Culture of Slander, 103. 
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exposure can also lead to critique, as can sudden absence. A standard complaint of rulers,323 the 
Duke’s hyperbolic claim imagines a panopticon-like reality where the king rather than the 
subject is under constant surveillance, emphasizing his belief that he is the cynosure of all eyes 
and the topic of all conversation. His lines additionally imagine a community where slander is a 
commonplace activity (or perhaps a more accurate assessment of his city).  
 The Duke further develops his slander-induced nightmare by imagining a “thousand 
escapes of wit” that “Make [him] the father of their idle dream, / And rack [him] in their fancies” 
(4.1.59, 60-61). He anxiously posits that as the subject of slander, he is simultaneously the 
progenitor of these tales. Their hypothetical father, rather than wielding power over those 
slanders, the Duke fears these “escapes of wit” have power over him. He believes slander racks 
his image, twisting it into unnatural shapes that are still recognizable as himself. The Duke’s 
imagining of slanders as his illegitimate children illustrates his vision of slander as a dark, false 
reflection; these calumnies are his dark image as they are fashioned in his image. He 
consequently links the crime of illicit sex to slander, attempting to nullify both their generative 
powers in one fell swoop. At the start of the play, the Duke thought to control the city’s illicit 
sexual drive while avoiding slander; having now been the subject of slander, the Duke has 
learned that he cannot punish one crime and ignore the other. He additionally learns that to effect 
change, he cannot rely on a deputy; he must take matters into his own hands.  
 
The New World Order 
																																																								
323 For example, Queen Elizabeth declared in an address to Parliament that princes “stand upon stages”; “Queen 
Elizabeth’s First Reply to the Parliamentary Petitions Urging the Execution of Mary, Queen of Scots, November 12, 
1586,” Elizabeth I: Collected Works, ed. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller and Mary Beth Rose (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2000), 186-90. James I similarly attests that Kings “are as it were set (as it was said of old) upon a 
publike stage, in the sight of all people”; Basilikon Doron. King James VI and I, Sommerville, 4. 
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The Duke displays his new style of governance during the final scene at the city gates, thereby 
using the dreaded millions of eyes to his advantage. He hints at his plans in an address to the 
audience explaining that “I am bound / To enter publicly” (4.3.87-88). He then sets the stage by 
directing Friar Peter to “bring trumpets to the gate” (4.5.9), to inform various individuals where 
they can meet the Duke prior to his arrival at the gates, and instructs Angelo, via letter, to 
“proclaim it in an hour before his entering, that if any crave redress of injustice, they should 
exhibit their petitions in the street” (4.4.7-9). In contrast to his covert departure, the Duke intends 
to reclaim his authority through public spectacle. He means to awe his subjects by demonstrating 
his ability to measure their worth, setting right the wrongs that have occurred under Angelo’s 
despotic rule. His choice of location for this scene is reminiscent of a new ruler’s coronation 
entry into the city of London. Rather than being greeted and extoled through pageants presented 
by eager subjects, the Duke attempts to engineer his own spectacle.  
The underlying theme of the Duke’s pageant is that all of Vienna’s sins are transparent to 
the Duke. The decision to stage this scene publicly demonstrates the Duke’s desire to begin his 
“new” rule in a different vein. By ousting the corrupt elements in the government, he hopes to 
present himself, and perhaps his previous negligence, in a better light.324 Angelo alone voices the 
response the Duke hoped to have elicited, describing the Duke “like power divine,” able to see 
and bring to light his hidden “passes” (5.1.361, 362). By presenting the Duke as all-knowing, 
Angelo’s lines provide a sound bite that perfectly encapsulates the public relations value of the 
Duke’s pageant. He will no longer ignore his subjects’ disobedience; he will now publicly punish 
repeat offenders. This spectacle seeks to impress upon his subjects the Duke’s vision of bodily 
integrity and a moral and social order where slander and illicit sex have been banished.  																																																								
324 This fantasy of a fresh start is appropriately mirrored by the play’s composition date, 1603/4, shortly following 
the ascension of King James I. 
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The Duke’s vision of a newly purified Vienna is an unattainable ideal. As his hyperbolic 
lines about slander subversively acknowledged, rulers are naturally subject to critique. That, 
however, is not the point. The public sentencing of Lucio and Angelo for slander and illicit sex 
illustrate that the Duke’s days of legal non-enforcement are over. Every named character that 
committed illicit sex is either threatened with death, or sentenced to an unwanted marriage (or 
both).325 The implication is that the countless others who visited Mistress Overdone’s infamous 
brothel and who have thus far escaped chastisement will likewise face punishment in time. 
Barnardine is perhaps representative of the Duke’s new resolve. Though pardoned, if his 
reported previous behavior is any indication (5.1.474-79), it is simply a matter of time until he 
again faces sentencing.  
I argue that the Duke’s elaborate spectacle drives slander underground, inculcating a new 
respect for silence and circumspection.326 No one dares openly critique the newly emboldened 
Duke. Instead, Mariana and Isabella beg mercy for Angelo, and Lucio pleads for a lessened 
sentence, emphasizing the Duke’s power. Most notably, the gathered characters are silent in 
response to the disclosure that Claudio is still alive. The only noted reaction is the Duke’s claim 
that he sees a “quick’ning in” Angelo’s “eye,” which he interprets as a sign that Angelo 
“perceives he’s safe” (5.1.489, 488). There are no lines or stage directions depicting the other 
																																																								
325 Jonathan Dollimore argues in “Transgression and Surveillance in Measure for Measure,” that the play’s 
transgressors, who represent “the spectre of unregulated flesh…are exploited to legitimate an exercise in 
authoritarian repression.” He adds that such desire “is never unregulated, perhaps least of all in Jacobean London”; 
Wheeler. 41-55, 52. Dollimore briefly considers Lucio’s aspersions about the Duke, noting that they “strike at the 
heart of the ideological legitimation of power” thereby explaining why “slander was a cause of obsessive concern to 
Elizabethan and Jacobean rulers, just as it is here with the Duke” (51). 
326 Kaplan contends, “The result of his dramatic and defamatory epiphanies is to batter the majority of his subjects 
into submission and silence”; The Culture of Slander, 104. While I am in agreement about the subjects’ silence, I 
question whether they are truly submissive. 
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witnesses’ reactions; theirs is a pregnant silence.327 The play’s final fifty lines focus on the 
Duke’s unanswered proposals and his punishment of Lucio; only they speak from this point on.  
The importance of silence as the safest alternative to the Duke’s new governance is best 
exemplified by Isabella’s argument, “Thoughts are no subjects, / Intents but merely thoughts” 
(5.1.445-46). The context is her argument that Angelo should be spared, given that his intention 
to dishonor her was not accomplished, yet this line of reasoning can be extended to excuse any 
potentially criminal thoughts, including slanderous ones. This is Isabella’s last line; the final 
thought of this most eloquent of characters seeks to limit the Duke’s authority. I believe the urge 
to slander has not been eliminated, but Vienna’s subjects have learned that their previous open 
flouting of authority will no longer be tolerated; the mitior sensus rule will not always be 
applied. The play suggests that keeping their thoughts to themselves is now the only safe route, 
for as Isabella indicated, thoughts are not subjects and thus not subject to the law. Her lack of an 
answer to the Duke’s proposal can be seen as an early form of civil disobedience that may 
represent the new status quo in Vienna.328 The Duke’s second proposal, after having asked 
Isabella to “Give me your hand, and say you will be mine,” underscores her refusal to perform 
either gesture (5.1.486). In contrast to Lucio, who pays the price for his wagging tongue, Isabella 
wisely chooses to hold her tongue. 
																																																								
327 Such silences place the onus on the actors performing the play. Phillip C. McGuire terms such moments “open 
silences” in Speechless Dialect: Shakespeare’s Open Silences (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). He 
defines this term as “silences that Shakespeare’s words impose upon characters who remain alive” clarifying that 
“an open silence is one whose precise meanings and effects, because they cannot be determined by analysis of the 
words of the playtext, must be established by nonverbal, extratextual features of the play that emerge only in 
performance” (xiv, xv). In the chapter, “The Final Silences of Measure for Measure,” McGuire considers five 
performances of the play, emphasizing various interpretations of six characters’ final silences: Angelo, Barnardine, 
Claudio, Juliet, Mariana, and Isabella, 63-96. 
328 Keith M. Botelho describes her silence as an “assert[ion] of her own authority” and an “insurgent silence” in 
Renaissance Earwitnesses: Rumor and Early Modern Masculinity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 85. 
Isabella’s silence has attracted a great deal of scholarly debate. For a brief overview of selected critical commentary 
on this matter, see McCandless Gender and Performance in Shakespeare’s Problem Comedies, 190, fn. 77. 
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Measure’s resolution does not cement the community. The Duke willfully ignores how 
he and those acting on his orders repeatedly used slander to engineer a “happy ending” for the 
various characters at risk: Isabella, Mariana and Father Peter are deemed slanderers (5.1.120-22, 
254-56, 283-85). Friar Lodowick (the disguised Duke) is accused of suborning them and later 
launches a damning account of the corruption in Vienna, an action condemned by Escalus as 
“Slander to th’ state!” (5.1.317). More importantly, the majority of the couplings do not promise 
happy marriages. Angelo made clear that he prefers death to marriage (5.1.470), indicating that 
the breach between himself and Mariana has not been repaired. Lucio thinks his marriage akin to 
death (5.1.515-16), suggesting that he will not form a familial unit with Kate and his daughter. 
And Isabella’s lack of an answer reveals that she does not want to be the Duke’s wife but cannot 
refuse. Moreover, these marriages do not foster any new alliances or connections between 
families. These tenuous and strained relationships mirror slander’s effects upon a population. A 
corrosive force, it divides people, and three of these couples have been touched by slander (the 
lone exception being Claudio and Juliet); even Isabella is slandered as part of the Duke’s staged 
pageant, though he ultimately upholds her reputation. Measure ultimately makes it clear that 
although slander is inevitable, subjects should nonetheless behave properly so as to avoid a fate 
such as Lucio’s. Punishment can diminish slander, but it cannot eradicate it. If as the Duke 
lamented, “place and greatness” will always attract critics (4.1.56), and if as Pompey argues 
illicit sex will reign until “all the youth” are “geld[ed] and spay[ed]” (2.1. 205-06), then slander 
will likewise thrive until everyone is made mute. 
My reading of Measure emphasized a fictional ruler’s reactions to verbal slander, 
demonstrating how fear of slander prompted the Duke to first attempt to escape and then to 
silence critique. James likewise tries to silence the critique of “The Five Senses” by using a 
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clever and non-confrontational strategy, sarcasm and dismissal. Taking the fear and anxiety that 
slander could produce a step further, the following chapter will continue to focus on slander’s 
imagined effects on the body, through a metaphorical examination of its ability to behave like a 
poison or plague, spreading internally and consequently producing visible reactions. 
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Chapter 3 “Tempring the Passion with Advisement Slow”: Slander, Anger, and the Body in 
Book II of The Faerie Queene 
There as they entred at the Scriene, they saw 
Some one, whose tongue was for his trespasse vyle 
Nayld to a post, adjudged so by law:  
For that therewith he falsely did revyle,  
And foule blaspheme that Queene for forged guyle, 
But with bold speaches, which he blazed had, 
And with lewd poems, which he did complye; 
For the bold title of a Poet bad 
He on himself had ta’en, and rayling rymes had sprad. 
 
Thus there he stood, whylest high over his head, 
There written was the purport of his sin, 
In cyphers strange, that few could rightly read, 
BON FONT: but bon that once had written bin, 
Was raced out, and Mal was now put in. 
So now Malfont was plainely to be red; 
Eyther for th’evill, which he did therein, 
Or that he likened was to a welhed 
Of evill words, and wicked sclaunders by him shed. (V.ix.25-6)329 
 
During their tour of Mercilla’s castle, Arthur and Artegall, the knight of Justice, Arthur’s half 
brother, and the protagonist of Book V of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene (1596), pass by 
this grisly sight.330 Of the several reasons proffered for this punishment, the narrator’s final 
explanation is that Malfont was punished for acting as “a welhed” of evil, slanderous words. In 
his text devoted to praising silence and revealing the double nature of the tongue, Fra. Giacomo 
Affinati d’ Acuto (Jacopo Affinati d’ Acuto) contends that one’s speech should be like a clear 
fountain, without spot.331 Authors of religiously motivated treatises on such subjects as silence 																																																								
329 All references to The Faerie Queene are to Edmund Spenser: The Faerie Queene, ed. A.C. Hamilton, text ed. 
Hiroshi Yamashita and Toshiyuki Suzuki. 2nd edition (London: Pearson Education, 2001). Hereafter quotations are 
cited in the text by canto, stanza, and line numbers. 
330 Individuals convicted of sedition, slander against the ruler, peer, or government official, were subject to corporal 
punishment, however, English slander law makes no mention of the slanderer’s tongue. David Cressy relates that in 
early modern Ireland, in contrast, seditionists “could be bored through the tongue” in Dangerous Talk: Scandalous, 
Seditious, and Treasonable Speech in Pre-Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 43. 
331 The Dumb Divine Speaker or Dumbe Speaker of Divinity, translated by A.M. (London: Printed by R. Bradock for 
William Leake, dwelling in Paules churchyard, at the signe of the Holy-ghost, 1605), 79. 
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and the tongue, men like Affinati d’ Acuto and Thomas Adams, believed that the tongue is not 
evil by nature, for it was made by God as the organ through which mankind can praise their 
creator. Yet in his fallen state, man has subverted the tongue’s original purpose, poisoning it by 
making it a vessel for ill speech.332 This well’s contamination makes it a danger not only to its 
owner, but to all those who drink from it, those who listen or read the slanderer’s words. Malfont 
is guilty of such an offense, using his tongue to spew slanderous speech, words directed against 
God’s magistrate on earth, his sovereign ruler, Gloriana.  
Both Books II and V portray examples of defamation, yet the two books’ interests in 
particular virtues dictates differing responses to slander. The Malfont episode from Book V, with 
its emphasis on the political virtue of justice, necessitates public punishment, given that his 
actions represent a criminal form of slander, specifically, sedition.333 Book II, in contrast, focuses 
on the private virtue of temperance and the body’s reaction to external threats, including 
calumny. Several episodes from Book II present examples of slander between commoners, the 
sort of case that would be heard in a civil court. Nevertheless, each of these episodes directly and 
indirectly rely on metaphorical depictions of calumny to portray the threats it poses. Book V 
figuratively depicts the tongue as a well, while Book II’s concentration on temperance, on bodily 
control, recalls the metaphor of the body politic. Although Books V and VI’s depictions of 
slander have drawn the most scholarly attention, in large part due to the appearance of the 
Blatant Beast – slander made flesh – a critical examination of Book II’s portrayal of slander’s 
effects on the body is long overdue.334  																																																								
332 Thomas Adams, The Taming of the Tongue (London: Printed by Thomas Purfoot, for Clement Knight, and are to 
be sold at his shop in Paules Church-yard, at the Signe of the Holy Lambe, 1616). 
333 The differences between slander and sedition are discussed in further detail in the introduction. 
334 For more on the Blatant Beast, see Kenneth Gross, “Reflections on the Blatant Beast.” Spenser Studies 13 (1999): 
101-23; Merritt Y. Hughes, “Spenser’s ‘Blatant Beast.’” The Modern Language Review 13.3 (July 1918): 267-75; 
and Victor Houliston, “Baffling the Blatant Beast: Robert Persons’ Anti-Appellant Rhetoric, 1601-1602.” The 
Catholic Historical Review 90.3 (July 2004): 439-55. See also Chapter 2, “Allegories of Defamation in The Faerie 
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In canto iv, the fairy knight Guyon battles the allegorical figures, Furor and Occasion, an 
episode that illustrates how slander incites irascibility, thus causing intemperance within an 
individual and, in turn, compromising the body politic by damaging individual relationships. 
Although Occasion is not immediately recognizable as a figure aligned with slander, I reveal that 
canto iv’s narrative repeatedly returns to the notion of calumny, its various episodes collectively 
exhibiting slander’s effects upon social bonds and the body itself. Even Guyon’s defeat of 
Occasion portrays the impossibility of conquering defamation. Figures such as Occasion and 
Furor can be temporarily bound or contained, but they cannot be destroyed. Such victories are 
thereby always pyrrhic, for the emotions that these allegorical figures unleash always return, 
albeit in different forms, such as the Blatant Beast or the hag Slander. Accordingly, Guyon is 
continually maligned by a variety of opponents. Each encounter tests the knight’s temperance. It 
is only when he retains his composure that he prevails, evidencing that patience is the tempered 
body’s defense against defamation. 
Slander’s effects on the body and the body politic are further developed in cantos ix and 
xi, through the assault on the House of Alma, the anthropomorphic house of temperance shaped 
like a human figure. The goal of temperance is the body’s wholeness, a perfect balance where all 
the members work cooperatively. The house’s unity is threatened by the villainous Malegar and 
his incorporeal rebel rout, who together besiege this dwelling. Attacking the house’s five senses, 
the assailants specifically use slander and other forms of ill speech to undermine the sense of 
hearing. Reading these episodes through the lens of slander’s traditional metaphoric conceptions, 
I will illustrate how these incidents collectively reveal slander’s ability to disrupt the body, 
emphasizing the need for patience. Patience, however, does not equate to inaction. Guyon 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Queene, Books IV-VI,” of M. Lindsay Kaplan’s The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
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demonstrates how to act while retaining control over oneself, acting not out of anger but 
necessity.335  
An intangible phenomenon, slander can be examined through the tangible, material 
results it produces, such as the rupturing of relationships and its damaging effects on the body. 
Book II, canto iv of The Faerie Queene illustrates slander’s effects on interpersonal 
relationships, through the narrative of Phedon and Claribell, and the individual body. The 
allegorical figure of Occasion portrays slander’s ability to incite anger, while the villainous 
squire Atin’s use of poisoned arrows introduces the metaphor of slander as an arrow in its ability 
to wound another’s reputation from afar. Calumny is additionally a poison in its ability to spread 
and distemper a body, a notion that takes shape in assault upon the House of Alma.  
																																																								
335 Erik Gray suggests that Book II’s narrative “threatens to be one of inaction” immediately thereafter arguing “yet 
Book Two is not dull or static” in large part because “for all his admirable self-control, Guyon does not have 
complete command of his own body”; Eric Gray, ed. Introduction to The Faerie Queen: Book Two (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2006), xi, xii. For more on Guyon as the symbol of temperance, his struggle to 
maintain this virtue, and the influences upon Spenser’s notions of temperance, see Madelon S. Gohlke “Embattled 
Allegory: Book II of The Faerie Queene.” English Literary Renaissance 8.2 (March 1978): 123-40. Gohlke argues 
that Guyon is unable to accept man’s fallen state, thereby leading to an unsolvable conflict between “a fallen reality 
and a morality based on a conception of unfallen nature,” a conflict that ultimately “undermines the superficial 
moral allegory of Temperance” forcing “a reconsideration of the allegory” in Book II (124). Peter D. Stambler 
argues that Guyon supplants an “Aristotelian or ‘classical’ ethical model” with “a radical Christian standard” that he 
unconsciously develops over the course of Book II in “The Development of Guyon’s Christian Temperance.” 
English Literary Renaissance 7.1 (Dec. 1977): 51-89, 52. Lauren Silberman contends that Book II reveals the 
limitations and ultimate failure of temperance as guiding principle in a fallen world. She argues that temperance, 
with its emphasis on a golden mean, is a virtue ill equipped to acknowledge the nuances of a sensual, fallen world in 
“‘The Faerie Queene,’ Book II and the Limitations of Temperance.” Modern Language Studies 17.4 (Autumn 
1987): 9-22. Similarly, Paul Suttie focuses on the moral ambivalence of Guyon’s choices in “Moral Ambivalence in 
the Legend of Temperance.” Spenser Studies 19 (2004): 125-33. Elizabeth Heale concludes that “it seems best, then, 
to understand Spenser’s vision of temperance as the product of an amalgam of traditions and sources, classical and 
‘living’, and to avoid trying to explain its details in terms of a single system” in The Faerie Queen: A Reader’s 
Guide, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 47. Michael Schoenfeldt considers the difference 
between temperance, “literally a static virtue” and continence, “a perpetually active virtue” in Bodies and Selves in 
Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 40-73, 43. For a contrasting view of Book II’s allegory, see Gerald Morgan, 
“The Idea of Temperance in the Second Book of The Faerie Queene.” Review of English Studies 37.145 (Feb. 
1986): 11-39. Morgan argues that modern readers have misinterpreted Spenser’s notion of temperance, especially 
regarding Guyon’s destruction of the Bower of Bliss. See also Catherine Bates who focuses on the importance of the 
word “govern” and its relation to Guyon’s voyage in “Images of Government in The Faerie Queene, Book II.” Notes 
and Queries 234 (Sept. 1989): 213-14. On the character of the Palmer, see Helen Cooney, “Guyon and His Palmer: 
Spenser’s Emblem of Temperance.” The Review of English Studies, New Series 51.202 (May 2000): 169-92. 
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Metaphor shares important similarities with slander, making it uniquely qualified to 
depict this verbal and written phenomenon. As Maria Franziska Fahey demonstrates in Metaphor 
and Shakespearean Drama, metaphors are inherently contradictory in that they combine like 
with difference, or, proximity with distance. Drawing on Aristotle’s notions of “standard” and 
“exotic” words discussed in his Poetics, Fahey argues that metaphors occur “in the same 
geographical place,” yet they can transport us “instead from one semantic domain to another. 
Metaphor is alien in its use, yet it is familiar nonetheless.”336 Like metaphor, slander transports 
individuals into another semantic domain, that of the body, both within individuals and between 
them. Calumny incites passions within the body, which, in turn, affect any number of 
relationships: from friendships to romantic partnerings, neighborly bonds to relations between 
communities. Focusing on two particularly problematic emotions, Book II of the Faerie Queene 
portrays how irascibility and concupiscence can lead to a lack of self-control, the absence of 
which can damage both the self and others. Slander provides a byline through both focal points, 
as it continually provokes anger through personal attacks and, sometimes, envy and jealousy, 
through allegations of sexual impropriety. This chapter reveals the early modern body’s 
vulnerability to slander and the continuing effort entailed in governing one’s response to this 
provocation.  
 
Enter the Allegory: Round One, Furor and Occasion 
Early in Book II, Guyon encounters Occasion and her son Furor, the former an old woman who 
recalls the classic allegorical figure of Fortune, and the latter, a pugnacious individual who is 
																																																								
336 Fahey’s focus on the link between metaphors and reproduction, especially metaphor’s fecund potential for 
unofficial meanings, differs from my own, yet her discussion of the nature of metaphor is incredibly useful to my 
work on slander. Maria Franziska Fahey, Metaphor and Shakespearean Drama: Unchaste Signification (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 11. 
		 151	
stirred to further mischief through his mother’s constant critiques.337 Occasion is initially 
described as “a wicked Hag” whose  
lockes, that loathly were and hoarie gray,  
Grew all afore, and loosly hong unrold,  
But all behind was bald, and worne away,  
That none thereof could ever taken hold (iv.4.1, 5-8).  
 
Like Fortune, Occasion must be seized by the forelock. Holding her is impossible once she has 
passed. Unlike her classical predecessor, Occasion’s only goal is to incite Furor to further 
violence using any means at her disposal. Though she is not above throwing stones, or using her 
walking staff to beat Furor, Occasion’s preferred impetus is her words; “And ever as she went, 
here toung did walke / In fowle reproch, and termes of vile despight…Ne any evill meanes she 
did forbeare, / That might him move to wrath, and indignation reare” (iv.5.1-2, 8-9). Her 
physical appearance may recall Fortune’s, yet her actions align Occasion more closely with 
offensive speech, with “reprochfull blame, / And evill meanes,” with “bitter rayling and foule 
revilement” (iv.11.3-4; iv.12.5). Elizabeth Heale contends that “Spenser seems to have combined 
a detail from the iconography of Occasion with details from an almost equally familiar figure, 
Envy, whom Whitney, following Ovid, describes as an ‘hideous hagge’ whose tongue is a forked 
viper as befits her poisonous speech and whose ‘feeble limmes’ are supported by a staff which 
serves both as support and weapon.”338 Envy, of course, provides an occasion for anger. In the 
early modern period, it was often considered one of the chief motivators for uttering slander.339 
																																																								
337 Morgan argues that Furor has three defining characteristics, which he links to Thomas Aquinas’s classifications 
of the differing types of anger. “The Idea of Temperance in the Second Book of The Faerie Queene,” 31. Paul J.  
Alpers compares this episode with the concurring episode from Spenser’s source, Lodovico Ariosto’s Orlando 
Furioso, in The Poetry of The Faerie Queene (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 54-69. 
338 The Faerie Queene: A Reader’s Guide, 49. 
339 Envy is listed as a main cause of slander in the Anonymous A Plaine Description of the Ancient Pedigree of 
Dame Slander (Imprinted at London by John Harrington, 1573), C2. Nicholas Breton, who is usually credited as the 
author of A Murmurer, reverses the causal link by claiming that murmuring (a period synonym for slander) arises 
out of impatience and leads to ignorance and envy (London: Printed by Robert Ravvorth, and are to be sold by John 
Wright, at his shop neere Christ-Church gate, 1607). Thomas Wright links envy and slander in his contention that 
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Moreover, various forms of ill speech, such as murmuring and slander, were periodically linked 
to serpents, because of the shared ability to harm.340 Together, these traits make Occasion the 
producer of ill speech par excellence. Like Malfont, she is “a welhed / Of evill words,” yet her 
words are kerosene to her son’s furor (V.ix.26.8-9). Though the reader is never told exactly what 
Occasion says to Furor to incense him, the message is clear: calumny breeds anger.  
In their footnotes to the Longman edition of The Faeirie Queene, Hiroshi Yamashita and 
Toshiyuki Suzuki note that Occasion’s provision of a “flaming fyer brond, / Which she in 
Stygian lake…/ Had kindled” enacts Saint James’s depiction of the harm caused by the tongue 
(v.22.6-8). James 3.6 states, “And the tongue is fyre, yea a worlde of wickendes: so is the tongue 
set among our members, that it defileth the whole bodie, and settetch on fyre the course of 
nature, and it is set on fyre of hel.”341 According to Jonathan Gil Harris, this verse from St. James 
was “one of the most popular passages from the New Testament in early modern England.”342 
Occasion obtains the firebrand in order to further enrage Furor. In addition to symbolizing Furor, 
the firebrand is a metaphor of Occasion’s relationship to her son, as she uses her words to 
continually enflame him. Though it may border on overkill, she spares no opportunity to ensure 
that Furor’s volcanic temper erupts.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
women are naturally more envious than men and thus more likely to slander others in The Passions of the Mind in 
General, ed. William Webster Newbold (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986), 119.  
340 For example, Breton compares murmurers to poisonous serpents in A Murmurer, 17; in the dedication to his 
work, Charles Gibbon states that lewd individuals have serpent’s tongues and no ears in The Praise of a Good 
Name: The Reproch of an Ill Name (London: 1594); quoting Psalm 140, William Vaughan states that the tongue, 
like a serpent, is poisonous in The Spirit of Detraction, Conjured and Convicted in Seven Circles (London: 1611), 
136; and Affinati d’ Acuto believes that defamers’ tongues are like serpents in that they are forked and they can 
harm the defamer or both the defamer and the defamed; The Dumb Divine Speaker 136, 163, 173. See below for 
more on slander’s connection to poison. 
341 Edmund Spenser, Hamilton, 199. 
342 Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic: Discourses of Social Pathology in Early Modern England (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 107. In his essay on detraction, Richard Brathwaite portrayed “spreaders of tales 
as firebrands;” Essaies upon the Five Senses: Revived by a New Supplement; with a Pithy One upon Detraction 
(London: Printed by Anne Griffin, and are to be sold by Henry Shephard in Chancery lane, at the signed of the 
Bible, 1635), 165. 
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In his brief article, “Calumny in The Faerie Queene, II.iv,” Michael Bull suggests that the 
iconographic detail of stanza three and the depictions of Occasion and Furor were influenced by 
Lucian’s Calumnia. This work described a painting by Apelles featuring Calumny dragging a 
man by the hair. Bull explains that Lucian depicted Calumny as exhibiting furor and rage, 
associations that are transposed unto Furor in the character’s introductory line, “A mad man, or 
that feigned mad to bee.” Taking on more than her emotional response, Furor also acts as 
Calumny does by drawing “by the heare along upon the grownd, / A handsome stripling with 
great crueltee” (iv.3.4, 5-6).343 While Furor embodies the wrath previously associated with 
Calumny, Occasion is not completely bereft of this link. It is Guyon’s guide, the black Palmer, 
who eventually names this figure, “Occasion, the roote of all wrath and despight” (iv.10.9). Her 
allegorical link to anger is reshaped in their familial relationship, and, just as importantly, it is 
fostered through Occasion’s words. It is her words that define her, while the effect of these same 
words define her son.  
Occasion’s defeat by Guyon provides yet another connection with slander. Having 
overcome her, Guyon fits Occasion with a scold’s bridle, a demeaning punishment meant to 
enforce silence on a woman who could not control her tongue.344 Following the Palmer’s advice, 
Guyon catches “hold of her ungratious tonge, / Thereon an yron lock, did fasten firme and 
stronge” (iv.12.8-9). Binding her hands for good measure, Occasion is left unable to 
communicate, at which point, Furor’s valor evaporates and he runs away. The scold’s bridle, like 																																																								
343 Michael Bull, “Calumny in The Faerie Queene, II.iv.” Notes and Queries 242 (Dec. 1997): 473-77. Bull also 
references two sixteenth century examples, a woodcut frontispiece to a 1516 German translation of Lucian’s 
Calumnia, and Federico Zuccaro’s painting of The Calumny of Apelles, arguing that while “it is not inconceivable 
that Spenser knew one or another of these images…the more obvious conclusion is that Spenser, like the two artists, 
arrived independently at the representation of Furor as a central protagonist” (473).  
344 For more on the devices and shaming rituals used to punish outspoken women, see Lynda E. Boose, “Scolding 
Brides and Bridling Scolds: Taming the Woman’s Unruly Member.” Shakespeare Quarterly 42.2 (1991): 179-213; 
and David Underdown, “The Taming of the Scold: the Enforcement of Patriarchal Authority in Early Modern 
England” in Order and Disorder in Early Modern England, ed. Anthony Fletcher and John Stevenson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 116-36. 
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the cucking stool, was a device meant to reinforce patriarchal control on a woman who had been 
interpreted as behaving in an unnatural way. These demeaning public punishments and the 
carnivalesque rituals surrounding them—scolds could be preceded by discordant music, were 
likely to be urinated upon, and were subjected to taunts and ridicule as they stood in the pillory—
were meant to reverse the breach of gender politics that had occurred as a consequence of the 
woman’s uncontrolled tongue. The shaming history behind the scold’s bridle tacitly points to 
slander’s ability to overthrow natural order. Though the text does not draw attention to this facet 
as it does when Radegund emasculates Artegall in Book V, the use of the scold’s bridle upon 
Occasion insinuates the inherent shame in Furor’s ill treatment at the hands of a woman, even if 
she is his mother.345 More importantly, Furor’s responsiveness to Occasion, both her provocation 
and her silencing, underscores calumny’s ability to conquer reason and the necessity of 
stemming the flow of ill speech before reason and temperance can be restored. Furor is nearly 
invincible so long as Occasion continues to prompt his anger. The moment she is silenced, 
Furor’s might is lost.  
The handsome, young knight whom Furor relentlessly beats, Phedon, provides the final 
link between Occasion and slander. Though literary scholars often note the allegorical meaning 
of Phedon’s subjection to Furor, they frequently elide slander’s role as the catalyst for his 
anger.346 Phedon’s narrative illustrates the impact that calumny can have on a listener. The 
																																																								
345 The word “bridle” is used repeatedly throughout Book II as a metaphor for controlling one’s emotions. For 
example, see Canto iv, stanza 34, for the Palmer’s advice to Phedon. 
346 For example, Morgan states that “the subjection of Phedon to Furor (as we shall later see) expresses the state of 
one who is overwhelmed by sorrow and an unappeasable desire for vengeance, and this combination of passions is 
evident in Phedon’s slaying of Claribell and is indeed a man in an agony of ‘griefe and furie’ (II.iv.33)”; “The Idea 
of Temperance in the Second Book of The Faerie Queene,” 14, also see 32. While the goal of Silberman’s analysis 
of the Furor and Occasion episode is to show “the limitations of Temperance in mediating between the individual 
and experience,” she merely gestures to the connection between Philemon’s slander and Phedon’s anger, arguing 
instead that “the occasion of Phedon’s murderous furor is his failure to establish the appropriate connections, either 
to the object of his passions, Claribell, or to his doppelgänger, Philemon”; “‘The Faerie Queene,’ Book II and the 
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figurative meaning of this episode is not understood until Guyon has defeated Furor and 
Occasion, allowing Phedon to share his story. Guyon overcomes the representative of Phedon’s 
anger for him, allowing Phedon to regain sufficient control of his emotions to narrate the troubles 
that resulted in his falling victim to Furor. He relates how he fell in love with a socially superior 
woman named Claribell, who returned his love and with whom he became engaged. His squire 
and dearest friend, ironically named Philemon, Greek for “affectionate,” defamed Claribell 
shortly before their wedding day, claiming that she “Had both distaind her honorable blood, / 
And eke the faith, which she to me did bynd” (iv.22.7-8). Phedon hypothesizes that Philemon 
betrayed their friendship due to envy (iv.22.2). Philemon’s aspersion eventually destroys the 
couple’s bond and the long treasured friendship, the “sacred band,” between knight and squire 
(iv.23.6). 
The anguish into which Phedon is plunged following the maligning of Claribell exhibits 
the common early modern conception of slander as poisonous and infectious, like the plague. 
Nicolas Breton, to whom A Murmurer is attributed, argued that murmuring (synonymous with 
slander) leads to dis-temperature, later adding that murmuring is poisonous and murmurers have 
poisoned tongues. The unknown author of A Plaine Description of the Ancient Pedigree of Dame 
Slander argues that those who listen to slander spread infection.347 Richard Brathwaite affixed a 
supplement on detraction to his popular work, The Five Senses. In this addition, he compared 
detraction to poison, calling it “this poison of the world.” And in The Dumb Divine, Affinati d’ 
Acuto contended that the tongue of the slanderer or depraver is the most insupportable of all, that 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Limitations of Temperance,” 13. Exceptions to this critical oversight are Bull, “Calumny in The Faerie Queene, 
II.iv,” and Gohlke,“Embattled Allegory,” 127, 134. 
347 Nicolas Breton, A Murmurer, 22-33. Description of the Ancient Pedigree of Dame Slander, F.i. The author also 
states that slander is akin to the plague and murder by poison in that they both work in secret (F.ii). He or she 
repeatedly returns to the notions that slander, backbiting, and flattery are poisonous and like the plague throughout 
the text.  
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murmurers and detractors are an infectious disease given to the world as a plague, and that only 
God could heal this plague.348 Phedon’s response to the allegation additionally depicts calumny’s 
ability to incite numerous negative emotional responses, including anger, envy, and jealousy.349 
His reaction is immediate, as he describes “The gnawing anguish and sharp gelosy, / Which his 
sad speech infixed in my breast, / Ranckled so sore, and festered inwardly, / That my engreeved 
mind could find no rest, / Till that truth thereof I did out wrest” (iv.23.1-5). Phedon interprets the 
aspersion as having an infectious effect. The agony and jealousy that result from the charge are 
depicted as if they were foreign objects that had pierced his heart, remaining affixed in this 
organ. Festering, Phedon’s jealousy takes hold of his mind, torturing him. Moreover, in the early 
modern period, the ears were thought to provide a direct path to the imagination. Brathwaite 
specifically links the ears with the imagination when he states that the ears are “one of the 
activest and laborioust faculties of the soul” and that they convey “the fruit of either moral or 
divine discourse to the imagination.” 350 Helkiah Crooke believed that “those things which be 
																																																								
348 Richard Brathwaite, Essaies upon the Five Senses, 159, 161. Affinati d’ Acuto, The Dumb Divine Speaker, 147-
60. Brathwaite and Affinati d’Acuto are far from the only individuals to figuratively link forms of ill speech, 
especially slander, to poison or infection. Jean de Marconville argues that poisonous and wicked tongues are more 
deadly than weapons for they destroy both bone and reputations; A Treatise of the Good and Evell Tongue (1592), 
17. Referencing Psalm 140, William Perkins states that “the man of an evil tongue, is a beast in the form of a man; 
for his tongue is the tongue of a serpent, under which lyeth nothing but venime and poison: nay, he is worse than a 
serpent” because a snake can only strike one who is near, unlike a slanderer who can strike from afar. Moreover, the 
slanderer’s “throate is like a grave that hath a vent in some part and therefore sendeth foorth nothing but stinke and 
corruption.” A Direction for the Government of the Tongue according to Gods worde (1595), 67. George Webbe, in 
turn, drew upon St. James and the Psalms, to argue that the evil tongue is poisonous (90, 101, 102), that the evil 
tongue is a sword, razor, bow and arrow, and a box of poison (95), before offering a series of remedies and antidotes 
to the poison of a slanderous tongue, which included: patience, experience, meditation, and providence (118-22). 
The Araignement of an Unruly Tongue (1619). Marconville, Perkins, and Webbe’s texts are each reproduced in The 
Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England, ed. Vienne-Guerrin. 1-134. Vaughan explains that if the spirit of 
detraction enters a household and is “by negligence permitted to infect some of the household, [it] will at length not 
onely envenome the head of the Family himselfe, but also empoison the whole neighbourhood, except at the first his 
fiery force be extinguished with the milke of Taciturnity and Patience.” The Spirit of Detraction, 306. Vaughan 
returns to the notion of detraction as poison several times throughout his work.  
349 The anonymous author of A Plaine Description argues that slander induces anger, thus honest men put anger 
away and listen with open minds. However, individuals with bad dispositions in turn hide anger their hearts (Ciii). 
Affinati d’ Acuto likewise views anger as a cause of hypocrites’ double tongue, tongues that speak both good and ill, 
or that speak ill making seem good; The Dumb Divine Speaker, 168. 
350 Brathwaite, Essaies upon the Five Senses, 8, 14. 
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heard, take a deeper impression in our minds” than by things that are seen.351 Having entered his 
ears, the slander “festered inwardly” leading Phedon’s “engreeved mind” to “find no rest” 
(iv.23.3-4). 
In The Poetry of the Faerie Queene, Paul J. Alpers argues that “Spenser, throughout, the 
episode, has turned the external events that victimize Phedon into active projections of his own 
mind.”352 From the moment Philemon defames Claribell, Phedon takes a potential external threat 
and filters everything through his imagination—that is, what he thinks he hears and sees are not 
what he actually hears and sees. He explains that Philemon “wisht me stay, till I more truth 
should fynd” (iv.22.9). Though he takes no action, Phedon begins to unconsciously reinterpret all 
the information that he obtains. Phedon’s pronoun use in this description of Philemon’s advice is 
telling. This line should read as Philemon asking Phedon to wait until “he,” Philemon, could 
secure evidence of Claribell’s trespass. Yet this is not what Phedon hears, nor what he relates to 
Guyon. Until “I” the truth find signals that Phedon has already internalized Philemon’s words, 
determining the accusation as worthy of further investigation. George Webbe, a Wiltshire 
preacher, argued that the ears could act as accomplices to slanderous tongues, in that they 
eagerly accept slander’s poison, a notion brought to life by Phedon’s doubt.353 Rather than 
trusting his betrothed, he gives in to doubt, thereby becoming an active agent in his own demise 
and complicit in Philemon’s lie. 
																																																								
351 Helkiah Crooke, Microsmographia qtd. in Bruce Smith, Acoustic World of Early Modern England: Attending to 
the O-Factor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 283. Wright discusses the connection between the 
imagination and the written and spoken word extensively in The Passions of the Mind in General, Newbold. 
352 The Poetry of The Faerie Queene, 63, 62-69. Examining stanza 27, Alpers goes on to say “Especially after the 
inwardness of ‘in a secret corner layd,’ we see the ‘tragedy’ as part of a complex psychological phenomenon—the 
mind feeling that it is about to do something dreadful and being helpless to stop itself. But Phedon himself—if 
indeed we feel his presence as the dramatized narrator—is not aware of the meanings that make this so resonant a 
line. To him ‘my Tragedie’ refers to an external event, and can only mean ‘the (staged) actions that was catastrophic 
to me” (63-64). 
353 The Araignement of an Unruly Tongue in The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England, Vienne-Guerrin, 115. 
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The ease with which Phedon falls prey to Philemon’s falsehood illustrates that slander 
thrives on a willing audience, gullible listeners who interpret calumnious statements as truth, 
reframing future data to support this premise. Slander is a stealthy form of ill speech in that it is 
always presented as truth. It relies upon its audience’s belief and cannot spread without 
implicating those listeners who deem such allegations truthful and choose to share the 
accusations with others. The spread of slander is a perversion of the modern idea of paying it 
forward. Drawing on the work of both Aristotle and Frederich Nietzsche, Faley shows how 
metaphors are also stealthy forms of speech. She explicates that for Aristotle, metaphors are most 
successful when they appear natural, when individuals do not notice the effort behind their 
crafting. Similarly, Nietzsche explains in “On Truth and Falsehood in the Extramoral Sense” that 
metaphors can be forgotten as metaphors and instead be understood as truths.354 Faley goes on to 
demonstrate how an auditor can be complicit in metaphor, complicating the notion of agency.355 
Analogously, the connection between slander and agency is not a simple matter. Once an 
individual hears incriminating words, whether he or she shares the information, or keeps it 
hidden, he or she too becomes implicated in the verbal crime.356 This notion is borne out by the 
sedition statutes of the 16th century, which punished those who merely repeated slanders against 
the monarch, peer, or government official. Phedon is thus implicated by Philemon’s slander the 
moment he hears it and gives in to doubt, rather than reputing the allegation, or at the very least 
questioning Claribell herself.357 
																																																								
354 Fahey, Metaphor and Shakespearean Drama, 1-21.  
355 Fahey, Metaphor and Shakespearean Drama, 15-16. 
356 For example, see Phillip and Mary’s 1554 sedition statute, or Elizabeth’s 1581 statute in Statutes of the Realm.  
357 Silberman finds Phedon culpable for a different reason, for his inability to accept responsibility for his actions 
and his use of “language both to justify and to sustain his furor”; “‘The Faerie Queene,’ Book II and the Limitations 
of Temperance,” 13, 13-14.  
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Phedon is further incriminated by Philemon’s slander when he is confronted with 
deceptive ocular proof of Claribell’s supposed infidelity, an incident that demonstrates the 
body’s vulnerability to outside influence. Although Phedon is beset by doubt, he does not act on 
his fears until Philemon “proves” them true. To substantiate his accusation against Claribell, 
Philemon has Claribell’s handmaiden, Pryene, dress as her mistress while a hidden Phedon 
watches them. Philemon’s ruse and Phedon’s misinterpretation of what he sees demonstrates 
Brathwaite’s claim that “there is no passage more easie for the entry of vice than by the cranie of 
the eye.”358 This misinterpretation additionally illustrates the epic’s distrust of visuals, seen 
through the constant use of the word “seems.” Phedon admits “her proper face / I not descerned 
in that darksome shade, / But weend it was my love, with whom he playd” (iv.28.3-5). Darkness 
forbids him from clearly observing Philemon’s interaction with “Claribell,” yet he never 
considers the possibility that what he thinks he witnessed might not be what actually occurred. 
The fact that Phedon immediately acts upon his admittedly incomplete knowledge suggests that 
he consciously chooses to believe Claribell is guilty. The forces that assault Phedon’s sight and 
hearing are spurious, yet they overcome his defenses. The sight of his now “loathed love” leads 
Phedon to kill the innocent Claribell “with wrathfull hand” and without warning (iv.29.3-4). 
Having learnt the truth too late, Phedon “with horrible affright / And hellish fury all enraged” 
contemplates suicide, before deciding “To wreake my wrath on him, that first it wrought” 
(iv.30.1-2, 5). He poisons his treacherous friend, and attempts to murder Pryene, who escapes his 
wrath by fleeing. As he chases her, Phedon find himself chased by Furor, the embodiment of the 
anger that consumes him, and Occasion, an allegorical figure who continually employs the very 
weapon that undoes Phedon, slander (iv.32). By allowing himself to be overcome by his anger, 
Phedon unintentionally summons the allegorical figures that represent his undoing.   																																																								
358 Essaies upon the Five Senses, 3. 
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The language of disease returns with the conclusion of Phedon’s tale. He explains to 
Guyon that though the latter has freed him from Furor and Occasion’s grasp, “yet stickes the 
morall sting, / That during life will never be appeasd” (iv.33.5-6). Phedon does not offer further 
comment on the precise nature of this sting, yet Guyon and the Palmer’s counsel implies that the 
sting refers to the lasting ill effects of Philemon’s slander. Guyon counsels “sore have ye beene 
diseasd; / But all your hurts may soone through temperance be easd” (iv.33.8-9). According to 
Guyon, ungoverned emotions are akin to illness in that both threaten bodily integrity. The Palmer 
adds that Phedon, rather than give the “bridle” “to affections” that “cruell battry bend / Gainst 
fort of Reason” and have “this Squyre...laide thus low” (iv.34.2, 7-9), must achieve temperance, 
which will allow him to conquer the emotions “Wrath, gelosy, griefe, love” that have proven so 
troublesome (iv.34.9).359 Though Guyon and the Palmer mean well, their advice is laughable. A 
man who has murdered his wife and best friend in cold blood and has been denied a third murder 
merely by the virtue of another’s superior speed is not capable of such self control—the disease 
has taken too strong a hold. Moreover, the Palmer’s suggestion that Phedon eradicate the 
passions within him is simply not possible, for such emotions are part of the human experience. 
Thomas Wright wrote “Passions are not only not wholly to be extinguished (as the Stoics seemed 
to affirm), but sometimes to be moved and stirred up for the service of virtue.”360 Guyon himself 
relies upon righteous anger to destroy the Bower of Bliss.  
Moreover, immediately following this exchange, Guyon’s self-control is put to the test by 
the appearance of Atin and Pyrochles, revealing that the passions cannot be exterminated; they 
																																																								
359 Stambler describers the Palmer’s counsel as “quintessentially practical” and sees in Guyon’s differing response 
an allusion to Scripture, which he interprets as evidence of Guyon’s unconscious inculcation into Christianity; “The 
Development of Guyon’s Christian Temperance,” 62. Madelon S. Gohlke notes that the Palmer’s suggestion is 
“extreme,” essentially telling Phedon to avoid all human emotion; “Embattled Allegory,” 135. 
360 Passions of the Minde in General, 101. Chapter 4 of Wright’s work is entitled “How the Passions may be well 
directed and made profitable,” 100-02. 
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instead must be continually wrestled into submission. The bellicose knight, Pyrochles, and his 
ill-mannered squire, Atin, mirror the allegorical figures of Furor and Occasion. Though further 
developed and individualized, Pyrochles and Atin are each symbolized by a particular emotion. 
Like Furor, Pyrochles is symbolized by fire, his shield bearing the motto “Burnt I doe burne,” an 
axiom demonstrating the disturbing effect of Pyrochles’s unappeasable anger (iv.38.5). 
Moreover, Pyrochles who “breathes out wrath and hainous crueltee” sends Atin to seek 
Occasion, for Pyrochles “is all disposed to bloody fight” (iv.43.8, 7). As implied by his motto, 
name, and lineage (iv.41), Pyrochles hardly needs the added motivation to fight, yet he proves 
true to his choleric nature by seeking that which will only further aggravate him. Atin’s name, in 
turn, is derived from Ate, the Greek goddess of strife or discord. Like Occasion, Atin’s defining 
characteristics are linked to slander. His name implies the effects that his mischief has upon 
others, as he incites discord wherever he goes. He achieves this end through his ungracious 
attitude and the poisoned arrows he carries with him. Approaching Guyon for the first time, Atin 
addresses the knight of temperance as “Sir knight, if knight thou bee,” using the imperative voice 
to command Guyon to “Abandon this forestalled place at erst, / For feare of further harme, I 
counsel thee” (iv.39.3-4). Claiming the middle space for Pyrochles, Atin ignores the rules of 
chivalry by first doubting Guyon’s knighthood and then denying Guyon’s right to the middle 
space, the ground that he had won by besting Furor in combat. Learning that Guyon has already 
conquered Occasion, Atin claims that Guyon “knights and knighthood doest with shame upbray” 
for using his “childishe might” against a “silly weake old woman” (iv.45.3, 4, 5). Atin attempts 
to wound Guyon first through his words, which fail to bite due to Guyon’s temperance, and then 
through a physical attack. 
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Atin is armed with two poisoned arrows, which were a popular metaphor for slander, 
appearing frequently in period treatises on slander and ills of the tongue. Drawing on biblical 
precedence,361 this verbal ill was often portrayed as an arrow because it has the ability to wound 
an individual from a distance.362 Atin carries with him “two dartes exceeding flit, /…whose heads 
were dight / In poison and in blood, of malice and despight” (iv.38.7-9). Not only are his arrows 
dipped in poison and blood, two infectious fluids, but they are also laced with malice and spite, 
two harmful emotions possibly meant to magnify each arrow’s deadly effectiveness. Period 
treatises often emphasized that slander was motivated by malice and that a statement was 
slanderous even if it was truthful but uttered out of malice.363 The belief that slander and sedition 
are inspired by malice can also be glimpsed in Phillip and Mary’s 1554 sedition statute, which 
law first defined sedition as a criminal act. This act assumed that sedition stemmed from “sundry 
malicious and evil disposed persons.”364 The effects of Atin’s arrows are displayed in the 
following canto when he pricks the lascivious knight, Cymochles, brother of Pyrochles, who 
instantly becomes “inflamd with fell despight” and springs into action (v.37.8). The depiction of 
becoming inflamed with spite stresses the onset of Cymochles’s anger, yet it also causally links 
																																																								
361 For example, see Proverbs 25. 
362 William Averell depicts words as piercing worse than arrows in A Mervailous Combat of Contrarieties (London: 
Printed by I. Charlewood for Thomas Hacket, and are to be solde at hys shop in Lomberd streete, vnder the signe of 
the Popes heade, 1588), C2. Gibbon contends that slander is like an arrow because of its speed with which ill words 
travel in The Praise of a Good Name, 30. Marconville, states that slanderous words are “swift and sharpe arrows, 
which are sent from a strong and poysant bowe” (17) in A Treatise of the Good and Evell Tongue, and Webbe uses 
the metaphor repeatedly throughout his work, The Araignement of an Unruly Tongue; both Marconville and 
Webbe’s texts are reproduced in The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England, Vienne-Guerrin. 1-38 and 83-134, 
respectively. Affinati d’ Acuto describes ill words as both arrows and poisoned arrows in The Dumb Divine Speaker, 
163, 164.  
363 In the dedication to his work on the ills of slander, Gibbon links malice and poison arguing that malice is 
poisonous and likely to kill the malicious. He also contends that the malice of women is worse than that of men, “for 
what will not a wicked woman in her malice imagine”; The Praise of a Good Name, 27. According to the printer’s 
epistle to the reader preceding the anonymous A Plaine Description, the goal of the text is to demonstrate to all 
readers “the malice of a wicked and slanderous tongue.” The author additionally claims that even if an individual 
reports the truth, if he or she acts out of malice, then he/she is a slanderer (Di). Breton likewise agrees that if a 
speech is true but is uttered out of malice, then the speaker is guilty of murmuring; A Murmurer. 
364 Statutes of the Realm, Vol. 4, part 1, 240. The statute is numbered 1 & 2 Phillip and Mary, c. 3. 
		 163	
the metaphors of slander as an arrow and as a plague by bringing to mind the painful swelling 
that can accompany infection. Although Cymochles later gives into temptation, setting aside his 
quest for revenge for the time being, Atin’s arrows nonetheless cause the naturally self-indulgent 
and lazy Cymochles to be overtaken by anger. 
The final stanza of canto iv provides another significant detail concerning Atin’s arrows, 
that they are double-pronged. Growing angry with Guyon, Atin brings an abrupt end to the canto 
when “one of his thrillant darts he threw, / Headed with yre and vengeable despight,” having 
taken aim at Guyon’s “brest” (iv.46.1-2, 4). Quickly perceiving Atin’s intent, Guyon “was wary” 
and “advaunst his shield atweene” the arrow and himself (iv.46.5, 6), which results in the arrow 
“backe rebownding” and leaving “the forckhead keene” stuck in the shield (iv.46.8). The arrows’ 
forked head may be another instance of Atin’s dissentious nature, yet it once again recalls period 
discussions on the tongue. This organ was thought to have a double nature because of its ability 
to both praise and curse. Slanderers, in particular, were often depicted as having double-
tongues.365 The Longman edition’s footnote references George Whitney’s emblem for calumny, 
which “shows that slander’s arrows cannot hurt virtue.” Michael Bull likewise mentions 
Whitney’s emblem and additionally links Atin’s use of arrows to Lucian’s depiction of slander.366 
Atin’s allegations against Guyon’s honor are only the first of many slanders that are 
continually spoken against the knight throughout Book II. Upon his first encounter with 																																																								
365 The notion of the double nature of the tongue consistently appears in various period treatises on this organ. These 
treatises often reference biblical images of the tongue and Erasmus’s Lingua (1525). For period discussion of the 
tongue’s double nature, see: the anonymous A Plaine Description, Affinati d’ Acuto, The Dumb Divine Speaker, a 
work specifically written to elucidate this notion, Thomas Adams’s The Taming of the Tongue, and Marconville’s A 
Treatise of the Good and Evell Tongue, the last of which is reproduced in The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern 
England, Vienne-Guerrin, 17. For more on the early modern period’s interest in the ambivalence of the tongue, see 
Carla Mazzio, “Sins of the Tongue,” in The Body in Parts, ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 53-79, and The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England, Vienne-Guerrin, xvii-l. Vienne-Guerrin 
notes that Erasmus’s Lingua was itself “much indebted to Plutarch’s “De Garrulitate”’ (xxiv). See also Ina 
Haberman, Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 
2003). See note 5 above. 
366 Edmund Spenser, Hamilton, 195. Bull, “Calumny in The Faerie Queene, II.iv,” 475-76. 
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Pyrochles, Guyon accidentally kills the latter’s horse, causing Pyrochles to label him a “Disleall 
knight, whose coward corage chose / To wreake it selfe on beast all innocent” and to claim that 
Guyon “oft with guile thine honor blent” (v.5.3-4, 7). Pyrochles’s complaint is the height of 
hypocrisy given his unprovoked attack of an on foot Guyon. Though he fails to honor the code of 
chivalry, Pyrochles’s charge still sticks, for the headless horse “did him fowly dight” (v.4.9). It is 
unclear whether the pronoun “him” refers to Pyrochles or Guyon, intimating that Guyon may 
feel some sense of shame at his accidental horse slaughter, a feeling exacerbated by Pyrochles’s 
critique. Guyon eventually defeats Pyrochles because “Tempring the passion with advisement 
slow,” he fights wisely, parrying his opponent’s attacks (v.13.1). Exercising temperance and 
patience, he waits for Pyrochles to spend himself and wins the day.367  
Guyon’s newfound strength, his patience, is immediately tested by an old foe, an episode 
underscoring that Guyon has learned his lesson. Having bested Pyrochles, Guyon grants him 
mercy and even allows him to free Occasion. True to form, no sooner has she been freed, than 
she begins to slander them both. Unlike their previous encounter where her “reproch and odious 
menace” “emboyling in his haughtie hart” nearly led Guyon to spill blood (iv.9.5, 6), Guyon is 
now “wise, / Ne would with vanie occasions be inflam’d” (v.21.6-7). He exercises patience, a 
virtue that the preachers Webbe and Vaughan each proffer as a remedy to slander, and does not 
allow her aspersions to upset him.368 His display of temperance illustrates that this virtue is not 
the same as inaction. Guyon chooses not to get upset; he controls the natural reaction to being the 
victim of calumny. He does, however, feel pity for Pyrochles who is viciously attacked by a 																																																								
367 In canto viii, Arthur defends Guyon after the latter faints as a result of his three days’ journey into hell in canto 
vii. Arthur employs a similar tactic when battling Pyrochles, “with pacience and sufferaunce sly” he lets Pyrochles 
tire himself out before going on the offensive (viii.47.7).  
368 Webbe’s remedies for slander also include experience, meditation and providence (118-22); The Araignement of 
an Unruly Tongue in The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England, Vienne-Guerrin. 83-134. Vaughan explains that 
if the spirit of detraction can only be defeated if “...at the first his fiery force be extinguished with the milke of 
Taciturnity and Patience” in The Spirit of Detraction, Conjured and Convicted in Seven Circles, 306. 
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reenergized Furor. Moving to intervene, Guyon is stopped by the Palmer. Advising him against 
“causeless ruth” and “pitty vayne” (v.24.5, 6), the Palmer rightly notes that Pyrochles “his 
sorrow sought through wilfulnesse, / And his foe fettred would release agayne, / Deserves to 
taste his follies fruit, repented payne” (v.24.7-9). The Palmer’s counsel teaches Guyon an 
important lesson concerning pity, that one must distinguish between earned pity, such as that due 
to virtuous victims like Amavia, and causeless or wasted pity, as in this situation. Throughout 
Book II, Guyon is prone to pitying others. This encounter demonstrates that compassion, like any 
other emotion, must also be held in check. This advice similarly applies to the virtue of patience. 
Though patience generally refers to the ability to accept suffering without resorting to anger, the 
Palmer suggests that one must also accept another’s suffering when that person has brought such 
suffering on him or herself. Having stubbornly pursued his own injury, even after Guyon warns 
him against freeing Occasion (v.18.1-4), Guyon now recognizes that Pyrochles must reap what 
he sowed and leaves the latter to his fate. Guyon will display the same judgment at the end of 
Book II when faced with Gryll, one of Acrasia’s victims who was turned into a boar and restored 
to his original shape by Guyon, but who complains of this second transformation (xii.86-87). In 
that encounter, as with Pyrochles, Guyon “let[s] Gryll be Gryll” (xii.87.8). 
Guyon’s later encounter with Cymochles, however, portrays that temperance is a 
continual struggle, a commitment that must be renewed time and again. Like his brother, 
Pyrochles, Cymochles slanders and attacks Guyon upon their first encounter. Guyon “grudging 
not so much his might, / As those unknightly raylinges, which he spoke, / With wrathfull fire his 
corage kindled bright” (vi.30.5-7). Guyon’s ability to master his emotions is again tested. 
Without his trusty guide, the Palmer, Guyon cannot help but feel angry at Cymochles’s 
allegations. He wins the battle and spares his antagonist’s life, but it is only because Phaedria 
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intervenes, rather than through self-control (vi.32-35). Guyon is the only of The Faerie Queene’s 
knights who never kills an opponent, yet one is left to wonder if he could still claim this 
distinction had it not been for Phaedria’s plea for mercy. Despite the victory, Guyon’s troubles 
are not yet over. Ten stanzas later, in what feels like a short, follow-up quiz, Guyon again 
encounters Atin. This time, a “sober Guyon, hearing him so rayle, / Though somewhat moved in 
his mightie hart, / Yet with strong reason maistred passion friale” (vi.40.2-4). The slandering of 
Guyon by a variety of opponents is a running theme of Book II.369 This repetition, however, is 
necessary. Each of these episodes allows Guyon the opportunity to use restraint and demonstrate 
self-control. These encounters show that temperance is not the same as doing nothing, for Guyon 
feels each of the allegations against him. He gets angry, but ultimately masters his emotions. He 
learns when to pity others and when to withhold mercy. Collectively, these episodes teach Guyon 
the value of patience and self-control. Temperance may not be glamorous, but it is needed. As 
the Palmer later advises Pyrochles and Cymochles, “May bee, that better reason will aswage, / 
The rash revengers heat. Words well dispost / Have secrete power, t’appease inflamed rage” 
(viii.26.6-8). While ill disposed words can cause a host of negative emotions, as demonstrated 
above, reasonable words can ease anger and potentially restore temperance.  
 
The Battle for Control of the House: Besieging the House of Alma  
Canto ix begins with the claim that “Of all Gods works, which doe this world adorne, / There is 
no one more faire and excellent, / Then is mans body both for power and forme,” a claim that is 
subject to the caveat “Whiles it is kept in sober government” (ix.1.1-4). Failure to maintain self-
control leads to the opposite effect, “But none then it, more fowle and indecent, / Distempred 																																																								
369 The brothers Pyrochles and Cymochles continue to slander Guyon in canto viii when they believe the fairy knight 
to be dead.  
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through misrule and passions bace: / It grows a Monster, and incontinent / Doth loose his dignity 
and native grace” (ix.1.5-8). To lose control is to become worse than a beast, a fear that is 
brought to life in Acrasia’s Bower of Bliss at the end of Book II. Before he meets Gryll and the 
other inhabitants of the Bower, though, Guyon first encounters a symbolic representation of 
God’s “faire and excellent” work.  
The House of Alma represents a well-ordered body, one in control of its passions in 
which each member contributes to the organism’s overall health, yet one whose inner workings 
appear oblivious to the siege occurring outside its parameters.370 Shortly after their arrival, Guyon 
and Arthur are given a tour of the anthropomorphized castle by its ruler, Alma, who represents 
the rational soul. One of the locations they visit is the mouth. Stanza 25 is dedicated to 
describing the tongue, emphasizing the need for the proper control of this slippery organ. An 
unnamed “Porter,” who represents the tongue, sits “Day and night duely keeping watch and 
ward, / Nor wight, nor word mote passe out of the gate, / But in good order, and with dew 
regard” (ix.25.1, 2-4). This is a fulltime job, requiring the porter to weigh the value of every 
single word so as to ensure that no idle or potentially harmful speech is allowed exit. To maintain 																																																								
370 For more on the House of Alma see James W. Broaddus, “Renaissance Psychology and the Defense of Alma’s 
Castle.” Spenser Studies 21 (2004): 135-57. Broadus investigates why Guyon (and the Palmer) do not partake in the 
defense of Alma’s castle, contending that their emotional vulnerability makes them ill equipped for the task. In The 
Poem’s Two Bodies: The Poetics of the 1590 Faerie Queene, David Miller focuses on the Castle’s missing genitals, 
seeing this lacuna as evidence of Spenser’s discomfort with sexuality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
Jerry Leath Mills focuses on the infamous stanza 22 in “Spenser’s Castle of Alma and the Number 22: A Note on 
Symbolic Stanza Placement.” Notes and Queries 212 (Dec. 1967): 456-57. Robert L. Reid claims that literary 
scholars have overemphasized the importance of Aristotelian psychology in the description of Alma’s castle, to the 
neglect of Platonic psychology. He argues that the dwelling “is a remarkable synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian 
systems” in “Alma’s Castle and the Symbolization of Reason in The Faerie Queene.” The Journal of English and 
Germanic Philology 80.4 (Oct. 1981): 512-27, 512. Michael Schoenfeldt argues the importance of Spenser’s 
attentiveness to the stomach and digestive system in the Castle of Alma in “The Construction of Inwardness in The 
Faerie Queene, Book 2” in Worldmaking Spenser: Explorations in the Early Modern Age, ed. Patrick Cheney and 
Lauren Silberman (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 234-43; expanded in Bodies and Selves in 
Early Modern England, 40-73. For more on the metaphorical depiction of the body as a house see, Leonard Barkan, 
Nature’s Work of Art: The Human Body as Image of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 116-74, 
and 201-76. Louise Vinge examines medieval and early modern representations of the senses, including the allegory 
of the senses as a besieged city; she also briefly examines the siege on the House of Alma in The Five Senses: 
Studies in a Literary Tradition (Lund, Sweden: Liber Läromedal, 1975), 47-103, especially 91-93. 
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this control, “Utterers of secrets he from thence debard, / Bablers of folly, and blazers of cryme” 
(ix.25.5-6).371 He completely denies entry to ill speech by barring all those with loose lips, 
individuals who take pleasure is engaging in foolish talk, or in revealing secrets and crimes. His 
mastery over those with loose tongues is further underscored by the fact that he only uses his 
“larumbell…/ When cause requryd, but never out of time” (ix.25.7-8). The stanza concludes by 
noting that the careful porter speaks, through the use of his alarm bell, only when needed. The 
specific causes that require speech remain unnamed. As a whole, the stanza appears dedicated to 
delineating the forms of speech that should be suppressed, rather than emphasizing fit subjects 
for discussion, subtly intimating the value of silence.  
In the following stanza, Guyon and Arthur walk past the anthropomorphized teeth, who 
no longer guard the mouth but instead protect one of the castle’s entryways. They are depicted as 
“rownd about the porch on every side / Twise sixteen warders satt, all armed bright, / In 
glistering steele, and strongly fortifyde” (ix.26.1-3). These “yeomen” “of great might” are said to 
be “enranged ready, still for fight” (ix.26.4, 5). Focusing on the castle’s entryways, Michael 
Schoenfeldt states, “Spenser here emphasizes the tense blend of porousness and fortification that 
marks the physiological self the castle represents.”372 Drawing on biblical precedent, particularly 
Pslam 141 when David asked God to set a watch upon his mouth, period treatises on the tongue 
often described the teeth as the guardians of the mouth.373 Spenser tweaks the allegorical 
depiction of the teeth, presenting them not as sentries against ill speech, but as thirty-two men 																																																								
371 The Longman edition glosses these lines as “a witty personal reference to [Spenser’s] career as a keeper of state 
secrets; Edmund Spenser, Hamilton, 239. 
372 “The Construction of Inwardness in The Faerie Queene, Book 2.” Cheney and Silberman. 235. 
373 Affinati d’ Acuto repeatedly reiterates David’s depiction of the lips as the door of the mouth in The Dumb Divine 
Speaker. Additional works of the era that describe the teeth as the mouth’s watchers include Gibbon, The Praise of a 
Good Name, Marconville, A Treatise of the Good and Evell Tongue, and Perkins, A Direction for the Government of 
the Tongue. Both Maconville and Perkins’s texts are reproduced in The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England, 
Vienne-Guerrin, 1-80. See also Thomas Tomkis’s Lingua: or The combat of the tongue, and the five senses for 
superiority: A pleasant comœdie (London: Printed by G. Eld, for Simon Waterson, 1607) and Thomas Adams’s The 
Taming of the Tongue. 
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guarding against physical threats. Presumably this is due to the House of Alma’s perfect 
temperance. Alma’s tour of her castle has already portrayed the tongue’s mastery over itself, a 
feat often depicted as impossible for man.374 The tongue’s self control thereby relieves the teeth 
of their traditional duty, allowing them to instead patrol the entryway to the castle.  
Although Guyon and Arthur’s tour of the anthropomorphized castle does not include a 
discussion of the ears, the sense of hearing does play a role in the castle’s workings. As they 
make their way to the brain, they walk up a strong turret that includes references to the eyes, 
eyelids, and hair, but no ears. Within the brain reside three wise sages whose duty it is to counsel 
Alma. These sages represent two of the inner senses and are linked to different time periods. 
Phantastes, the imagination, looks to the future; the unnamed second sage watches over the 
present; and Eumnestes, memory, studies the past. Each of the sages has his own room, which 
reflects his respective interests. My interest lies with Phantastes, whose room is “filled…with 
flyes, / Which buzzed all about, and made such sound, / That they encombred all mens eares and 
eyes” (ix.51.1-3). The sounds these flies make are revealed to be “idle thoughtes and fantasies, / 
Devices, dreames, opinions unsound, / Shewes, visions, sooth-sayes, and prophesies; / And all 
that fained is, as leasings, tales, and lies” (ix.51.6-9). From his room in the brain tower, 
Phantastes engages with all forms of speech from a remove. The speech acts to which he lends 
an ear focus on any number of potential subjects and are presumably not about himself.  
Robert L. Reid argues that Phantastes “…expends himself so dynamically and wastefully 
in the first chamber of the brain, as he looks downward to the sense impressions of the natural 
order.” He adds that “Such a downward perspective makes him, in Spenser’s view, the most 
uncontrolled and unreliable of the three powers, a mere initiator of ratio, who indeed misuses his 																																																								
374 For example, in The Araignement of an Unruly Tongue, Webbe contends that man can only hope to master the 
tongue through God’s assistance. Drawing on Proverbs 16, Affinati d’ Acuto states that only God can control the 
tongue; The Dumb Divine Speaker (221). 
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considerable powers on ‘leasings, tales, and lies.’”375 I argue that there is value in such murmurs. 
Unlike Phedon and Guyon who have shown themselves susceptible to the emotions stirred by 
slander and other forms of illicit speech, Phantastes considers all speech from an intellectual 
perspective—that is—he views such speech acts as potential vehicles of information and 
knowledge. He proves himself a good counselor by presumably sifting for the truth within all 
speech acts, including lies and misinformation, because such words are not immediately 
recognized or labeled as lies. Moreover, he attends to the same forms of speech that the 
besieging rout uses to attack the sense of hearing. Given his interest in the future, his attention to 
ill speech underscores its ability to impact an audience and the body itself. Ill speech has to be 
attended to because words can, and often do, incite a reaction in listeners. He listens to these 
different speech acts without ever compromising his self control, providing a positive example of 
the patience needed when encountering slander and other forms of offensive speech.  
Emphasizing the body’s susceptibility to outside influence, the rout attacking the House 
of Alma directs its efforts against the five senses, a strategy that presents the senses as vulnerable 
openings into the body. The rabble rout is lead by Malegar, a figure whose name is a 
combination of evil and sickness, a combination that implies the future that awaits this 
anthropomorphized house should it be defeated.376 Like disease itself, Malegar and his gathered 
forces are oddly incorporeal. At first, they appear to be flesh and blood, but when challenged, 
their bodies seem to fade (ix.15, xi.20, 44.3). These forces are divided into twelve camps, 
representing the seven deadly sins and the five vices. The vices each attack one of the senses, 
which are listed in their traditional order, sight being the most important, followed by hearing, 
																																																								
375 Reid, “Alma’s Castle and the Symbolization of Reason in The Faerie Queene,” 519. 
376 Malegar has been the focus of much scholarly discussion. For instance, in “Nature and Grace in The Faerie 
Queene,” A.S.P. Woodhouse argued that Malegar represents original sin, an interpretation that continues to spark 
debate (Journal of English Literary History 16.3 [Sept. 1949]: 194-228). 
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smell, taste, and touch. Although this is the order in which the senses were most often presented, 
there was not complete agreement as to their ranking.377 Only one stanza is dedicated to the 
attack on each sense, with the exception of sight, which gets two. Against the sense of hearing 
are numerously arrayed “Deformed creatures, in straunge difference, / Some having heads like 
Harts, some like to Snakes, / Some like wilde Bores late rouzd out of the brakes” (xi.10.3-5). 
Spenser here draws upon traditional associations between the senses and animals.378 The boar 
was frequently aligned with hearing and, while the snake is not traditionally associated with this 
sense, it does recall Eve’s temptation by the serpent, a notion underscored in the connection 
between slander and snakes. Indeed, these creatures hurl “Slanderous reproches, and fowle 
infamies, / Leasinges, backbytinges, and vaineglorious crakes, / Bad counsels, prayses, and false 
flatteries” against the sense of hearing (xi.10.6-8). This choice of weapons recalls Phantastes in 
his tower, further demonstrating that the virtue of temperance does not demand that individuals 
ignore offensive speech, instead requiring individuals to learn how to confront such speech acts 
without giving in to anger, frustration, jealousy, etc. To maintain temperance, one must exercise 
patience.  
Malegar and the forces at his command bear certain similarities to Furor, Occasion, and 
Atin, echoing earlier encounters from Book II, collectively suggesting a heretofore-unnoticed 
connection between the besieging forces and slander in this episode. In the conclusion to his 
brief Notes and Queries piece, Bull states that 
																																																								
377 See Constance Classen, Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and Across Cultures (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 3-4; and Vinge The Five Senses: Studies in a Literary Tradition, 47-103, especially 91-93. Smith 
argues that the sense of hearing was more highly valued than the sense of sight in early modern England in The 
Acoustic World of Early Modern England. For a recent review of scholarship dedicated to the early modern 
literature and the senses, see Patricia A. Cahill, “Take Five: Renaissance Literature and the Study of the Senses.” 
Literature Compass 6.5 (2009): 1014-30.  
378 Carl Nordenfalk provides an overview of late medieval and early modern European pictorial representations of 
the senses in “The Five Senses in Late Medieval and Renaissance Art.” Journal of the Warbung and Courtauld 
Institutes 48 (1985): 1-22. 
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Identifying Spenser’s sources not only reveals the freedom with which he 
reworked both classical and contemporary texts, it also suggests that the idea of 
calumny is of rather more significance in this canto [iv] than is usually 
acknowledged. Indeed, it may be argued that Spenser’s general theme of 
temperance in the face of provocation is derived from Lucian’s narrower concern 
with the appropriate response to hearing slander.”379  
 
My goal is not to argue that the book of temperance revolves around slander; rather, I suggest 
that Book II repeatedly returns to the notion of slander and offensive speech to emphasize its 
quotidian nature, thereby arguing for the continual need to exercise patience. Even after the 
defeat of Occasion, Pyrochles, Cymochles, and Atin, all of whom malign their enemies, calumny 
continues to be wielded as a weapon against temperance. The heroes of Book II, Guyon and 
later, Arthur, continually encounter slanderous foes because slander is an everyday reality.  
In his choice of companions, Malegar resembles the allegorical figures Furor and 
Occasion. While Furor was accompanied by his mother, the hag Occasion, Malegar is 
accompanied by two hags, Impotence and Impatience. Like Occasion, Impotence is said to have 
a lame leg and to use a staff for support (xi.23.6-8) and Impatience carriers “burning fier brands” 
(xi.47.5). Occasion had previously provided Furor with a firebrand, an image associated with the 
harm caused by the tongue. Impatience is aligned with fire and anger, the emotion that Guyon 
continually had to master in order to express patience and maintain self-control. 
Malegar’s choice of weaponry additionally associates him with Atin. While each of the 
vices uses different immaterial weapons to attack the five senses, the forces sieging sight and 
touch use physical weapons, the former using bows and arrows (xi.8.7) and the latter using 
“dartes of sensuall delight” (xi.13.6). Malegar himself uses poisoned arrows, which he shoots 
after a pursuing Arthur. The Longman edition notes, “the arrow is a common emblem of sin 
																																																								
379 “Calumny in The Faerie Queene, II.iv,” 477. 
		 173	
which assaults the body,” referencing Psalms 11.2 and Ephesians 6.16.380 One of the types of sin 
that biblical images of arrows often illustrate is ill speech, verbal sin. Psalm 11, referenced above 
by the editors of the Longman edition, is a psalm petitioning God’s protection against false 
friends. The second verse reads “For, lo, the wicked bend their bow, they make ready their arrow 
upon the string, that they may privily shoot at the upright in heart.” The following psalm, Psalm 
12 is a prayer against verbal treachery, categorizing the wicked as having “flattering lips” and 
speaking “with a double heart.”381 Together, these psalms imply a fear of verbal deceit, of 
individuals who offer friendship, but secretly speak ill of others, trying to wound through speech. 
The group of psalms in which Psalm 11 appears are particularly interested in such lies, as Psalm 
5 asks for protection from slander, Psalm 15 specifically notes that those “that backbiteth…with 
his tongue” are not allowed entry into God’s tabernacle, and Psalm 17 protests false 
accusations.382 Arrows are more explicitly linked to verbal sin in Proverbs 25.18, which states 
that “a man who beareth false witness against his neighbor is like a maul, and a sword, and a 
sharp arrow.”383  
Malegar’s arrows, moreover, are said to produce incurable wounds: “Ne was their salve 
ne was their medicine, / That mote recure their wounds: so inly they did tine” (xi.21.8-9). Like 
the wounds Phedon received from Furor and Occasion, which “Ranckled so sore, and festered 
inwardly” (iv.23.3), these injuries cannot be cured by medicine. They seem to take root in a 
person’s very core, intimating that they require a different approach. Such wounds cannot be 
healed, they can only be guarded against. For instance, in a near-echo of one of Guyon’s 
																																																								
380 Edmund Spenser, Hamilton, 264. 
381 The English Bible: King James Version. Volume One: The Old Testament, ed. Herbert Marks (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 2012), 967, 968. 
382 Ibid., 962-71. 
383 Ibid., 1146. Additionally, several psalms, such as Psalms 7, 18 and 21, depict God as punishing the wicked by 
unleashing his own arrows, presumably paying sinners in kind.  
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interactions with Atin, Arthur protects himself against Malegar’s arrows by being “warie” 
(xi.24.6). The arrow “warded well / Upon his shield, that it no further went, / But to the ground 
the idle quarrel fell” (xi.24.6-8).384 Arthur, like Guyon, is temperate and wary, ready to defend 
himself against poisoned arrows that threaten his bodily control. According to The Oxford 
English Dictionary, a “quarrel” is “a short, heavy arrow or bolt with a four-sided (typically 
square) head for shooting from a crossbow or arbalest.”385 The name for this arrow also provides 
a semantic link to slander, hinting at the possible repercussions of calumny.  
When Malegar’s arrows fail to hit their mark, Impotence “gathered them againe, / And to 
him brought fresh batteill to renew,” a detail that depicts the impossibility of truly defeating 
slander (xi.28.2-3). Arthur can defeat these particular allegorical figures, but calumny itself does 
not die, it continues to regenerate itself. After various tries, Arthur ultimately kills Malegar by 
crushing him to death and throwing the latter’s body into “a standing lake” (xi.46.6). When the 
hags realize that their leader has been killed, Impatience “quencht her burning fier brands” and 
drowns herself in the same lake (xi.47.5-6). In her death, Impatience recalls Furor’s codependent 
relationship to Occasion. Just as Furor needs Occasion to fuel his might, Impatience needs 
Malegar to provide her with a reason for being. Without him, she quenches both her flame and 
her life. Her death reasserts the need for patience. Her defeat is a necessary component for the 
House of Alma’s safety, for the continued preservation of temperance. In turn, Impotence “one 
of Malegers cursed darts did take, / So ryv’d her trembling hart, and wicked end did make” 
(xi.47.8-9). Impotence’s death underscores defamation’s lethal potential, showing that no one is 
invulnerable to its effects, for its poison works even on allegorical figures. 
																																																								
384 When Atin attacks Guyon by shooting an arrow at him, Guyon “was wary, and ere it empight / In the meant 
marke, advaunst his shield atweene, / On which it seizing, no way enter might, / But backe rebownding, left the 
forckhead keene” (iv.46.5-8).  
385 The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press 2016; online edn., 2016. 
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Although Arthur bests Malegar and his rabble rout, this victory does not represent a total 
conquest over slander. Slander, simply put, refuses to remain silent. The body will always be 
threatened by outside influence, by the energies and emotions unleashed by defamation, anger, 
concupiscence, etc. Part II of The Faerie Queene features the entry of the Blatant Beast, who is 
accompanied by another two hags, including Slander. The Blatant Beast likewise will not be 
contained, breaking the chains that seek to hold it near the end of Book VI. Additionally, there is 
the infamous reference to Malfont in Book V with which we began. While individual slanderers 
like Malfont can be punished, the urge to slander is a constant.  
Focusing on The Winter’s Tale (1610-11), the final chapter develops the notion of slander 
as poison by investigating what happens when it is the monarch who has become possessed by 
slander and the resulting harm this causes to familial and social bonds and the nation itself. 
Reading this as a sort of analogue to Phedon’s tale of calumny and murder, I investigate what 
happens when the worst occurs and slander claims the lives of one’s beloveds. The Winter’s 
Tale, however, does not end in death, but goes on to illustrate how individuals and the larger 
community can move beyond slander and begin to heal—an internal and external mending that 
Guyon and the Palmer can only suggest to Phedon (iv.34), but which is never enacted within The 
Faerie Queene.   
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Chapter 4 “Is Whispering Nothing?”: Slander in The Winter’s Tale 
 
King Leontes’s jealousy of his wife, Hermione, in William Shakespeare’s The Winter’s 
Tale (1610-11) is infamous, not only for the suddenness with which this jealousy takes hold of 
the king, but also for the grip that it has held on scholarly attention within the past fifty years or 
so. Wilbur Sanders neatly summarizes the matter, declaring, “I would have thought there is 
rather a profusion of explanations, than a scarcity of them. And they could very easily be 
multiplied.”386 My interest is not why Leontes slanders Hermione but what happens after he has 
done so.387 To borrow Sanders’s phrasing, following his initial misinterpretation of Hermione’s 
gracious behavior, Leontes insists on multiplying his mistake, publicly and repeatedly defaming 
the Queen. He exclaims that “to have nor eyes, nor ears, nor thought” is the only possible reason 
to deny Hermione’s guilt (1.2.277).388 Despite the negation, Leontes’s hyperbolic claim neatly 
charts the progress of his suspicions. What begins in the eyes with a simple misreading quickly 																																																								
386 He suggests that Leontes might be tired of his hosting duties, but cannot admit it thereby leading him to overdo 
this duty; Sanders, The Winter’s Tale: Twayne’s Critical Introductions to Shakespeare (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1987), 21, 8-9. For psychoanalytic readings, see Janet Adelman, “Masculine Authority and the Maternal Body: The 
Return to Origins in the Romances,” in Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare’s Plays, 
Hamlet to The Tempest (New York: Routledge, 1992), 193-238; Peter Erickson, “Patriarchal Structures in The 
Winter’s Tale,” PMLA 97.5 (1982): 819-29; Murray M. Schwartz, “Leontes’ Jealousy in The Winter’s Tale,” 
American Imago 30.3 (1973): 250-73, expanded in “The Winter’s Tale: Loss and Transformation.” American Imago 
32.2 (1975): 145-99; and David Houston Wood, “‘He Something Seems Unsettled’: Melancholy, Jealousy, and 
Subjective Temporality in The Winter’s Tale.” Renaissance Drama ns 31 (2002): 185-213. Carol Thomas Neely and 
Charles Frey, among others, have argued that Leontes distrusts human sexuality. See Neely, “Women and Issue in 
The Winter’s Tale,” in The Winter’s Tale: Modern Critical Interpretations, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea 
House, 1987), 75-88, expanded in Broken Nuptials in Shakespeare’s Plays (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1993 (1985)); Frey, “Tragic Structure in The Winter’s Tale,” Bloom, 89-99. Stanley Cavell suggests Leontes’s 
jealousy is a manifestation of skepticism in “Recounting Gains, Showing Loses: Reading The Winter’s Tale” in 
Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 (1987)). For a 
wider range of interpretations for the king’s jealousy, see the varied essays in Bloom’s edited volume, The Winter’s 
Tale: Modern Critical Interpretations, as well as The Winter’s Tale: Critical Essays, ed. Maurice Hunt (New York: 
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1995). For an overview of the varying ways Leontes’s jealousy has been handled in 
performance, see Dennis Bartholemeusz The Winter’s Tale in performance in England and America, 1611-1976 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
387 In this decision, I take my cue from Leontes’s most trusted advisor, Camillo, who contends “‘tis safer to / Avoid 
what’s grown than question how ‘tis born” (1.2.432-33).  
388 All references to The Winter’s Tale are from The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen 
Greenblatt, et al. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997). Hereafter quotations are cited in the text by 
act, scene, and line numbers. 
		 177	
escalates as Leontes begins to hear words that are never spoken, socially coproducing events that 
never occur; these overheard whispers and invented encounters in turn provoke Leontes to voice 
additional, more grievous calumnies against Hermione. When the “evidence” of Leontes’s eyes 
moves to others’ ears and their imaginations, the effects prove fatal. Once voiced and made 
public, Leontes’s slanders take on a life of their own before actually claiming lives. 
By recognizing that in early modern thought, hearing is even more vulnerable than sight, 
I reframe The Winter’s Tale as a play preoccupied with slander’s social effects, which echo 
beyond the initial speech acts into the ears of many others. I add this analysis of hearing to 
previous critical work on vision in the play, for it is through hearing that calumny affects even 
those not physically present during the slanders’ initial voicing.389 My work on hearing is also 
indebted to fascinating and crucial work on women’s speech and silence in the play, but I 
contend that slander’s damages extend beyond sexual relationships to the entire social body. 
While I remain in debt to such scholars as Carol Neely and Lynn Enterline, I contend that slander 
extends beyond gender.390 Akin to an earworm, slander strikes anyone, anywhere, and the harm 
																																																								
389 For a sampling of criticism on the play’s attention to visuals, see James A. Knapp, “Visual and Ethical Truth in 
The Winter’s Tale.” Shakespeare Quarterly 55.3 (2004): 253-78. Howard Felprin notes that The Winter’s Tale 
presents readers and audience alike with the “problem of what to make of unrepresented” or partly represented 
“events.” He links this issue to language’s indeterminacy, the fact that language is always mediated and thus always 
interpretive. He contends “this is why it is impossible to ascertain just what basis there is for Leontes’ jealousy, the 
degree to which what he describes is a distortion of an enacted reality, or the relative proportions of perception and 
imagination in his account of what goes on. We see enough to know it has some basis, but not enough to say how 
much. We are from the outset in a world of interpretation…where nothing can be dismissed or wholly believed, and 
nothing can be known for certain.” Felprin, “‘Tongue-tied our queen?’: The deconstruction of presence in The 
Winter’s Tale,” in Shakespeare and the Question of Theory, ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York: 
Methuen, Inc., 1985), 3-18, 4, 8. A notable exception to scholarly interest in the play’s presentation of sight is 
Evelyn Tribble’s ““O, she’s warm”: Touch in The Winter’s Tale” in Knowing Shakespeare: Senses, Embodiment 
and Cognition, ed. Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 65-81. See also 
Patricia Parker’s “Sound Government, Polymorphic Bears: The Winter’s Tale and Other Metamorphoses of Eye and 
Ear” in The Wordsworthian Enlightenment: Romantic Poetry and the Ecology of Reading, ed. Helen Regueiro Elam 
and Frances Ferguson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 172-90.  
390 For examinations the play’s depiction of female speech, see: Lynn Enterline, “‘You Speak a Language that I 
Understand Not:’ The Rhetoric of Animation in The Winter’s Tale.” Shakespeare Quarterly 48.1 (1997): 17-44; 
Carol Neely, “The Winter’s Tale: The Triumph of Speech” in The Winter’s Tale: Critical Essays, Hunt, 243-57, as 
well as her “Women and Issue” and Broken Nuptials; and Martine Van Elk, “‘Our praises are our wages’: Courtly 
Exchange, Social Mobility, and Female Speech in The Winter’s Tale.” Philological Quarterly 79.4 (2000): 429-57. 
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it inflicts is communal. Leontes’s inexplicable defaming of Hermione damages his communal 
bonds: his familial relationships, those with his counselors, and the international relationship 
between Sicilia and Bohemia, initiating a chain of events that culminates in three unexpected 
deaths, those of Mamillius, Hermione, and Antigonus.391 In this chapter, I will use the early 
modern notion that slander is responsible for a triple homicide in order to generate a new reading 
of The Winter’s Tale, one that better explains the play’s deaths, which feel arbitrary, and, more 
importantly, the harm these deaths wreak upon Sicilia. This lesser-known concept contends that 
slander murders three people: the speaker, the hearer, and the individual slandered. Revising his 
main source, Robert Greene’s Pandosto: The Triumph of Time (1588), Shakespeare plays with 
the romance’s deaths. Most notably, he spares the guilty king who “fell into a melancholy fit 
and…slew himself” as a result of his “calling to mind” his many sins.392 Shakespeare allows 
Leontes to survive, substituting another husband, the loyal Antigonus, thereby completing the 
triad of slander victims.393 Following the deaths of his family members, Leontes begins 
demonstrating penance for his actions, showing how slanderers can reclaim a positive role within 
the community they previously harmed. I contend that Leontes’s self-imposed penance shares 
context with the sentences decreed by early modern ecclesiastical courts. Rather than awarding 
damages, church courts sought to repair a slandered individual’s reputation by ordering 
convicted slanderers to perform public penance. This emphasis on penance, on the repairing of 
damaged reputations, allows for the play’s happy ending, yet one that is qualified by the 
remembrance of losses that can never be restored.  																																																								
391 Although Camillo is the first individual with whom Leontes shares his suspicions, Camillo is not among the list 
of slander’s victims discussed below because he leaves Sicilia nearly immediately after learning of Leontes’s belief.  
392 The full text of Pandosto is reprinted in The Winter’s Tale, The Arden Shakespeare Third Series, ed. John Pitcher 
(London: Methuen, 2010), 405-45, 445.  
393 Numerous scholars have noted that Antigonus dies in Leontes’s place; for example, John Pitcher states, 
“Antigonus doesn’t die because he is evil but because he is Leontes’ surrogate: someone has to die for the crime 
against Perdita, and it can’t be the king.” Introduction to The Winter’s Tale. Pitcher, 30.  
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Deadly Earworms: Slander’s Effects on the Body 
Several early modern treatises focusing on the ills of the tongue depicted slander as responsible 
for a triple homicide, killing the slanderer, the victim of the slander, and the listener of the 
allegation.394 Certain period authors drew upon Proverbs 25.18, which provides a more detailed 
portrayal of the particular end met by each of the three individuals involved in this “slander 
triangle.”395 In The Araignement of an Unruly Tongue (1619), for instance, George Webbe 
directly addressed the slanderous tongue, arguing that: 
Solomon the wise calleth thee [Pro.25.18], an Arrow, a maule, & a Sword. An 
Arrow, in respect of him that is absent, whom thou woundest afar off in his good 
name, in his goods, in his friends: and sometimes in his life. A Maule or Hammer 
to knock him, who receiveth thy slander, in the head…whiles thou dost infect his 
eare, thou dost destroy his soule, casting thereinto seedes of suspicion, hatred and 
contempt. Lastly, to thy selfe thou art a Sword, in destroying thine own soule, by 
committing that sinne which is most odious to God.396 
 
Slander’s metaphoric depiction as an arrow, a sword, and a maul or hammer emphasized its 
ability to harm individuals both nearby and far off. While this capacity for harm was widely 
acknowledged, the notion that slander was responsible for three deaths underscored the 
importance of reputation and the fact that being a victim of calumny could lead to social death. 
The motive behind this particular metaphoric depiction of slander seems to have been an attempt 
to stem the act of voicing and listening to slanderous accusations. The unspoken belief is that 
there is a level of shared guilt between the speaker and the listener. As Cyndia Clegg reminds us, 
“the problem of slander, both in society and in a court of law, is not the lie alone, but the 																																																								
394 Anonymous, A Plaine Description of the Ancient Pedigree of Dame Slander (Imprinted at London by John 
Harrington, 1573), 95, 113; and William Vaughan, The Spirit of Detraction, Conjured and Convicted in Seven 
Circles (London: 1611), 104. 
395 I borrow Ina Habermann’s term for the three subject positions involved in the voicing of slanderous accusations. 
See Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003). 
396 Webbe, The Araignement of an Unruly Tongue, in The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England: Three 
Treatises, ed. Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2011), 83-134, 111. See 
also page 90. 
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readiness with which hearers, based on their cultural and social perspectives, embrace lies.”397 
The ears are greedy listeners who do not discriminate between truth and lies.  
In early modern England, the ears, like the tongue, were considered an ambivalent organ. 
The “organ of understanding,” the ears were capable of having “an edifying” effect on an 
individual, as the sense of sound conveys “the fruit of either moral or divine discourse to the 
imagination.”398 Bryan Crockett has shown how “Renaissance Protestants are in general 
agreement that in matters of religious devotion, the ear is to be trusted more than the eye.”399 In 
contrast, Jennifer Rae McDermott emphasizes that the ears’ openness was a source of concern 
for anatomists of the era.400 For instance, the ears could allow for the entry of actual or figurative 
poisons, as in Hamlet (1600-1) and Othello (1603-4). They could also act as passageways for 
vice to enter the body.401 Lacking the natural defenses of the body’s other orifices, such as 
eyelids and lips, the ears are particularly vulnerable to the dangers of ill speech, including lying, 
flattery, or slander.  
																																																								
397 “Truth, Lies, and the Law of Slander in Much Ado About Nothing” in The Law in Shakespeare, ed. Constance 
Jordan and Karen Cunningham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 167-88, 176. 
398 Richard Brathwaite, Essaies upon the Five Senses: Revived by a New Supplement; with a Pithy One upon 
Detraction (London: Printed by Anne Griffin, and are to be sold by Henry Shephard in Chancery lane, at the signed 
of the Bible, 1635), 6, 8. The text seems to have enjoyed some popularity, as it was printed with a new a supplement 
in 1625 and 1635. 
399 “‘Holy Cozenage’ and the Renaissance Cult of the Ear,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 24.1 (Spring 1993): 47-
65, 49. See also Crockett’s The Play of Paradox: Stage and Sermon in Renaissance England (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995). 
400 Jennifer Rae McDermott, “‘The Melodie of Heaven’: Sermonizing the Open Ear in Early Modern England,” 
Religion and the Senses in Early Modern Europe, ed. Wietse de Boer and Christine Göttler (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 
179-97.  
401 Writing on the sense of sight, Brathwaite explains that “as the eye of all other Senses is most needfull, so of all 
others it is most hurtfull” and that “there is no passage more easie for the entry of vice than by the cranie of the eye”. 
Essaies upon the Five Senses, 3. In his antitheatrical tract, Anthony Munday likewise sees both the ears and the eyes 
as potential vehicles for sin, arguing that “there commeth much evil in at the ears, but more at the eies, by these two 
open windows death breaketh into the soule” in A Second and Third Blast of Retrait from Plaies and Theaters 
(Imprinted at London: By Henrie Denham, dwelling in Pater noster Row, at the signe of the Starre, being the assigne 
of William Seres. Allowed by aucthoritie, 1580), 64. 
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While “Protestant preachers most desired” the “openness” of the ear, they and the authors 
of period slander treatises recognized that individuals could exhibit “figurative deafness.”402 For 
example, A Plaine Description of the Ancient Pedigree of Dame Slander (1573) argued that 
slander stopped the ears of listeners, creating a barrier to the truth.403 Individuals who mistakenly 
credited ill speech as fact would in effect make themselves deaf to the truth. If a listener did not 
actively guard against slander, then slander metaphorically produced the ear’s missing barrier, an 
“earlid,” so to speak.404 Echoing Cato’s critique of lewd individuals, Charles Gibbon went so far 
as to contend that lewd individuals have tongues “like the poyson of aspes” and ears “as deafe as 
the adders.”405 William Perkins in A Direction for the Government of the Tongue (1595) 
emphasizes that the only way to protect oneself against a slanderer is to manually close off one’s 
ears, that is, to create one’s own barrier before slander produced an artificial one, whereas 
Gibbon argued for responding to individuals who speak ill of others with an “angry 
countenance.”406 Fearing that ears can often act as accomplices to slanderous tongues, by eagerly 
accepting slander’s poison, Webbe calls for a three-pronged defense, which includes turning a 
deaf ear, casting a frowning look, and giving a sharp reproof.407 Such works urged listeners to 
cover one ear as they listened to others, so as to stymie, or at least minimize the effects of slander 
																																																								
402 McDermott, “‘The Melodie of Heaven,’” 183. 
403 Anonymous (Imprinted at London by John Harrington, 1573). The ears were considered susceptible to any 
number of potential assaults in this period; for example, Eleanor Decamp discusses the ear’s vulnerability to 
overzealous ear pickers in her essay “‘Thou art like a punie-Barber (new come to the trade) thou pick’st our ears too 
deepe’: barbery, earwax and snip-snaps” in The Senses in Early Modern England, 1558-1660, ed. Simon Smith, 
Jackie Watson and Amy Kenny (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 74-90. 
404 I must thank Darryl Chalk for emphasizing slander’s ability to produce this missing barrier, which he termed the 
“earlid” (and which I have borrowed), during our discussion at the 2016 SAA panel, “Early Modern Sensory 
Interactions.” 
405 The Praise of a Good Name: The Reproch of an Ill Name (London: 1594). 
406 Perkins’ A Direction for the Government of the Tongue according to Gods worde is reproduced in The Unruly 
Tongue in Early Modern England, Vienne-Guerrin, 30-80. Gibbon, The Praise of a Good Name, 33.  
407 The Araignement of an Unruly Tongue in The Unruly Tongue in Early Modern England. Vienne-Guerrin, 115, 
116-17. In The Dumb Divine Speaker or Dumbe Speaker of Divinity, Fra. Giacomo Affinati d’ Acuto (Jacopo 
Affinati d’ Acuto) repeatedly contends that ears greedily capture slander, translated by A.M. (London: Printed by R. 
Bradock for William Leake, dwelling in Paules churchyard, at the signe of the Holy-ghost, 1605), 150-55.  
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and other forms of dangerous speech. An angry countenance was likewise meant to curb the flow 
of ill speech. The era’s slander treatises urged the need to actively protect one’s ears.  
I suggest that Leontes’s continual aspersions against Hermione stop his own ears to the 
truth; the more calumnies he voices against the queen, the more he believes the slanders that he 
produces. Leontes’s trusted advisor, Camillo, corroborates these allegations’ hold upon the king 
when he explains to Polixenes that shaking “the fabric of [Leontes’s] folly” would be impossible 
for its “foundation / Is piled upon his faith, and will continue / The standing of his body” 
(1.2.429-31). Camillo’s summation is repeatedly proven true through the first three acts of the 
play. Having stopped his own ears with his folly—his slanders—Leontes refuses to hear the truth 
despite the lack of evidence for his conviction and the united front of queen, counselors, and 
even Apollo’s oracle, who each attest to Hermione’s chastity.  
Focusing on the notion of the oracle, Virginia Lee Strain’s article “The Winter’s Tale and 
the Oracle of the Law” intriguingly argues for a critically overlooked  
oracular tradition that functioned in the legal-political world and literary contexts 
contemporaneous with Shakespeare’s romance. The epithet “oracle” also 
distinguished a legal-political type, the legal expert and wise counselor whose 
authority was established through deliberative and self-fashioning practices that 
suggested the rhetorical mode and performance style of the oracles of antiquity.408 
 
Strain thus sees Leontes’s rejection of the oracle as another rejection of judicial advice. Because 
he truly believes his diseased imagination, he anticipates that others will respond to Hermione’s 
behavior in the same manner. He does not need anyone to agree with him, yet he expects others 
to likewise interpret her “self-evident” guilt. For example, as Strain notes, “the exchange 																																																								
408 “The Winter’s Tale and the Oracle of the Law,” ELH 78.3 (Fall 2011): 557-84, 557. Strain’s larger argument is 
that “this alternate tradition” allows for “a reimagining of The Winter’s Tale, in which Apollo’s supernatural oracle 
evokes human judicial figures,” which thus “resonates with the explosive tensions between the judiciary and the 
sovereign in early seventeenth-century England” (557-58). Stuart M. Kurland similarly investigates the play’s 
depiction of counsel in “‘We Need No More of Your Advice’: Political Realism in The Winter’s Tale.” Studies in 
English Literature 31.2 (1991): 365-86. See also Christopher Pye, “Against Schmitt: Law, Aesthetics, and 
Absolutism in Shakespeare’s Winter’s Tale.” South Atlantic Quarterly 108.1 (2009): 197-217. 
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between Camillo and Leontes in 1.2 prefigures the King’s assumption of the oracle’s support and 
[Leontes’s] subsequent refutation of its authority once its contrary opinion is revealed in 
court.”409 Shocked at learning that his counselors disagree with him, Leontes proceeds to 
discredit all alternative judicial officials. He tells Camillo “we have been / Deceived in thy 
integrity” (1.2.240-41) and proceeds to heap abuse upon his loyal servant (1.2.244-51, 301-06). 
He proclaims his counselors “liars all” (2.3.146) and blasphemously declares “there is no truth at 
all i’th’ oracle / …This is mere falsehood” (3.1.138-39). His tyrannical behavior damages his 
reputation and shares certain similarities with another producer of ill speech, the murmurer, who 
is said to refuse counsel.410 Leontes’s comportment evidences the dangers of uttering potentially 
slanderous allegations and why slanderers were included within the triad of slander victims. A 
good reputation could lead listeners to more readily believe a speaker’s accusations. 
Alternatively, if an individual was found guilty of slander, or if the allegations were simply not 
believed, then the speaker’s reputation was damaged, as is the case with Leontes. 
Leontes’s jealousy causes him to question Hermione’s behavior towards Polixenes, yet 
the act of voicing his qualms only strengthens these fears about her fidelity. Leontes asks his son, 
Mamillius, “Art thou my boy?” (1.2.122), a question he reiterates a few moments later, “How 
now, you wanton calf — / Art thou my calf?” (1.2.128-29). In between these two questions, 
Leontes inspects his son’s appearance, specifically Mamillius’s nose, stating, “They say it is a 
copy out of mine” (1.2.124). Leontes’s suspicions seem to immediately trigger a concern with 
court chatter. In its initial appearance, this nebulous talk is mustered in defense of Mamillius’s 
parentage. He notes that the physical likeness between father and son is voiced by women, who 																																																								
409 “The Winter’s Tale and the Oracle of the Law,” 568. 
410 Attributed to Nicholas Breton, A Murmurer (London: Printed by Robert Ravvorth, and are to be sold by John 
Wright, at his shop neere Christ-Church gate, 1607). Murmuring was a synonym for detraction in the era. A 
Murmurer does not provide a specific definition for the term, though it is depicted as false or maliciously motivated 
speech. Though clearly false, Leontes believes his accusations to be truth and he does not utter them out of malice. 
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“will say anything” (1.2.133). However, even he must admit “yet were it true / To say this boy 
were like me” (1.2.136-37). This is the only moment where Leontes briefly struggles with his 
response to such talk, perhaps because of its liminality; this speech is both something voiced by 
other characters (though not included in the actual playtext) and a speech act recalled by his 
feverish mind. The speech act thus stems from without and within Leontes, explaining why he 
cannot immediately dismiss it. The physical resemblance proves that Mamillius is a legitimate 
heir, but Leontes determines that it does not constitute proof of Hermione’s continued chastity. 
His misogynistic critique implies a distrust of women as well as a more general distrust of the 
opinions of others. This quick deliberation subtly intimates what follows, Leontes’s rejection of 
his counselors’ advice. In turn, the court’s amorphous voice becomes tied to his suspicion. As his 
anxiety grows, a paranoid Leontes begins tormenting himself by imagining the court’s whispers 
about his cuckoldry. 
Although Leontes accepts that Mamillius is his son, this acknowledgement does not stop 
him from voicing pointed insinuations to the young prince. Attempting to dismiss Mamillius, he 
states, “Go play, boy, play. Thy mother plays, and I / Play too; but so disgraced a part, whose 
issue / Will hiss me to my grave” (1.2.188-90). Intuitively, Mamillius detects his father’s distress 
and the innuendo against his mother. Appealing to their physical similarities and echoing his 
father’s language (“they say”), he tells his father, “I am like you, they say” (1.2.209).411 The 
promising, precocious young prince recognizes his father’s repeated implications, leading him to 
respond with concern, rather than certainty (concern over the implied aspersion against 																																																								
411 Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin likewise notes Mamillius’s echoing of Leontes’s language in “‘Sicilia is a so forth’: la 
rumeur dans The Winter’s Tale,” in “A sad tale’s best for winter”: Approches critiques du Conte d’hiver de 
Shakespeare, ed. Yan Brailowsky, Anny Crunelle and Jean-Michel Déprats (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Paris 
Ouest, 2011), 149-63. Susan Snyder contends that in response to Leontes’s questions Mamillius’s “last attempt to 
give the desired answer resorts to the same dubious third-person authority that troubled Leontes’ own perceptions of 
filial likeness: ‘I am like you, they say’” in “Mamillius and Gender Polarization in The Winter’s Tale” in 
Shakespeare: A Wayward Journey (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2002), 210-20, 206. 
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Hermione, not his parentage). Internalizing the allegation, he mulls it over, and comments on his 
similarity to his father. Like his father, he is cognizant of court chatter, yet the court’s 
indeterminate voice cannot dispel the spectre of infidelity. Reading the play through a Christian 
lens, G. Wilson Knight contends, “Mamillius stands before Leontes as Truth confronting 
Error.”412 Near the end of Act II, Leontes is again offered ocular proof of Hermione’s faithfulness 
when Paulina brings him his newborn daughter, urging him to see how,  
Although the print be little, the whole matter 
And copy of the father: eye, nose, lip, 
The trick of’s frown, his forehead, nay, the valley, 
The pretty dimples of his chin and cheek, his smiles, 
The very mould and frame of hand, nail, finger. (2.3.99-103) 
 
Despite Paulina’s facial forensics’ list of similarities,413 Leontes again rejects the self-evident 
truth, choosing to believe in his own infected imagination rather than his family, friends, and 
trusted counselors. 
Sicilia’s royal family demonstrates that slander’s power is intimately bound with the 
power of the imagination. While Leontes represents the slanderer within the slander triangle, his 
feverish mind conceives another triangle in which he is also the subject and victim of the slander. 
Following Mamillius’s exit, Camillo remarks how Polixenes would not change his travel plans at 
Leontes’s request, implying that the Bohemian king proved amenable only when Hermione did 
the asking. Leontes immediately responds, “Didst perceive it?” adding in an aside, “They’re here 
with me already, whisp’ring, rounding, / ‘Sicilia is a so-forth’” (1.2.216, 217-18). While he 
cannot bring himself to utter the word “cuckold,” his belief in Hermione and Polixenes’s guilt 
																																																								
412 ““Great Creating Nature”: An Essay on The Winter’s Tale.” Bloom. 7-45, 11.  
413 Interestingly, neither the ears nor tongue are included in the list of facial organs resembling Leontes’s. Paulina 
goes on to add that if Nature “hast / The ordering of the mind too, ’mongst all colours / No yellow in’t, lest she 
suspect, as he does, / Her children not her husband’s” (2.3.105-08). Perhaps the ears and tongue are ignored for this 
same reason; if Perdita is indeed a copy of her father, then were she to have her father’s ears and tongues, she would 
also be liable to hear the same imagined whispers and speak his calumnies.  
		 186	
leads Leontes to assume that everyone else is aware and commenting upon the adulterous 
relationship, “For, to a vision so apparent, rumour / Cannot be mute—or thought—for 
cogitation” (1.2.272-73).414 He fancies his court as a hotbed of gossip and rumor, a depiction that 
accords with many courts of the era, but not the cold, decorous Sicilian court. Gail Kern Paster 
has argued that Leontes’s subsequent spider speech is “the clearest instance of an emotion being 
coproduced environmentally.” She clarifies that “by constituting the spider as a thoroughly 
subjectified object (inside and outside the mind of the perceiver), by thoroughly dissolving the 
borders between the social and the biological, this trope affords a perfect instance of the ecology 
of the passions.”415 Leontes’s imagined court chatter is similarly coproduced socially. These 
conversations are composed inside his feverish mind, yet projected outside of it as if they have 
been accidentally overhead by the king. By imagining others as remarking upon the Queen’s 
behavior, Leontes removes from himself the responsibility for slandering Hermione and places it 
upon the gossipy court. In this version of the slander triangle, he is the object of talk, not its 
progenitor. His fear of court speech again arises when he asks a disbelieving Camillo, “is 
whispering nothing?” in a speech that imagines a series of escalating illicit touches and 
encounters between Hermione and Polixenes (1.2.286). Even Mamillius is rendered suspect 
when Leontes sees him whispering his winter’s tale in Hermione’s ear at the beginning of Act II, 																																																								
414 On the importance of whispering in this play, see Vienne-Guerrin, “‘Sicilia is a so forth.’” Brailowsky, Crunelle, 
and Déprats. 149-63. 
415 Paster, “Seeing the Spider: Cognitive Ecologies in The Winter’s Tale,” in Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's 
Theatre: The Early Modern Body-Mind, ed. Laurie Johnson, John Sutton and Evelyn Tribble (New York: Routledge, 
2014), 149-53, 149. Paster discusses the environmental coproduction of emotions in much greater detail in her 
seminal Humoring the Body Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
See also Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997). Anne Barton argues that Leontes’s spider speech “functions in ways of which the speaker is himself 
unaware, tells a truth he consciously rejects…Leontes’ mind, as his words involuntarily but quite explicitly inform 
us, has poisoned itself, breeding madness from an illusory evil, even as the minds of people doomed by voodoo or 
black magic are supposed to do.” “Leontes and the Spider: Language and Speaker in Shakespeare’s Last Plays.” 
Bloom. 101-21, 103-04. David Ward provides a remarkable reading of another of Leontes’s emotionally charged 
speeches, the notoriously difficult affection speech, in “Affection, Intention and Dreams in The Winter’s Tale.” 
Modern Language Review 82.3 (1987): 545-54.  
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prompting him to separate mother and son.416 His imagining of Hermione, Polixenes, and 
Mamillius’s participation in “whispering” is a further example of Leontes’s attempt to clear 
himself of any culpability for his own injurious speech. 
In addition to absolving Leontes of any responsibility for defaming Hermione, his “is 
whispering nothing?” speech addresses the critical problem behind his allegation, namely the 
lack of evidence of Hermione’s guilt. Responding to an incredulous Camillo, Leontes declares, 
Is whispering nothing? 
Is leaning cheek to cheek? Is meeting noses? 
Kissing with inside lip? Stopping the career 
Of laughter with a sigh? —a note infallible 
Of breaking honesty. Horsing foot on foot? 
Skulking in corners? Wishing clocks more swift, 
Hours minutes, noon midnight? And all eyes 
Blind with the pin and web but theirs, theirs only, 
That would unseen be wicked? Is this nothing? 
Why then the world and all that’s in’t is nothing, 
The covering sky is nothing, Bohemia nothing, 
My wife is nothing, nor nothing have these nothings 
If this be nothing.     (1.2.286-98) 
 
Like Othello, Leontes is a jealous husband who becomes convinced that his wife is unfaithful. In 
both cases, the innocent women are condemned due to flimsy, circumstantial evidence. While 
Othello’s initial disbelief is overcome by Iago’s narrative skills, his ability to interpret innocent 
events as proof of guilt, Leontes both provides the accusation and invents the circumstantial 
evidence needed to prove his case. In a book chapter analyzing Othello’s various scenes of 
narration, specifically those scenes’ presentation of the interplay between the rhetorical and the 
judicial, Patricia Parker notes that the words:  																																																								
416 Marion Wells similarly contends that “this whispered exchange of an old wives’ tale is evidence enough of a 
contamination of the boy by female influence” in “Mistress Taleporter and the Triumph of Time: Slander and Old 
Wives’ Tales in The Winter’s Tale.” Shakespeare Survey: An Annual Survey of Shakespeare Studies and Production 
58 (2005): 247-59, 252. Wells’s larger concern is with “the play’s complex treatment of the relationship 
between…gendered discourses and the genre of romance” (248-49). Whispers are also associated with secretive, 
potentially treasonous knowledge when Camillo tells Polixenes that “Your followers I will whisper to the business, / 
And will by twos and threes at several posterns / Clear them o’th’ city” before Leontes is any the wiser (1.2.437-39). 
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‘dilation’ and ‘delation’ can summon up the sense both of accusation and of the 
provision of a narrative in response to interrogation. But what is even more 
important for the crossing of judicial and rhetorical in Othello is the fact that both 
depend on the provision of what were known as ‘circumstances’—a tradition 
which still survives in what we refer to as ‘circumstantial evidence’ as well as in 
the basic principles of composition—and that Shakespeare himself founded a 
number of scenes on precisely this overlapping, or identity.  
 
She adds, “circumstances’ dilate, then; but they may also indict…The provision of such 
circumstances serves not only to amplify a narrative but to prove a case before a judge, including 
that judge who is the jealous husband of a woman ‘dilatit of adultery.’”417 Leontes’s 
“whispering” speech is such an amplified narrative, an attempt to overcome disbelief by 
fashioning circumstantial evidence. According to Leontes, Hermione is guilty because she acts 
suspiciously. He likewise treats the whispers concerning Hermione and Polixenes that he claims 
to have overheard as proof of her guilt; these whispers develop his narrative, strengthening his 
conviction for the simple reason that if other people are commenting on the queen’s behavior, 
then it must be true. Of course, Leontes dismisses the fact that he invented this evidence, 
similarly ignoring the contradiction that “all eyes / Blind with the pin and web but theirs, theirs 
only” (1.2.292-93). If all eyes are blind to Hermione and Polixenes’s illicit actions, then these 
actions could not have sparked commentary; the subsequent whispers he claims to have heard are 
pure fabrication. This speech’s inherent contradiction reiterates that the case Leontes is building 
is no more than a prejudicially interpreted mix of invented and circumstantial evidence.418 
 Leontes’s case against Hermione may not be sound, yet the results of his allegations 
prove lethal. Following his separation from Hermione, Mamillius becomes slander’s first 
																																																								
417 Parker, “Shakespeare and rhetoric: ‘dilation’ and ‘delation’ in Othello.” Parker and Hartman. 54-74, 56, 57.  
418 Investigating “the question of evidence,” Stephen Orgel declares, “truth has been made independent of evidence” 
in his Introduction to The Winter’s Tale, ed. Stephen Orgel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 20, 21. 
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victim.419 Prior to his death, we are told that Mamillius is unwell (2.3.10-11). In his introduction 
to the Arden edition of The Winter’s Tale, J.H.P. Pafford argues that Mamillius’s death is not all 
that unexpected, given that the audience is informed he is ill and “it is not until the next act, 300 
lines on, that his death is announced, so that the shock comes a as perfectly credible event, a 
death from physical illness accentuated by grief.”420 Yet in his final appearance, when he sought 
to entertain Hermione and her ladies with a sad, winter’s tale (2.1.27), Mamillius appears to be in 
perfect health. Moreover, the derivation of his name from the Latin “mamilla” or breast intimates 
the closeness of his relationship with Hermione and adumbrates the danger that awaits should the 
two be forcibly separated.421 Indeed, it is not until he has been removed from Hermione that we 
are told he is sick. Commenting on his son’s health, Leontes stresses that it is not a prior illness, 
but Mamillius’s shock at hearing the public allegation (“’tis Polixenes / Has made thee swell 
thus”) against his mother that affects him (2.1.63-64). According to Leontes, 
He straight declined, drooped, took it deeply, 
Fastened and fixed the shame on’t in himself; 
Threw off his spirit, his appetite, his sleep, 
And downright languished. (2.3.14-17) 
 
Although Leontes had previously hinted at his suspicions about Hermione to Mamillius, it is not 
until these allegations are made public that Mamillius’s health is negatively impacted, illustrating 
Lisa Jardine’s argument that “reputations are damaged by harmful accusations made under 
																																																								
419 Wells intimates as much when she claims, “in the court scene, Shakespeare indicates a direct—almost magical—
connection between sexual slander and the destruction of lineage. Mamillius seemingly dies as a direct result of 
Leontes’s obtuse refusal to believe in his wife’s innocence even after the oracle is pronounced.” “Mistress 
Taleporter and the Triumph of Time,” 254.   
420 Introduction to The Winter’s Tale, The Arden Shakespeare Second Series, ed. J.H.P. Pafford (London: Methuen, 
1963), lxv. 
421 Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1993), 265. Focusing on Shakespeare’s portrayal of the narrative act in several of his plays, Mary Ellen Lamb 
contends that with his winter’s tale Mamillius “is composing not only a story but a self defined in terms of an 
intimate and very physical bond with his visibly pregnant mother as well as with her surrounding ladies, who care 
for him” in “Engendering the Narrative Act: Old Wives’ Tales in The Winter’s Tale, Macbeth, and The Tempest.” 
Criticism 40.4 (1998): 529-53, 533.  
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socially significant circumstances.”422 It is Leontes’s insistence on broadcasting these allegations, 
first to his advisors and then to the country at large, which causes irreparable harm.  
 Mamillius’s death again emphasizes the link between the ears and the imagination, 
exhibiting that this connection can be fatal under the right circumstances. Darryl Chalk, in his 
book chapter, ““Make Me Not Sighted like the Basilisk”: Vision and Contagion in The Winter’s 
Tale,” contends that Mamillius’s death is “described unequivocally in terms of a conception in 
his mind.” That is, his death is a result of the effect the calumny against Hermione takes upon his 
impressionable young mind. Chalk argues that Leontes’s sudden onset of jealousy is a “disease 
of the imagination” resulting from “an offensive image that infects his mind” and that such a 
disease is communicable and is indeed spread to the young prince.423 I agree with Chalk’s 
assessment that Leontes’s sharing of his suspicions with Mamillius ultimately leads to the latter’s 
death; where we differ is that Chalk is concerned with visual contagion (Leontes’s infection 
stemming from the king’s faulty sight), while I argue that the disease is spread through the 
slanders against Hermione, thus affecting listeners through the vulnerable ear canal. The ears 
were not only thought of as “one of the activest and laborioust faculties of the soul,” they were 
also seen as the passageway of discourse to the imagination.424 Their link to the imagination 
																																																								
422 See Chapter 1, “‘Why Should he Call Her Whore?’ Defamation and Desdemona’s Case,” in Reading 
Shakespeare Historically (London: Routledge, 1996), 19-34. Antigonus underlines the same point when he tells 
Leontes “I wish, my liege, / You had only in your silent judgement tried it, / Without more overture” (2.1.170-72). 
423 In Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's Theatre: The Early Modern Body-Mind, ed. Lawrence Johnson, et al. 
(New York: Routledge, 2014), 111-32, 113, 127. 
424 Brathwaite, Essaies upon the Five Senses, 14, 8. Helkiah Crooke corroborates the effect of things heard on one’s 
imagination when he argues that “those things which be heard, take a deeper impression in our minds” than by 
things seen; from Microsmographia qtd. in Bruce Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England: Attending 
to the O-Factor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 283. Thomas Wright discusses the connection 
between the imagination and the written and spoken word extensively in The Passions of the Mind in General, ed. 
William Webster Newbold (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986). Katharine A. Craik’s book chapter, “The 
Word and the Flesh in Early Modern England,” focuses on “Wright’s theory of the passions which deal with the 
feelings men experienced in their minds and bodies when they encountered words and texts” in Reading Sensations 
in Early Modern England (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11-34.  
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illustrates the organ’s ambivalence, one greater than that of the eyes. Knowledge conveyed 
through the ears is as likely to instruct as it is to harm. 
Having heard the allegations against Hermione, Mamillius internalizes them with 
disastrous results. Chalk contends that locking Mamillius away was the worst possible decision 
in this situation given that he was sequestered immediately after having heard his father defame 
his mother, thereby ensuring that he would think of nothing but this slander, fixing it in his 
imagination.425 In his article, “Rhetoric, Grief, and the Imagination in Early Modern England,” 
Stephen Pender explains that grief was considered potentially fatal in the period. Contemporary 
physicians recommended treatments that “focused on the imagination as [a] potentially harmful 
faculty that prolonged or intensified suffering,” yet “precisely in the same period, the 
imagination was enlisted more and more as fertile ground for emotional therapy.”426 The 
imagination was paradoxically both a potential cure and a further spur to grief. With nothing else 
to entertain him, the slander against Hermione is allowed to take root in Mamillius’s mind, 
continually fueling his grief and wasting his spirit. Paulina echoes Leontes’s version of 
Mamillius’s death in her hyperbolic retelling of Leontes’s faults, proclaiming that the accusation 
and the prince’s “honorable thoughts—…cleft the heart / That could conceive a gross and foolish 
sire / Blemished his gracious dam” (3.2.193, 194-96). Paulina’s word choice also seems to recall 
slander’s common, metaphoric depictions as various weapons, as the image of Mamillius’s cleft 
heart emulates the violence caused by swords and arrows. Like Leontes, she believes that the 
slandering of Hermione and Mamillius’s subsequent fixation on it caused the young prince’s 
death. Yet while Leontes portrays Mamillius as withering away, Paulina’s account is of a darker 
hue, preparing us for Hermione’s death and, perhaps, that of her husband, Antigonus. 																																																								
425 Conversation with the author. 
426 Pender, “Rhetoric, Grief, and the Imagination in Early Modern England,” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 43.1 (2010): 
54-85, 54, 55, 58. 
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With Mamillius’s death, Leontes begins to realize the damage he has wrought upon his 
family. He acknowledges that “Apollo’s angry, and the heavens themselves / Do strike at my 
injustice” (3.2.144-45). In contrast, Hermione silently falls to the ground, in response to which 
Paulina announces that “this news is mortal to the Queen” directing spectators on and off stage to 
“look down / And see what death is doing” (3.2.146-47). As with Mamillius, Hermione 
internalizes distressing news and her body instantly responds. Leontes is right to note that 
Hermione’s “heart is but o’ercharged” but his hopes that she “will recover” are shortly dashed, as 
Paulina announces her death within the next 50 lines (3.2.148). Hermione’s overcharged heart 
again emphasizes the toll that one’s emotions can have upon the body, allowing slander to claim 
its second victim. The conclusion of the play reveals that Hermione’s “death” is not a physical, 
but a social death.427 Unlike Mamillius, she heard the oracle’s prophecy, knowledge that helped 
keep her hope (and herself) alive during her period of seclusion.  
 The triad of slander victims is concluded in the following scene when Antigonus meets 
his grisly end in what is possibly Shakespeare’s most infamous stage direction, “Exit, pursued by 
a bear” (3.3.57). Commenting on twentieth-century scholarly interest in the bear, Susan Snyder 
and Deborah T. Curren-Aquino declare that “Shakespeare’s notorious stage direction occasioned 
little or no editorial/critical treatment before the twentieth century, as attested by the contrasting 
coverage in variorum editions of Furness (1898) and Turner (2005).” The footnote adds that 
“Furness has nothing on the bear; Turner, on the other hand, devotes four pages to it, with only 
																																																								
427 David Bergeron argues that the version of the play that has come down to us includes a revised ending, that 
Hermione truly died in the lost original version; see “The Restoration of Hermione in The Winter’s Tale” in 
Shakespeare’s Romances Reconsidered, ed. Carol McGinnis Kay and Henry E. Jacobs (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1978), 125-33. Snyder contends in “The Winter’s Tale Before and After” that in 1612-13, two 
masques included scenes where statues came to life, suggesting “it was most likely this taste of the Jacobean court 
for wonders that underlay Shakespeare’s revision, rather than a need to cancel the death of Hermione”; Shakespeare: 
A Wayward Journey, 221-33, 228. 
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one nineteenth-century comment.”428 At the risk of talking the bear to death, I suggest another 
meaning for this infamous creature. Antigonus is ripped apart by a bear, “his shoulder-bone” 
“tore out” (3.3.89), because it makes physical the damage caused by slander. A divisive force, 
slander strains and can break the bonds between individuals and communities, as demonstrated 
by the various fractured relationships in the play. Within the logic of the metaphoric depiction of 
slander as responsible for a triple homicide, the bear thus represents a form of divine justice. I 
agree with Pitcher and others that Antigonus dies in place of the slanderer, Leontes. Shakespeare 
substituted one husband for another in order to allow for a “happy” ending. In addition to their 
shared role as husbands, Antigonus narrates a dream he had of Hermione shortly before his 
death. Misinterpreting it, he states,  
I do believe 																																																								
428 Introduction to The Winter’s Tale, ed. Susan Snyder and Deborah T. Curren-Aquino (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 30, 30n80. Snyder and Curren-Aquino also briefly review the debates surrounding the 
staging and meaning of the bear (30-33). For a review of Stratford productions’ staging of the bear from 1945-1999, 
see Patricia E. Tatspaugh’s introduction to The Arden Shakespeare, Shakespeare at Stratford Series’ The Winter’s 
Tale (London: Thomson Learning, 2002), 123-31. Chapters 1 and 2 additionally note the various productions’ bear 
props, which adumbrate Antigonus’s mauling. For representative examples of the debate concerning whether a real 
bear was used, see Neville Coghill, “Six Points of Stage-Craft in The Winter’s Tale.” Shakespeare Survey 11 (1958): 
31-42; and Barbara Ravelhofer, “‘Beasts of Recreacion’: Henslowe’s White Bears.” English Literary Renaissance 
32.2 (2002): 287-323. Regarding the meaning of the bear, Michael D. Bristol contends that the bear is associated 
with winter, specifically “the carnivalesque bear-man is connected with a range of practices and observances that 
mark the end of Christmastide leisure and the beginning of the agricultural work year”; “In Search of the Bear: 
Spatiotemporal Form and the Heterogeneity of Economics in The Winter’s Tale.” Shakespeare Quarterly 42.2 
(1991): 145-67, 159. John Pitcher tentatively suggests that “in 1600 in the popular theater the bear was an animal 
which could be associated with revenge for a crime against the family” in “‘Fronted with the Sight of a Bear’: Cox 
of Collumpton and The Winter’s Tale.” Notes and Queries 239, 1 (n.s., 41, 1) (March 1994): 47-53, 51. Daryl W. 
Palmer remarks that “Shakespeare surely understood that the bear carries symbolic and cultural associations; ideas 
of winter and tyranny mingled with his audience’s taste for bearbaitings” in “Jacobean Muscovites: Winter, 
Tyranny, and Knowledge in The Winter’s Tale.” Shakespeare Quarterly 46.3 (1995): 323-39. Kevin Crawford, in 
turn, argues that the play achieves “aesthetic unity” through “a patterned employment of the elements of the 
grotesque through both ‘halves” of the play,” one of which is the infamous bear” in “‘He was torn to pieces with a 
bear’: Grotesque Unity in The Winter’s Tale.” Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts 10.3 (1999): 206-30, 206, 207. 
See also Dennis Biggins, “‘Exit Pursued by a Beare’: A Problem in The Winter’s Tale.” Shakespeare Quarterly 13.1 
(1962): 3-13; Louise G. Clubb, “The Tragicomic Bear.” Comparative Literature Studies 9.1 (1972): 17-30; Teresa 
Grant, “White Bears in Mucedorus, The Winter’s Tale, and Oberon, the Fairy Prince.” Notes and Queries 246, 3 
(n.s., 48, 3) (Sept. 2011): 311-13; Andrew Gurr, “The Bear, the Statue, and Hysteria in The Winter’s Tale.” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 34.4 (1983): 420-25; Maurice Hunt, “‘Bearing Hence’: Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale.” 
Studies in English Literature 44.2 (2004): 333-46, which like Parker in “Sound Government, Polymorphic Bears,” 
focuses on the text’s wordplay on “bear”; and Dale B.J. Randall, “‘This is the Chase’: or, The Further Pursuit of 
Shakespeare’s Bear.” Shakespeare’s Jahrbuch 121 (1985): 89-95. 
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Hermione hath suffered death, and that 
Apollo would—this being indeed the issue  
Of King Polixenes—it should here be laid,  
Either for life or death, upon the earth 
Of its right father. (3.3.40-45) 
 
Antigonus comes to believe that Hermione is guilty of adultery and consequently has been put to 
death. He thus becomes the only individual besides Leontes to believe in Hermione’s guilt. 
Furthermore, by vocalizing this belief, he changes location within the slander triangle, moving 
from being a listener of slander to another slanderer, strengthening the case for his substitution 
within the trio of slander victims. Pafford contends that the deaths of Antigonus and the mariners 
“are more remote and more obviously to be ascribed to natural causes outside the protagonists in 
the struggle.”429 I disagree. Antigonus, through his association with Leontes, is placed in the heart 
of the struggle, as is his wife, Paulina. In Act V, Paulina and Leontes recall that which has been 
lost through Leontes’s follies and this includes Antigonus. It is the King’s instructions that place 
Antigonus in the bear’s path. Leontes’s jealousy rips apart Paulina’s family as well as his own.430 
 
Sex, Lies, and Penance: Slander Suits in Early Modern England 
Before turning to Leontes’s self-imposed penance for the deaths of his family members, I will 
briefly discuss the legal options available to victims of slander. In medieval England, slander 
cases were heard exclusively in the ecclesiastical courts and were restricted to instances where an 
individual had “maliciously imputed a crime to another.” By the early modern period, this 
constraint had been all but disregarded, giving slander victims a choice to file their suits in either 
																																																								
429 Introduction to The Winter’s Tale, Pafford, lviii.  
430 Not only does Paulina lose her beloved husband, but also the three daughters to whom Antigonus refers in 
2.1.144-50, who disappear from the play with their father’s departure from court. There is no mention of their 
daughters when Leontes threatens Antigonus and Paulina with a painful death if Antigonus fails to abandon Perdita 
in “some remote and desert place” (2.3.170-73, 176). 
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the ecclesiastical or the secular courts.431 Though the church courts could now hear a wider 
variety of slander cases, theoretically, they were still limited to hearing cases that concerned only 
spiritual matters. In turn, in the late sixteenth century, the secular courts began hearing cases 
concerning words that caused demonstrable damage, but did not impute a crime; by the 
seventeenth century, cases involving potentially harmful language were being regularly heard.432 
The benefit of the secular courts was that they could award financial compensation to a slandered 
individual. The remuneration was meant to offset any economic damage caused by the slander; 
yet, these courts could not do anything to repair victims’ reputation. Conversely, the 
ecclesiastical courts focused upon the harm caused to the victim’s reputation, aiming to mend 
this hurt.433 The inherent differences in these court systems’ response to slander litigation meant 
that victims had to decide what mattered most to them, their reputation, or economic reparation.  
The Constitution of the Council of Oxford (1222), the origin of all slander law in 
England, defined excommunication as the punishment for convicted slanderers. Additionally, 
“there was canonical authority” for “imposing silence on the defamer.”434 Rather than 
excommunicating all convicted offenders, the ecclesiastical courts regularly chose to impose a 
punishment that both shamed the offender and repaired the victim’s reputation. They required 
offenders to perform “‘spiritual’ penalties” that “normally contained two elements: public 																																																								
431 R.H. Helmholz, ed., Select Cases on Defamation to 1600 (London: Selden Society, 1985), xiv. Helmholz states 
that “by the sixteenth century the necessity that an actual crime have been named seems to have disappeared.” He 
further adds that there is evidence that “this natural expansion” to hearing cases that included “general 
words…occurred around 1500”; xxix. For more on the development of slander law in England, see the introduction. 
432 For a brief survey of the history of slander laws in England, see Select Cases on Defamation to 1600, ed. 
Helmholz. They were a few exceptions where an individual did not need to prove that he or she had suffered 
demonstrable damages as a result of the alleged slander, for instance, if the allegation touched upon an individual’s 
professional reputation. For a brief consideration of these special categories, see Baker, An Introduction to English 
Legal History, and Select Cases, ed. Helmholz. 
433 Helmholz notes, however, that “even in the law of defamation, payment of expenses was a regular part of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.” The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume I, The Canon Law and 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s, ed. John Hamilton Baker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 587. 
434 Helmholz, ed., Select Cases, xiv, xxxviii-xxxix. 
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penance and public apology to the party defamed.”435 Martin Ingram has described the 
experience as “a ritual of repentance and reconciliation” that was “a deeply humiliating 
experience designed to deter others and give satisfaction to the congregation for the affront of 
public sin.”436 Those required to perform such penance “generally had to confess their fault 
openly in church and to ask God for forgiveness.”437 R.H. Helmholz explains that although 
“sentences formally imposing ‘silence’ on defamers and requiring them to perform a public 
penance, or at least make a public acknowledgement of fault, became the rule,” the logistics of 
the penalty often varied. The reason for this was “judicial discretion under the canon law” and 
because:  
The civilians said the remedy should fit the defamation. Thus, for defamation in 
the market, a public retraction; for defamation at another’s house, a private 
confession of error. The status of the parties and the circumstances surrounding 
the quarrel between them also mattered. So did the heinousness of the words. The 
constant factor was the admission of wrongdoing coupled with a public 
apology.438 
 
Given Leontes’s status, he would not have been required to undergo a humiliating punishment. 
As discussed in further detail below, he nonetheless chooses to publicly admit his faults in the 
location where his slanders were heard by the greatest amount of individuals, at Hermione’s trial. 
Victims of slander had the opportunity to clear their names through “the procedure of 
compurgation—whereby neighbors of the defamed person appeared in court to swear to their 
belief in his or her innocence—sometimes supplemented or replaced by certificates of good fame 
																																																								
435 Ibid., xl. 
436 Church Courts, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1570-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 3.  
437  Ibid., 53-54.  
438 The Oxford History of the Laws of England, 586-87, 588. Ingram states that the procedure was always a formal 
one, often including the wearing of “a white sheet,” the carrying of “a white rod” and confession before the 
congregation “during service timer on a Sunday or major holiday” (Church Courts, 54). 
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and credit signed by ‘honest neighbors.’”439 I suggest that Leontes’s counselors and Paulina 
consciously take on a similar task, providing the sense of a community actively combating 
slander. At the cost of royal displeasure, they collectively plead Hermione’s innocence. The 
counselors’ responses additionally portray that slander does not exist in a vacuum. This domestic 
matter ripples beyond the familial unit to affect the country at large. The counselors thus risk 
their positions to defend Hermione because they understand that the allegations endanger them 
all. For example, when Camillo finally understands Leontes’s insinuations, he immediately 
replies “I would not be a stander-by to hear / My sovereign mistress clouded so without / My 
present vengeance taken” (1.2.281-83). Camillo stresses his loyalty and his desire to protect 
Hermione’s reputation by seeking retribution had the calumny been uttered by anyone but the 
King. He further states, “You never spoke what did become you less” going so far as to 
respectfully censure Leontes for his indecorous fears (1.2.284). Later, an unnamed lord offers to 
“lay down” his life “that the Queen is spotless” (2.1.132, 133) and Antigonus hyperbolically 
states that if Hermione is false, then all women must be likewise (2.1.139-41). Leontes’s royal 
counselors use their positions of trust to attempt to reach Leontes, in a sense, relying on their 
own reputations of honesty and integrity to re-establish Hermione’s. The point is further 
underscored when a frustrated Leontes asks if he lacks credit and an unnamed lord responds “I 
had rather you did lack than I, my lord, / Upon this ground” (2.1.160-61). The lord’s response is 
a tacit admission that Leontes cannot be reasoned with. Despite the united front of Queen and 
counselors, their truth (“the” truth) is being interpreted as the ruler’s lies and Leontes, as the 
highest-ranking official, is insistent on proclaiming his version of the “truth.” 
																																																								
439Ingram adds that this procedure was “not cheap” and could potentially backfire if the victim’s innocence was not 
established. Further, “even a successful performance was normally followed by an admonition to avoid cause for 
suspicion in the future – in other words, the shadow of discredit was not entirely lifted” (Church Courts, 293). 
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Hero, the young heroine of Much Ado About Nothing (1598), finds herself in a similar 
situation when her future husband slanders her on their wedding day. Cyndia Clegg notes that the 
secular courts would not have been much help, for “Even if Hero’s cause could come within 
slander’s legal definition, because Hero did not suffer measurable financial loss, resorting to the 
secular law courts would not have been an option for a young woman of her class.”440 The 
situation is even worse for Hermione, given that “Technically, married women could not sue 
cases at the common law: their desires and their legal authority, were ‘subject to their husband.’” 
In contrast, within the church courts, “married, single and widowed women sued cases in their 
own names.”441 Hermione’s position as queen and the impossibility of quantifying her losses 
forecloses the secular courts as a suitable location to argue her case. She, however, does not seek 
any form of reparation, only to clear her name. Yet she knows that the entire legal system is 
undermined through Leontes’s overseeing of her sham trial. As she succinctly states following 
her indictment, “it shall scare boot me / To say, ‘Not guilty’” (3.2.23-24). Given this knowledge, 
Hermione displays unimpeachable integrity and considerable patience throughout her ordeal. 
Analyzing the Sicilian court’s reaction to Leontes’s aspersions, Lindsey Kaplan and 
Katherine Eggert claim, “it would be difficult to imagine that a king’s accusations, regardless of 
their veracity or his motivations, could ever have been construed as constituting defamation.”442 
The truth and a speaker’s motivation were important considerations in determining whether a 
																																																								
440 “Truth, Lies, and the Law of Slander.” Jordan and Cunningham, 181. 
441 Laura Gowing, “Language, power and the law: women’s slander litigation in early modern London,” Women, 
Crime and the Courts in Early Modern England, ed. Garthine Walker and Jenny Kermode (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 26-47, 26. 
442 ““Good queen, my lord good queen”: Sexual Slander and the Trials of Female Authority in The Winter’s Tale.” 
Renaissance Drama 25 (1994): 89-118, 105. Kaplan and Eggert read The Winter’s Tale as a representative example 
of the “gendered legal history of early modern England” specifically with regard to “the problem of slander” (90).   
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speech act constituted slander.443 Leontes truly believes that Hermione has been unchaste. His 
contrasting responses to Polixenes and Hermione demonstrate that he does not act against her out 
of malice. Whereas he orders Camillo to poison Polixenes, Leontes seeks legal redress against 
Hermione for adultery and high treason. His actions exhibit a misguided desire to protect the 
reputation of the Sicilian royal family and lineage.  
As Kaplan and Eggert also observe, Leontes’s position as king complicates the situation, 
or, rather, should complicate matters. Despite the fervor of his allegations, Leontes fails to 
convince anyone but himself. Instead, his accusations are noted for what they are, dangerous 
slanders. Although Camillo never uses the word “slander,” he tells Leontes that he will poison 
Polixenes on the condition that Leontes take Hermione back as if nothing had occurred, “for 
sealing / The injury of tongues in courts and kingdoms / Known and allied to yours” (1.2.339-
41). Paulina later boldly declares that “he / The sacred honour of himself, his queen’s, / His 
hopeful son’s, his babe’s, betrays to slander, / Whose sting is shaper than the sword’s” (2.3.84-
87),444 warning him that his treatment of Hermione will make Leontes “ignoble” and “scandalous 
to the world” (2.3.120, 121). Even Leontes recognizes the inherent danger of the charge, 
exclaiming to Camillo that he would not “Give scandal to the blood o’th’ prince, my son” 
without sufficient cause (1.2.332). While Leontes mistakenly believes that he is ensuring the 
sanctity of the Sicilian royal family’s bloodline,445 Camillo and Paulina both fear the international 
repercussions of the king’s actions. Paradoxically, Leontes’s status does not awe or convince 																																																								
443 As Helmholz explains, “Defendants had to establish their own lack of malice by doing more than showing the 
truth of what they had said,” that is, that the “truth was a mitigating factor, but in itself no more.” The Oxford 
History, 582, 583. 
444 The reference to slander’s harmful potential is the only use of the word “slander” within the text. Perhaps for 
metrical purposes, Shakespeare more often employs slander’s near synonyms, including “scandal,” “scandalous,” 
and “calumny.” “Scandal” appears in 1.2.332, “scandalous” in 2.3.121, and “calumny” in consecutive lines at 
2.1.74, 75. The words “rumor,” “whisper(s),” and “whispering” are also frequented used in the play.  
445 Mario DiGangi notes that “by calling attention to the queen’s supposed sexual transgression and labeling his 
daughter a bastard, Leontes sullies the symbolic display of sovereign power that usually attended a royal birth” in 
the Introduction to The Winter’s Tale, ed. Mario DiGangi (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2008), 9. 
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anyone to think as he does. What it does is ensure that the knowledge of his follies will spread 
beyond the country’s borders. In short, Camillo and Paulina both anticipate that Leontes will 
generate the very gossip that he imagines is rampant in his court, conversations in which he is the 
subject of slander. 
Throughout the course of Hermione’s trial, Leontes undergoes a change of heart that 
leads him to change his role as essentially a prosecutor in a criminal treason case to a defendant 
in an ecclesiastical slander case. The trial begins with Leontes abusing his position as king to 
initiate prosecution against Hermione, believing that such a proceeding will restore the royal 
family’s honor that Hermione’s supposed infidelity damaged. The tables start to turn following 
the series of announcements concerning the state of the royal family that begin with the oracle’s 
prophecy and end with the news of Hermione’s death. In his seminal study of early modern 
church courts, Ingram explained that most cases brought before these courts:  
were dealt with as suits between parties – rather like civil actions in the secular 
courts. Many, including most matters involving a strong moral element, were 
handled as ‘office’ or disciplinary cases: the courts themselves initiated 
prosecutions in a fashion roughly analogous to criminal proceedings. But such 
prosecutions were not, at least in theory, primarily designed to exact retribution 
for offenses. They were intended to reform the culprit, and were ostensibly 
undertaken ‘for the soul’s health’ (pro salute animae), to restore offenders to a 
healthy relationship with God and their neighbors.446 
 
The cumulative effect of these announcements force Leontes to admit his mistakes. 
Consequently, he begins to behave as if he were a defendant in an ecclesiastical defamation case; 
he recognizes that it is he who is in need of rehabilitation, that it is he who has injured his 
spiritual and physical health, the family’s honor, and the community at large.447 
Individuals found guilty of slander in ecclesiastical cases were made to do public penance 
and to ask forgiveness of the slandered individual. Similarly, Leontes begins the long process of 																																																								
446 Ingram, Church Courts, 3. 
447 We are told in 2.3 that Leontes is not sleeping well. His slanders thus affect both Mamillius’s and his own health. 
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atonement immediately following the news of Mamillius’s death and Hermione’s loss of 
consciousness by publicly acknowledging his multiple mistakes. Before the lords and officers 
present at Hermione’s trail, Leontes declares, “I have too much believed in mine own suspicion,” 
and asks Apollo’s forgiveness for his “profaneness” (3.2.149, 152). He unequivocally announces 
that the fault lay entirely in him and his imagination. Keenly aware of the damage that he has 
caused several members of his community, he also hatches a plan to make amends with 
Polixenes, Hermione, and Camillo. The brevity of his lines, “I’ll reconcile me to Polixenes, / 
New woo my queen, recall the good Camillo” belies the amount of time it will take to reunite 
these severed friends (3.2.153-54). The simplicity of these phrases only underscores the obvious, 
that his plan is wishful thinking. Leontes additionally reveals his previous treachery, which led 
Polixenes and Camillo to flee (3.2.155-70). Like a penitent making his confession, Leontes 
essentially attempts to restore his wounded relationships, to fix his neighborly bonds, by first 
taking responsibility for his actions. Yet there is one glaring omission. He is silent concerning 
Antigonus and Perdita, perhaps assuming that they can simply be recalled before any harm 
befalls them. It is left to Paulina to count them among the dead in her litany of Leontes’s faults.  
Having publicly recited his faults, Leontes spends the next sixteen years of his life 
performing his self-imposed penance. He makes good on his promise that “Once a day I’ll visit / 
The chapel where they lie, and tears shed there / Shall be my recreation” (3.2.236-38). Visiting 
daily the tomb of his deceased wife and son, he comes to be defined by his contrition, earning the 
epithet, “the penitent King” (4.2.5). Unable to ask for forgiveness from those he hurt, he instead 
spends sixteen years attempting to gain some solace from his routine of mourning. Part of his 
penance also seems to include a licensing of critique. Not only does Leontes allow Paulina to 
rehearse his mistakes a second time, he also declares that he deserves “all tongues to talk their 
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bitt’rest” concerning his tyrannical actions (3.2.214).448 In Greene’s Pandosto, the titular king 
commissions an inscription to his late queen and son’s monument commanding all passersby to 
voice another form of ill speech and “curse him that caused this queen to die.”449 Pandosto’s 
request authorizes critique of his inappropriate behavior. It demonstrates one of Laura Gowing’s 
conclusions from her research on early modern slander litigation, that slander could be used “to 
define and enforce the moral character of their neighborhood.”450 Pandosto’s inscription as well 
as Leontes’s statement implies that they are each deserving of righteous critique.451 Leontes’s 
comment, which at first glance appears to be an over-the-top mea culpa, recalls Pandosto’s 
shocking decision. Though it may partly be a self-indulgent wallowing in his guilt, it is another 
public acknowledgement of culpability. Leontes’s remark is an acceptance of the type of court 
chatter that he formerly feared. Whereas he previously attempted to displace responsibility for 
inventing the slander against Hermione and Polixenes, he now embraces it.  
In his long work devoted to praising silence, The Dumb Divine Speaker or Dumbe 
Speaker of Divinity (1605), Fra. Giacomo Affinati d’ Acuto briefly offers advice on how to 
correct the faults of great men, including kings, contending that it must be done “sweetly.”452 
Paulina, unsurprisingly, ignores such advice, proclaiming her adherence to the truth through a 
rejection of sweet words, stating, “If I prove honey-mouthed, let my tongue blister” (2.2.36). She 
announces Hermione’s death by way of a diatribe against Leontes, leading the male counselors 
to critique her for the dangerous harangue. In turn, Leontes, who had previously referred to her 																																																								
448 From this point on, only Paulina directly critiques Leontes. Even then, the king’s reputation is carefully guarded 
by his male counselors, who quickly reprimand Paulina whenever she goes too far. For example, see 3.2.214-30. 
449 Pandosto in The Winter’s Tale. Pitcher, 420.  
450 “Language, power and the law.” Walker and Kermode. 30. Gowing’s observation that this practice was not 
without risk, as accusations of slander can often rebound on those voicing them, does not apply in this case, as the 
fictional Pandosto, ruler of his country, specifically welcomed such criticisms.  
451 Pandosto’s request for criticism, however, does not eliminate his tyrannical tendencies. He later threatens to rape 
his daughter (whom he does not recognize) and then commits suicide over the shame of this action once he learns 
the truth of her parentage. 
452 Affinati d’ Acuto The Dumb Divine Speaker, 268. 
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as “a callat / Of boundless tongue,” a “gross hag” whose husband could not “stay her tongue,” 
and a “lewd-tongued wife” (2.3.91-92, 108, 110, 172), authorizes her to go on by stating “Thou 
didst speak but well / When most the truth” (3.2.230-31). It is only after Leontes admits his faults 
and permits Paulina’s speech that she softens her approach, voicing a gendered critique, “I have 
showed too much / The rashness of a woman,” and acknowledging Leontes’s grief, “He is 
touched / To th’ noble heart” (3.2.218-20). By licensing her speech, Leontes elevates Paulina to 
the role of his main advisor and confessor, the role previously held by Camillo (1.2.237-41). 
Taking on this priestly role, she teaches Leontes to trust women and to value female speech as he 
completes his penitence in the intervening sixteen years between the conclusion of the trial and 
Perdita’s return to Sicilia. His trust in Paulina’s judgment helps to re-carve a space for women in 
his court.453 
Although ecclesiastical courts sought to repair the victim’s wounded reputation, in The 
Winter’s Tale, it is the slanderer’s reputation that needs reparation. In addition to the public 
recrimination and his daily visitations to his family’s monuments, Leontes, under Paulina’s 
tutelage, chooses to remain single, rejecting his counselors’ advice that he remarry for the good 
of the realm. What most concerns the male counselors, the length of time that the country 
remains without an heir, is the very thing that ultimately allows for reconciliation. Leontes’s 
progress, between the accusing of Hermione and her resurrection, is a time-consuming process 
shared by most slander cases. Whether filed in the secular or ecclesiastical courts, most slander 
																																																								
453 In his discussion of the play’s final scene, Orgel states, “it is…difficult to believe that the emphasis in the play’s 
resolution on the evidence of things not seen, the primacy of the spirit over the letter, salvation through faith—on the 
tenets, in short, of Pauline Christianity—does not account for Paulina’s name” in his Introduction to The Winter’s 
Tale, 59-60. For more on Paulina and the Pauline tradition, see Roy Battenhouse, “Theme and Structure in The 
Winter’s Tale,” Shakespeare Survey 33 (1980): 123-38; and Huston Diehl, “‘Does not the stone rebuke me?’ The 
Pauline rebuke and Paulina's lawful magic in The Winter's Tale” in Shakespeare and the Cultures of Performance, 
ed. Paul Yachnin and Patricia Badir (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 69-82. Paul D. Stegner has recently compared 
Paulina and Camillo’s “gendered” and “competing models of penitence” in “Masculine and Feminine Penitence in 
The Winter’s Tale.” Renascence 66.3 (2014): 189-201, 191.  
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suits never reached the settlement stage because the court systems deliberately moved slowly, the 
ecclesiastical courts even more so. This pace was intended to give the parties involved every 
opportunity to resolve the issue out of court, thus allowing for reconciliation and a repairing of 
the social bonds that the slander had harmed. Ingram explains that within the church courts this 
was partly due to “the canon law principle that, unless the suit raised issues which could not be 
compromised…the litigants should be positively encouraged to reach an out of court settlement 
to restore harmony between them as soon as possible.”454 For this reason, coupled with the costly 
expense of litigation, the majority of cases did not reach the sentencing phase.455 Similarly, 
Hermione’s treason trial, though a foregone conclusion, is interrupted before a sentence is 
declared. This is partly because it is Leontes, and not Hermione, who is ultimately on trial.  
It has become a scholarly commonplace that Leontes spends these sixteen years in a 
prolonged stasis, what T.G. Bishop has labeled Paulina’s “gelid theater of remorse…[which] 
refuses all impulse of development.” Susan Snyder argues “the sense…of Leontes’ sixteen years 
is not slow transformation but rather endless repetition of the same rituals of rebuke and 
penitence before the fixed image of the dead Hermione.”456 This ostensible stagnation, however, 
is precisely the point. Penance is neither sexy nor glamorous, but it is necessary. As he earlier 
imprisoned Hermione for her supposed crime, Leontes must now serve his sentence. It is only 
through this repeated ritual that he can grow. It is not an empty ritual, for Leontes must accept 																																																								
454 Most historians who have worked on early modern slander agree that the courts did move rather slowly, although 
Ingram has contended that the slowness of these proceedings has been exaggerated and that “defamation causes” in 
particular “were often straightforward and therefore speedy.” As noted above, he nonetheless acknowledges that 
participants were encouraged to settle cases out of court (Church Courts, 50).  
455 Slander litigation was expensive. J.A. Sharpe notes that “it has been estimated, fighting a defamation suit to its 
conclusion might take from two to four years and cost an average of £8.” Defamation and Sexual Slander in Early 
Modern England: The Church Courts at York (Heslington, York: University of York, Borthwick Institute of 
Historical Research, 1980), 24. Ingram likewise explains that slander litigation in the church courts was expensive 
and that it was cheaper to litigate in the common law courts, especially as time progressed (Church Courts, 57).  
Sadly, the records do not indicate the nature of out of court settlements.  
456 T.G. Bishop, Shakespeare and the Theater of Wonder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 148; 
Susan Snyder, “Memorial Art in The Winter’s Tale and Elsewhere: ‘I will kill thee / And love thee after’” in 
Shakespeare: A Wayward Journey. 197-209, 204.  
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his private guilt (and public shame). When Cleomenes tells Leontes that he has done enough and 
should forgive himself, the king replies that he “cannot forget/…The wrong I did myself, which 
was so much / That heirless it hath made my kingdom, and / Destroyed the sweet’st companion 
that e’er man / Bred his hopes out of” (5.1.7, 9-12). Leontes’s inability forgive himself, his 
acknowledgement that penance cannot bring back those he destroyed, and his “new apprehension 
of Hermione” are the visible signs of his growth.457 Commenting on Leontes’s exchange with 
Cleomenes, Sarah Beckwith contends, “to forgive himself would entail absolving himself, and 
this would imply that he could, by an act of his will, reclaim his acts and their effects on others 
back from the lives of those others and order them by dint of that will.” She further argues, 
“forgiving, then, like promising, requires the presence of others.”458 For Leontes to move past his 
sins, he must be forgiven by the person he hurt most, Hermione, and others must witness it.  
In the meantime, the sojourn in Bohemia again vividly portrays slander’s destruction of 
communal harmony as well as the verbal violence to which any woman perceived as threatening 
could be subjected.459 The societal accord that marks the beginning of the sheep-shearing festival, 
an inclusive harmony that ranges from the lowest to the highest ranks of society, from the 
itinerant peddler Autolycus to members of the royal family, is brought to an abrupt end through a 
king’s explosive anger. Rejecting his son, Florizel’s, choice of fiancée, Polixenes interrupts their 
betrothal and calumniates Perdita in the same gendered terms that Leontes previously leveled at 
both Hermione and Paulina. Though he cannot help but notice her beauty (4.4.156-59), Polixenes 
declares Perdita a “fresh piece / Of excellent witchcraft,” a “knack,” and an “enchantment” 																																																								
457 Carol Neely, Broken Nuptials, 204. Though as his greeting to Florizel demonstrates, “Your mother was most true 
to wedlock, Prince, / For she did print your royal father off,” Leontes’s concern over legitimate succession remains 
(5.1.123-24).  
458 Sarah Beckwith, Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 
133. 
459 For more on the women’s speech in The Winter’s Tale and the fear that such speech can elicit, see David 
Schalkwyk, “‘A Lady’s ‘Verily’ Is as Potent as a Lord’s’: Women, Word and Witchcraft in The Winter’s Tale.” 
English Literary Renaissance 22.2 (1992): 242-72; also see note 390. 
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(4.4.410-11, 416, 422), threatening that same beauty if she ever again admits Florizel’s presence 
(4.4.413-14, 428-29). These aspersions additionally damage familial unity, as Florizel prefers 
marriage to Perdita to his birthright, and the old shepherd turns on Perdita for her pretensions in 
loving the prince. Like her mother before her, Perdita is reduced to a cheap possession, a 
plaything to be passed around; like Paulina, her effect on those around her is associated with the 
demonic. Though Perdita rejects the King’s slander through the radically democratic sentiment, 
“I was about to speak, and tell him plainly / The selfsame sun that shines upon his court / Hides 
not his visage from our cottage, but / Looks on alike” (4.4.431-34) following Polixenes’s exit, 
she, like Hermione, is effectively silenced by the slanderous attack upon her. Hermione offers a 
passionate defense at her trial, yet after her “death and resurrection,” she takes on the statute’s 
muteness and speaks only once when she acknowledges Perdita as “mine own” (5.3.124). Perdita 
similarly has very few lines after the sudden conclusion of the festival.  
Carol Neely has noted that many women in Shakespeare’s plays are unjustly accused of 
infidelity. She contends that although these women are vindicated, it comes at a cost; “women’s 
power is enhanced and confirmed by the men’s slander, but only at the price of confinement in 
the most restrictive of stereotypes—only if they remain chaste, loving, obedient, and long-
suffering, only if they are willing to die for love (or to pretend to die for love), to return after 
marriage to something resembling the chaste immobility of the Petrarchan beloved.” She goes on 
to argue, however, that the women in The Winter’s Tale are ultimately “‘freed and enfranchised’ 
(II.ii.60)” from these restrictions, an assessment I disagree with and discuss below.460 Leontes 
and Polixenes’s critiques indicate that sexual slander was part of a standard lexicon used to keep 
women in their assigned place. With the exception of Paulina, whose speech is specifically 
licensed by a reigning monarch, the ensuing silence of the female characters attests to the 																																																								
460 Carol Neely, Broken Nuptials, 7, 209. 
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enduring effects of slanderous attacks. However, as discussed below, I read this silence as 
defensive rather than indicative of their having been contained. 
 
There Must be Some Kind of Way out of Here 
As literary critics have often noted, Perdita’s return to Sicilia also brings a return to spring. The 
restoration of the lost heir allows for the additional restoration of the lost wife. Having gathered 
the principal characters to view her newly finished “statue” of Hermione, Paulina offers to make 
the statute move.461 Leontes responds, “What you can make her do / I am content to look on; 
what to speak, / I am content to hear” (5.3.91-93). His response demonstrates his progress over 
the past sixteen years. No longer guided by his fancies, Leontes has come to value Paulina’s 
advice, allowing himself to be counseled by a woman. His willingness to listen to another’s 
words illustrates his growth, a clear difference from his previous tyranny. This is further 
underscored by his response to the touch of Hermione’s hand, “O, she’s warm!” (5.3.109). Gone 
is the alleged lascivious “hotness,” replaced by natural warmth. Moreover, noting Hermione’s 
reluctance to meet Polixenes’s eyes, Leontes tells her to “look upon my brother,” asking both for 
forgiveness “That e’er I put between your holy looks / My ill suspicion” (5.3.148-50). His 
attention and sensitivity to their discomfort indicates that he can now see beyond his own 																																																								
461 For selected readings on the final scene, see Leonard Barkan, “‘Living Sculptures’: Ovid, Michelangelo, and The 
Winter’s Tale.” English Literary History 48 (1981): 639-67; Sarah Beckwith, “Shakespeare’s Resurrections: The 
Winter’s Tale,” in Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness, 127-46; Bishop, Shakespeare and the Theater of 
Wonder, 125-75; Robert Appelbaum, “‘Lawful As Eating’: Art, Life, and Magic in The Winter's Tale.” Shakespeare 
Studies 42 (2014): 32-41. Hardin L. Aasand writes of the scene, “given the iconoclastic nature of the Protestant 
church, the appearance of a venerated statute of a ‘deceased’ queen evokes the outlawed Catholic belief in the 
intercession of saints” in the Introduction to The Winter’s Tale, ed. Aasand (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview 
Press, 2015), 15. For more on the scene’s potential iconoclasm, see Aaron Landau, “‘No Settled Senses of the World 
Can Match the Pleasure of That Madness’: The Politics of Unreason in The Winter's Tale.” Cahiers Elisabéthains: 
Late Medieval and Renaissance Studies 64.1 (2003): 29-42; and on iconoclasm in general, see Huston Diehl, 
Staging Reform, Reforming the Stage (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). Gail Kern Paster sees 
Hermione’s “unveiling” as “symboliz[ing] its function as a reminder of the churching ceremony that Leontes’ trial 
prevented” in The Body Embarrassed, 271-78, 278. For a reading of the many references to statutes throughout the 
Shakespearean corpus, see Bruce Smith, “Sermons in Stone: Shakespeare and Renaissance Sculpture.” Shakespeare 
Studies 17 (1985): 1-23. 
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viewpoint and consider not only others’ words, but also their feelings. 
Although Leontes is no longer blinded by jealousy, the references to Mamillius and 
Antigonus within this final scene remind all of the consequences of his actions, that some losses 
are beyond repair. Furthermore, Paulina’s warning to Leontes, “Do not shun her / Until you see 
her die again, for then / You kill her double” (5.3.105-107) can be interpreted as the play’s final 
injunction: forgive, but never forget. Leontes must carry the memory of his mistakes with him, 
for failure to do so could result in another fall into error and, perhaps next time, Hermione’s 
death could be literal rather than social, as with the other two deaths in slander’s triple homicide. 
Whether Leontes deserves Hermione is certainly open to debate, but it is important to recognize 
that Paulina—Hermione’s greatest advocate—finds his atonement to be sufficient. In the 
intervening sixteen years, Paulina played the roles of Leontes’s judge and jury, roles that the 
king encouraged. Leontes repents immediately following the deaths of his loved ones, yet merely 
acknowledging these faults is insufficient recompense for the harm he caused. Perhaps that is 
why Paulina must gently scold Leontes to accept Hermione’s hand, stating, “Nay, present your 
hand. / When she was young, you wooed her. Now, in age, / Is she become the suitor?” (5.3.107-
09). While it is certainly possible to perform this scene with Hermione rejecting Leontes, I 
believe we must take Paulina and the text at its word. Leontes may need to be prompted because 
he simply cannot believe that the woman he has so horribly wronged could be capable of 
forgiveness. Perhaps he is overcome with emotion at being offered a second chance. Whatever 
the reason, Hermione’s open hand, presumably clasped by the penitent king moments later, is a 
symbol of acceptance and forgiveness. This powerful non-verbal communication brings us full 
circle. As with Paulina’s warning, the moment echoes Hermione’s gracious gesture to Polixenes, 
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reminding both Leontes and the audience how easily one can mistake a simple gesture and the 
awful consequences that can result when one closes oneself off from others’ counsel. 
As noted above, Hermione’s silence illustrates the costs of having been accused of 
slander. While I agree with Neely’s assessment of women’s vital role in allowing for the play’s 
resolution, I do not see the female characters as “freed and enfranchised’ (II.ii.60) from the rigid 
conceptions and imprisoning roles projected onto them by foolish men.”462 However, I neither 
agree with readings such as David Schalkwyk’s who argues for “the suppression of women” 
through the male character’s “reappropriation and repression” of the female character’s verbal 
power, or Peter Erickson’s appraisal that the revaluation of the women comes at the cost of “the 
imposition of restrictive definitions of gender.”463 I contend that there is a middle ground between 
these positions, that the imposition of chastity, silence, and obedience is not as complete as it 
appears. Hermione and Perdita’s verbal prowess incited male anxiety resulting in their subjection 
to verbal violence. In response, these women speak less frequently than in their prior 
appearances, an action that I read as defensive. If women’s speech was previously feared by 
insecure male characters, then female silence offers a measure of protection.464 These characters 
may be silent and chaste, yet the silence is a choice and not containment as the result of a re-
imposition of patriarchy. As with Isabella’s silence at the end of Measure for Measure (1603-
04), silence allows these women to maintain a level of control over the way they are interpreted 
by men, a degree of agency over their lives. Furthermore, the final scene itself provides a 
positive interpretation of silence when Hermione’s statue is first revealed, prompting Paulina’s 																																																								
462 Broken Nuptials, 209.  
463 David Schalkwyk, “‘A Lady’s ‘Verily’ Is as Potent as a Lord’s,’” 266, 264; Peter Erickson, “Patriarchal 
Structures in The Winter’s Tale,” 828. 
464 Enterline argues that Hermione does not speak to Leontes because of Leontes’s penchant for “mediating” others 
through the “screen of his own form.” Her silence is thus an avoidance of “conform[ing] utterly to his language and 
his desire” (“‘You Speak a Language that I Understand Not,’” 42). See also Van Elk’s “‘Our praises are our wages’” 
who argues for a “reformation of female courtliness” throughout the course of the play (431).  
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comment, “I like your silence; it the more shows off / Your wonder” (5.3.21-22). Here silence is 
a symptom of overwhelming emotion.465 
Hermione’s lack of verbal communication with Leontes can be read as a sign of lingering 
anger or resentment; however, I argue that she remains silent because her gesture and her silence, 
paradoxically, speak louder than words. I also suggest that Leontes does not offer a direct 
apology to Hermione because words are insufficient and, more importantly, because any attempt 
at an apology would rehearse the deadly slanders. To again speak these allegations, even if only 
to apologize, could reawaken their power. In a scene that is deeply retrospective, with gestures 
and speeches meant to recall and reverse Leontes’s fatal misinterpretation, the calumnies 
themselves can only be gestured to, but not spoken, through Leontes’s dual apology to Hermione 
and Polixenes (5.3.148-50). Paulina’s prompt,  “Nay, present your hand. /…/ Is she become the 
suitor?” (5.3.107-09), though often read as alluding to the marriage ceremony may additionally 
refer to Hermione’s trial. The words “present” and “suitor” may be read in a legal sense, 
gesturing to the fact that she indeed had a case against Leontes for slander and that he willingly 
performed public penance as if he had been found guilty. The possible reference to her trial only 
underscores the magnanimity of Hermione’s reaching for her former and future husband.  
Leontes ultimately learns that only slow time, the favored strategy of the ecclesiastical 
courts, can redeem him and begin to repair the wounds he caused. In the end, the individuals 
killed by slander cannot be replaced, yet the return of Perdita and Leontes’s suggestion that 
Paulina marry Camillo, allow the play to end with a hopeful glance toward the future.466 Perdita 																																																								
465 Even Leontes’s final speech, which begins with the comment, “O peace, Paulina!” is more a comic request for 
silence than an angry injunction to cease speaking. The fact that the following line, in which Leontes suggests that 
Paulina “shouldst a husband take” is a conditional—should—rather than a command, and that his speech concludes 
with the imperative “lead away,” a command directed at Paulina, demonstrate that Paulina remains a valued member 
of Leontes court (5.3.136-56). In short, Paulina retains Leontes’s respect; she is not silenced. 
466 As Camillo and Paulina fulfill complimentary roles, their suggested pairing at the end of the play feels 
appropriate. 
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and Camillo allow the protagonists to create new bonds, the same familial bonds that slander 
previously destroyed: Leontes and Hermione can once again become parents and Paulina can 
enjoy a new matrimony, should she choose it. Like the play’s ending, these new bonds are 
limited by the fact that neither couple can produce new offspring; time bears its own cost. 
The conclusion of The Winter’s Tale portrays that the way past slander is the self-
awareness to admit error and atone, coupled with the ability to forgive. The potential for 
forgiveness is practical, life most go on; social, Sicilia needs a ruler who is engaged with the 
outside world, not one cloistered by his guilt; and imperfect, no amount of pity or absolution can 
bring back the dead. While the play concurrently demonstrates slander’s murderous potential, it 
more importantly concludes by illustrating that individuals can move beyond slander and 
eventually heal. The larger communities of Sicilia and Bohemia are part of this process as the 
personal and political bonds between the kings are restored and repaired.  
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